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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF THE UNSTABLE BALANCE-OF-POWER IN
MACHIAVELLI, FREDERICK THE GREAT, AND CLAUSEWITZ
:
CITIZENSHIP AS ARMED VIRTUE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF WARFARE
May 1984
Bradley S. Klein
B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jean B. Elshtain
This dissertation examines the relationship between
citizenship and the growth of standing national armies in
early modern Europe. The works of Niccolo Machiavelli,
Frederick the Great, and Carl von Clausewitz are examined
in detail to account for the evolution of realist
political-military strategy in the balance-of-power state
system.
My thesis is that the state's recurring efforts to
mobilize citizenship—construed as armed virtue—and its
development of ever-more violent technologies and
strategies of war rendered the balance-of-power unstable.
The opening chapter surveys the legacy of realism in
the history of international relations theory. Chapter
viii
two surveys how the modern state system developed out of
the declining Christian Commonwealth of medieval Europe.
Each of the three following chapters locates a realist
theorist within the historical context in which he wrote
and was active as a political-military reformer:
Machiavelli and the crises of the Florentine Republic;
Frederick the Great's struggle to form a Prussian Army;
and Clausewitz's effort during the Reform Era to respond
on a revolutionary scale to the challenge of total
Napoleonic warfare.
By studying the political context in which secular
realism in early modern Europe developed a balance-of-
power state system, I show the genesis of political-
military strategies that even today prepare for war in
order to achieve international peace. My study of
mobilized citizenship, military strategy, and the state's
preparation for war shows that the balance-of-power is
inherently unstable. A state system that arose on the
basis of limited and pre-emptive wars can scarcely
serve as a worthy model for international relations in
the era of total war, indeed, of nuclear war.
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The people refused to listen to Samuel;
"No," they said, "we will have a king
over us; then we shall be like other
nations, with a king to govern us, to
lead us to war and fight our battles."
1 Samuel 8: 19-20
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF REALISM
Considerations of a balance-of
-power have long ex-
ercised a forceful hold upon the theory and practice of
Western international relations. Evidence of such a
framework of statecraft—or at least evidence of diplo-
matic thinking about balances and imbalances of state
power—can be traced back to Ancient Greece. 1 It con-
tinues to play a significant role today in the search
for stable nuclear deterrence.
The two and a half centuries between the end of the
Thirty Years War in 1648 and the beginning of World War
One saw the balance-of-power emerge as a formal system of
international relations. By the end of the War of the
Spanish Succession in 1714, the sovereign European
states were conducting their foreign policies in terms
of constant realignments and allied wars that assured no
one power could predominate. This decentralized Euro-
pean state system gave way in 1815, after the defeat of
Napoleonic France, to a more formal, more centralized
system of concert diplomacy in which power was managed
by convention. The high water mark of this concert
diplomacy was the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Otto
von Bismarck, Chancellor of the Second German Reich,
1
2convened a meeting of Europe's leaders to settle issues
of which powers would secure hold of the Balkans. A
complex web of mutual treaties enmeshed all the Conti-
nental powers so that no one state or coalition of
states would be able to gain European hegemony. A rela-
tive peace, a caesura in war between the major European
powers between 1878 and 1914, enabled these states to
pursue colonial ambitions and to build up their own
industrializing economies. In the summer of 1914, how-
ever, a combination of rabid nationalism and diplomatic
myopia impelled these powers to carry through in lock-
step fashion the alliances and promises of military
support they had fashioned in the name of the balance-of-
power. The war they undertook, however, bore no re-
semblance whatsoever to the ritualized warfare of limited
objectives which had characterized the classical balance.
The advent of total industrial warfare in the era of
mass nationalism induced the architects of interwar di-
plomacy to move away from traditionally anarchical inter-
national arrangements. Interwar plans, however, for an
international regime based on collective security
—
through a worldwide League of Nations—proved unable to
displace the discourse on power which had informed the
prewar state system.
3Not even the ravages of the Second World War have been
able to dislodge the realism of military power as the
key element in relations among states. An imminent
threat of nuclear annihilation hovers above the poli-
tical-economies of mutually interdependent states. The
enduring legacy Of- power politics has been inherited by
the nuclear powers. The search for stability in the
balance of nuclear deterrence has now gone on for 38
years. During no period of the nuclear era have the two
major powers been content to rely solely on the promise
of retaliation. Despite the character of nuclear wea-
pons, despite the promise of a nuclear revolution, the
balance of nuclear power very much recalls the classical
2 ... . .balance-of-power . The similarity, however, is not in
terms of the formal state system, but in terms of the
politics within the state itself.
This dissertation explores the nature of the state
that had underpinned the classical-balance-of-power and
that today underpins nuclear deterrence. My focus upon
realism in early modern Europe explores the path of citi
zenship as armed virtue and the path of warfare as it
evolved from a limited to a total activity. My point is
that the preparation for warfare played a central role
in European states after the Renaissance. Prussian mobi
4lization under Frederick the Great was but the clearest
example of a Continent-wide phenomenon. It was a phenom-
enon that both emerged out of and prompted further ef-
forts by all the European states to organize their poli-
tical-economies for warfare. The resulting instability
in the early era of the balance-of -power remains embedded
today in the state system and within the states them-
selves of our day.
The State of Realism
Thucydides analyzed the origins of the Peloponnesian
War in terms of Corinth allying with Sparta in order to
thwart the growing power of Athens. In the narrative of
war, and in the many dialogues which report to us either
what orators actually said or what Thucydides believes
3
was called for by each situation, we can discern the
origins of an intellectual tradition which sees the state
system as subject to no central authority, as the product
of each polity's interests competing against the inter-
ests of other polities, as a realm in which good will or
professions of intent are irrelevant if not misleading,
and as a realm in which war stands as an acceptable ar-
biter of political disputes. It is a world in which
citizens, rather than appalled by recourse to violence,
5are actually supposed to be ennobled by the state's wil-
lingness to resort to warfare when its leaders believe
it is threatened or that vital interests are at stake.
Because states acknowledge the propriety of warfare
as an instrument of politics, they have to be wary of
those countries professing peaceful intentions while
retaining a military capability. After the Persian War,
for instance, Sparta proposes that Athens not build her
own fortifications and that existing fortifications
throughout Hellas be dismantled. Sparta explains this
disarmament proposal in terms of denying Persia, should
it again invade Hellas, potential positions of strength.
But Sparta really fears Athenian power; it should become
neither too strong nor invulnerable to attack. Themisto-
cles, leader of Athens, travels to Sparta to negotiate
the proposal, but once there he delays talks until
Athens, unbeknownst to Sparta, has completed erecting the
city's fortifications. Themistocles will not negotiate
. .
4from a position of weakness.
The continued growth of the Athenian thalassocracy
alarmed the Laecedemonians of Sparta and their fellow
Dorians of Corinth. Their common fear of Athenian power
induced them to league together in support of a revolt
in Potidea against her tributary status in Athens' empira
6This allied intervention shattered over three decades
of Hellenic peace and initiated a quarter of a century of
war. It was a war that spread from the Aegean Sea to
Sicily. As Thucydides wrote, it was not simply the al-
liance of Corinth and Sparta over Potidea that breached
the peace, but rather their concern about Athenian he-
gemony. "What made war inevitable was the growth of
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." 5
Sparta and Corinth resorted to war in order to es-
tablish—or to re-establish--a peace based on a balance-
of-power. The goal of their alliance was not imperial
gain, but a weakening of the Athenian empire. In so
doing the alliance adhered to a basic element of what,
two millennia later, became the basis of European states-
manship .
We see evidence here of realist considerations and
of a state system based upon them. Realism is a theory
of international relations, a discourse on the management
of force in politics among states, that relies upon the
threat and use of military power to establish a modicum
of peace. It sees world politics in terms of a given im-
mutable structure to which states have to orient their
policies. It attributes to that system an objective,
unyielding character over which no unifying sovereign
reigns
.
7Such statesmanship entails a peculiar responsibility
for the fate of a polity: a responsibility construed in
the realist tradition as requiring political leaders to
accept the risks of war in the name of restraining other
states
.
In the centuries after Thucydides, the realist tradi-
tion repeatedly addressed the anguish, the moral anguish,
of a statesmanship whose means involve recourse to force.
St. Augustine agonized over the legitimacy of violence in
the "civitas terrena," the city of man. His work focused
upon the politics by which fallen man must order his
world. Only with power can the public peace be assured.
It is a peace based upon the just uses of force and not
upon justice itself.
As we will see with Machiavelli, this moral dilemma
of realist statesmanship was made all the more vexing be-
cause of the secular conditions in which politics had to
take place. Shorn of gods, unable to appeal to purer
forms of knowledge and the good, struggling with the vi-
cissitudes of "fortuna" in its always incomplete attempts
to secure a political space, the strategies of power ad-
vanced by realist statesmanship have been a central con-
cern of Western thought and practice.
That concern has become paramount in the era of nucle-
8ar weaponry. There have been developed levels of arma-
ments and technologies of destruction to the point where
the firepower available to statesmen exceeds in dramatic
disproportion the scale of political conflict that might
lead to their deployment. We now have the power, for the
first time in human history, to annihilate life on earth.
Yet the strategies devised for the management of that
power are rooted in the aged politics of realism.
A concern for insinuating a certain measure of re-
straint into realist conceptions of diplomacy has been
cogently handled by E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis
,
written on the very eve of the Second World War, discusses
the dilemma of modern statesmanship in terms of a dia-
logue between realism and idealism. Realism sees no
prospect in altering the world it confronts. It places
no faith in the reconstruction of human nature; it argues
rather that external relations among men or nations pro-
vide the only opportunity for action and for effecting
change. Idealism, by contrast, builds upon the mutabil-
ity of the world. It sees possibilities for change over
time in the very nature of man and in the ability of man
to influence his own actions by moral suasion. Idealism
attributes to public life an internally constructed quali-
ty, one that man may affect.
9The debate between realism and idealism can be
traced back to the Old Testament
, where the Jews are
confronted after their exodus from Egypt with the choice
of devoting themselves to that God which has chosen them
or to become like the other peoples of the world. Samuel
tries to convince them to choose God, but the "people
refused to listen to Samuel." 6
In Book I of The Republic
,
Thrasymachus cannot ac-
cede to the rules of Socratic dialogue and threatens to
disrupt the whole enterprise. The discursive serach for
an ideal truth obscures the underlying element of power
which on Thrasymachus 1 account is the "ultima ratio" of
justice. This debate between a politics of power and a
politics of epistemology can be traced through subsequent
political thought. It courses through the tension be-
tween the city of man and the city of God. The debate
opposes the absolutist Leviathan to the reign of perpe-
tual peace. It places the unsheathed sword of "raison
d'etat" against the natural law foundations of just-war
and the law of nations.
Carr undertook his study to restore an appreciation
for the element of power in international relations. In
British free-trade doctrine, in Woodrow Wilson's idealism
about erecting through the League of Nations a truly in-
ternational regime that would deter conflict among states,
10
and in Anglo-French adherence to the anti-bellicist
norms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the face of the
Third Reich's violations of the Treaties of Locarno,
Carr discerned a refusal by Western countries to con-
strue power seriously as the basis of world politics.
He argues for a realist critique of idealist diplomatic
styles, but he does not leave power politics unchastened.
So long as power wholly dominates
international relations, and policy
exists exclusively in preparation
for war, the subordination of every
other advantage to military neces-
sity intensifies the crisis, and
gives a forestate of the totali-
tarian character of war itself."7
A foreign policy based solely upon realism will exhaust
itself in limitless exertion; a foreign policy based
entirely upon idealism will obscure to both itself and
others the underlying interests that it mistakenly con-
strues in terms of a "harmony of interests" and the a-
bility of power structures to change.
Carr argues, in short, that diplomacy and the study
of international relations cannot jettison either of
these world views;
if an orderly procedure of peaceful
change is ever to be established in
international relations, some way
must be found of basing its operation
not on power alone, but on that un-
easy compromise between power and
morality which is the foundation of
all political life.
8
11
:es a
There can be little doubt, however, that Carr advanc,
highly qualified realism of means rather than a highly
qualified idealism of ends as the foundation for world
politics. He argues that a true science of international
relations was only possible when the fate of states was
torn from the hands of a professional military caste and
was incorporated into the full panoply of resources that
characterize modern political-economies. World politics
concerns itself with policy and political action in a
realm of sovereign units: a world of states with dis-
crete interests, intentions, and traditions, and with
institutions and resources mobilized behind them. The
challenge of diplomacy is to interpret political purpose
as a constitutive element that envelops itself in power
—
in military, economic, and moral strength—and that en-
gages and often conflicts with the interests of other
sovereign polities.
In reaction to the optimism and political generosity
with which the Western powers—until September 1939—had
looked upon the totalitarian-fascist states, there de-
veloped in the aftermath of The Twenty Years' Crisis a
systematic, theoretically self-conscious real ism that pro-
vided the basis of postwar foreign policy. Reconstruc-
tive realists like George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau
sought to broaden the basis of the practical realism that
12
they thought America should adhere to in its role as
postwar architect of the West.
They pointed to the need for the classical realist
paradigm to appreciate the limits of relying upon mili-
tary power and national economic interests as the guide-
post for diplomacy. in their early reassessments of
U.S. foreign policy in the era of containment, they
criticized the misguided crusading spirit which shaped
cold war statesmanship. 9 They argued from within a
realist perspective that America's exceptionalism--its
historical uniqueness, its geographical insularity, its
confidence and industrial prowess--worked against its
development of a cultivated, measured statesmanship. it
is no wonder that as early critics of the Vietnam War, as
advocates of arms control—including unilateral measures--
and as critics of Kissingerian linkage, both Kennan and
Morgenthau voiced respect and support for the negotiating
style by which technology and power were subordinated to
the guiding hand of diplomacy. Their internal critiques
of American diplomacy exemplify a concern for what might
be called the virtual autonomy of political leadership.
From this perspective, statesmen stand in an indefinite
relationship to their own nation-state on the one hand,
and to the international community on the other. The
mark of successful statesmanship is to address these two
13
realms without ever abandoning responsibility for the
integrity of the one by dogmatically asserting the pri-
macy of the other.
The world cannot be remade to conform to a state's
particular image. A curious form of idealist realism
emerges from the single-minded concern for a state's
interests and security. It becomes a realism that con-
strues interests as global, that legitimates a worldwide
network of military bases for allied security, that per-
ceives straits of water as potential choking points,
that sees Soviet surrogates everywhere disturbing nations
whose social structures and governments would otherwise
be bastions of freedom, and that is apparently mandated
by the delicate balance of nuclear terror to presume
worst-case scenarios in justifying continuation of an
arms race. To cover its flanks before entering the nego-
tiations "process," a country holds out bargaining chips
in terms of new weapons systems in order to prompt seri-
ous discussions. Such strategies ensure, however, not
mutual restraint and agreement, but rather a dialectic
of escalating reserve force in which both sides end up
less secure than before the arms control talks were un-
dertaken. And each party to this Armageddon waltz points
an accusing finger--and not without some justification
—
14
to the other as the source of all the trouble.
When I began this dissertation, I thought that the
conventional wisdom of reconstructed realism could show a
way out of this cycle. But in the course of my research
I discovered that the realist tradition offers an inade-
quate basis for this task of salvaging statesmanship.
The fault resides deep within the whole tradition. The
problem lies in the realist theory of the state, and in
the citizenship that populates it. And, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, this problematic complex finds full
expression in the idea of a balance-of
-power
.
As Kenneth Waltz has pointed out, the "balance of
power is the hoariest concept in the field of interna-
tional relations." 10 For instance, Morgenthau's formal
theory of international relations revolves around the
claim that politics, both domestic and foreign, is gov-
erned by the pursuit of "interest defined in terms of
power," 11 and that this has always been so: an iron law
of politics, so to speak, that does not so much commend
itself to statesmen as actually embody itself in all their
works. It does so in an objective manner which the poli-
tical analyst must recognize if he desires to apprehend
the logic of politics and of the international balance-of-
power
.
15
Morgenthau's view of international relations, how-
ever, emphasized the political autonomy with which
statesmen wield their political power. They pursue, he
argues, "interests defined in terms of power." 12 The
autonomy of the political sphere is one of the basic
elements of Morgenthau's realism. It means the ability
of political actors to marshal a country's sources of
national power: its geographic strengths, its natural
resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness,
population, national character, national morale, and its
quality of diplomacy. Collectively, these comprise the
sources of national power which a statesman deploys in
the balance-of-power
.
Inis L. Claude has pointed out that Morgenthau habi-
tually shifts from the view of the balance-of-power as in-
13
evitable to an appeal that diplomacy voluntarily heed it.
Morgenthau cannot really decide whether the balance re-
fers to a diplomatic system specific to Europe in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; to a more general
phenomenon characterizing the whole history of interna-
tional relations; to an analytic category referring to any
distribution of power; or to a specific condition of in-
ternational equilibrium. Indeed, Morgenthau's ambiguity
about the balance-of-power reflects the broad variety of
16
views throughout the whole discipline of international
relations. There exists no agreement on whether the
balance-of-power is a specific system or a general con-
dition of world politics; whether it is inherently or
only fortuitously unstable; whether it refers to a con-
dition of equilibrium or a condition of predominance; whe-
ther it persists in the era of nuclear superpowers; or
whether a foreign policy that ignores it is possible
—
14
or advisable.
These are not questions merely for the diplomatic
historian. They are crucial issues in analyzing the con-
temporary search for balance and stability between (and
among) nuclear arsenals.
In the wake of the failure during the interwar
years to construct an international regime of collective
security, there developed after the Second World War a
dual system of mutual security. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact became the means
by which a fragile peace was maintained across Central
Europe. The military alliances of the West and the East
relied heavily upon the nuclear bomb to oversee their
security. But security in the nuclear age is a precari-
ous, if not chimerical, matter. In the face of huge
arsenals deliverable within half an hour, neither the
17
.s a
European Continent nor the two superpowers could ever
claim to be assured of their safety. 15 Indeed, it li
strange reversal of the realist order of things that the
deterrence upon which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relied
claimed it a sort of security to remain vulnerable to an
attack with nuclear weapons. Only by remaining vulner-
able does a country forgo any possibility of enduring or
surviving a protracted nuclear war. A country thus de-
clares itself unwilling (because unable) to benefit from
a first-strike, and it reduces the mutual tension that
which would inevitably arise from preparing to do battle
with nuclear armaments. In contrast with conventional
military strategy, then, nuclear deterrence calls for
"no-defense"—neither an active defense of anti-ballistic
missiles nor a passive defense of civil defense shel-
1
6
ters. A nuclear revolution, a transvaluat ion of the
traditional continuity between foreign policy and the use
of warfare, has seen to it that each side on the nuclear
scale of balance would pursue security by remaining vul-
nerable—and would only promise to retailiate against a
first-strike
.
The advent of atomic and thermonuclear weaponry
ushered in an era of armaments which dwarfed all those
ever deployed in military history. But the nuclear revo-
lution is not merely a technical phenomenon, to be meas-
ured in terms of new radii of destruction, the distance
of delivery, and the speed with which these weapons
travel. The nuclear revolution is also a revolution in
political-military strategy: in the way statesmen and
military leaders use their new-found capability.
Classical realism, and most dramatically, the real-
ism embodied in the Continental balance-of
-power , had
seen limited warfare comprise an essential component of
foreign policy. This balance-of
-power was built upon the
imminent recourse to warfare as a means of intervening in
the affairs of ambitious or emboldened states and as a
means of preventing them from becoming too powerful. In
effect, many wars of the balance-of
-power were pre-emp-
tive, much like the allied intervention of Corinth and
Sparta in the Potidean revolt sparked the Peloponnesian
War. In 1756, for instance, Prussia seized Saxony in the
face of a new alliance between Austria and France that
Frederick the Great feared would threaten his hold over
Silesia. Even offensive wars, such as Prussia's seizure
of Silesia in 1740, or earlier, recurrent attempts by
Sweden to capture lands along the south coast of the
Baltic Sea, were undertaken for specific objectives
—
though without annihilating opposing armies, and without
warring upon homelands and civilians. Wars, to recast
Clausewitz's famous dictum, were the continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other,
though limited, means.
Gradually, the firepower of states grew, as did the
size of their armies. War increasingly became a matter
of national mobilization and professional effort and
approached the total integration of a country's resour-
ces. The mercenary armies of Machiavelli 1 s Italy became
the standing citizen forces of Frederick the Great's
Prussia. During this entire period of development, the
armies of Europe retained their classical role: to win
wars by compelling the enemy's retreat or surrender,
cutting off its supply lines, and preventing it from
besieging fortresses or walled-in cities. The armies of
the Continental balance-of -power
,
particularly before
Napoleon and after Metternich , were instruments of poli-
tical policy, but that policy had limited aims. Armies
sought neither complete destruction of the enemy nor to
engage an adversary's whole land and people in battle.
Popular and courtly outrage over the destruction wrought
upon Germany by the various Protestant and Catholic,
French, Swedish, and Imperial armies during the Thirty
Years War led the statesmen of Europe, after the Peace oJ
Westphalia in 1648, to restrict the movements of armies.
Mercantile considerations combined with technological
shortcomings and widely shared Christian sentiments to
20
shape and limit the aims of warfare. 17
In Clausewitz's day these constraints loosened them-
selves. Standing armies were transformed into nations
at arms, and this in turn led to the industrialization of
combat and the total mobilization of the nation-state.
In this new era of total national warfare—a warfare
Clausewitz scrutinized in On War
-wartime aims became an-
nihilation and the unconditional surrender of the enemy.
War approached the very limits of rational policy.
The nuclear revolution burst those limits asunder.
It completely transformed the nature of political
military strategy. The nuclear superpowers each have at
their disposal arsenals and delivery systems sufficient
to destroy whole countries in once concerted blow. The
weaponry now available to the armed forces renders mean-
ingless the traditional categories of victory and de-
feat, of achieving specific war aims: categories by which
armies had appraised their performance for millennia.
The use of nuclear weapons in the course of battle
has thus been made literally incredible. No one could
now seriously consider using these weapons against an
adversary armed with sufficient numbers of "survivable"
weapons which it could use in retaliation against an
aggressor. From the perspective of such a nuclear revo-
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lution, nuclear war-fighting is but a euphemism for in-
ternational suicide. The adjective "nuclear" contra-
dicts the noun "war-fighting."
Nuclear weapons, their immediate effects of blast,
heat, radiation, and fallout, and their longer term ef-
fects upon genetic structure, the food chain, the atmo-
sphere, and the climate, have elevated modern "warfare"
into a totally new realm: a realm which exists apart from
that conventional continuum of weapons and warfare rang-
ing from the battle axe to the strategic bomber.
The revolutionary character of this new weapon in-
duced on the part of political-military planners a to-
tally new strategy. The weapon gave rise to the strategy
of mutual deterrence. As the most astute student of the
nuclear revolution observed as early as 1946, "thus far
the chief purpose of our military establishment has been
to win wars. From no on its chief purpose must be to
avert them. 11 ^
An enormous literature has developed around the is-
sue of mutual nuclear deterrence. There is no need to
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review those works here. It suffices to say that this
dissertation constitutes an effort on my part to question
the common belief today in a nuclear revolution. Instead
of writing about nuclear strategies, however, I have de-
cided to write about the tradition which deterrence is
no
alleged to have repudiated.
That repudiation takes place on four grounds:
first-use of nuclear weapons; no defense against them;
only a limited number of them are necessary-enough to
pose a retaliatory threat to a potential aggressor; and
these weapons should not become an instrument of foreign
policy, but instead should be deployed only to pose a
retaliatory threat against the first-use of nuclear
weapons
.
To one degree or another, however, recent strategies
of nuclear deterrence have failed to uphold these norms.
Both the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. are prepared to use
"battlefield" tactical weapons on a first-use basis in
the face of conventional aggression. The Soviet Union
has taken the lead in relying upon civil defense shel-
ters, and—despite treaties to the contrary—the United
States has re-opened the case for defensive missile sys-
tems. Both powers have continued to arm themselves with
weapons far beyond the number needed to ensure a crip-
pling retaliatory second-strike. And the U.S. has taken
the lead in incorporating the nuclear bomb into a conven-
tional strategy of worldwide containment, while the So-
viet Union has replied with a far more modest use of
nuclear arms in its foreign policy within the Eastern
bloc and with both N.A.T.O. lands and China. It now ap-
23
pears that the temptations of a nuclear "war-fighting"
strategy are stronger than the arguments on behalf of a
strategic revolution.
This should come as no surprise to students of real-
ism. The realist state which forms the object of this
study and which informed the classical balance-of
-power
was built upon several propositions. First, interna-
tional peace can only be achieved when countries prepare
for war and show their resolve to defend against poten-
tial aggressors. "Si vis pacem, para bellum;" if you want
peace, prepare for war. Second, the state has to prepare
itself constantly for the possibility of going to war; it
has to train a standing force, organize the acquisition
of materiel, and mobilize its economy—on a permanent
basis. And third, its citizens must discipline them-
selves for the hardships of military service and they
must be willing to fight on its behalf.
There is much of political life that is overlooked
by this realist theory of the state, but there is little
of that theory that eludes these three elements. They
comprise the essence of the realist state. They comprise
that state which Max Weber, in the weeks after the First
World War, defined as a "human community that successfully
claims for itself a monopoly of the legitimate use of
20physical force within a particular territory."
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The classical balance-of
-power relied upon that un-
questioned legitimacy and enabled statesmen to call upon
their armies without having to offer special justifica-
tions to citizens. A professional officer corps and dis-
ciplined troops were literally instruments of state poli-
cy. Deterrence theory today has inherited a legacy left
behind by that classical realism. The legitimacy of
deterrence, the credibility of retaliation, would be en-
tirely undermined were citizens to make clear they will
not allow themselves to be held hostage under a nuclear
umbrella. Peace movements today pose a challenge to
statesmen who hope to wield without restraint the threat
21of retaliation. War-fighting doctrines abandon even
this restraint and demand of citizens that they be pre-
pared to endure a protracted nuclear war, as if these
weapons were nothing but intercontinental artillery.
The State of "Peacelessness
"
This dissertation explores three moments in the de-
velopment of realism: those represented by Machiavelli,
Frederick the Great, and Clausewitz. The second chapter,
a general survey of statesmanship in Medieval Europe, sets
the stage for the emergence in late fifteenth century
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Italy of a state system that structured itself in t,
of competing republics, principalities, and city-states.
The third chapter explores one stage in the emergence of
modern realism: Machiavelli
' s development of a secular
theory of armed civic virtue and citizen-armies. The
fourth chapter examines the efforts of Frederick the
Great in mobilizing within absolutist Prussia the mili-
tary strength and economic base required for the wars of
the classical balance-of
-power
. The fifth chapter does
not so much explore the balance-of
-power as explore the
nature of that total warfare which all the European
states— in the wake of the French revolutionary wars—
had to be prepared for. In this chapter, I explore in
some detail the contribution of Clausewitz to a politics
of warfare: a theory of the relationship between the
state and the conduct of warfare that had been implicit
but unarticulated in the era of the classic power bal-
ance .
I have chosen these three thinkers because they lo-
cated themselves in a tradition emphasizing military
power as a basic, indeed, the basic, element of the
state. They shared a view of the propriety of warfare
as an instrument of policy. They were also all active in
military reform, and a good part of this dissertation con-
cerns transformations in the scope of warfare and in the
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armies that eonducted it.
Why this emphasis upon the nature of warfare?
Debates about realism too often construe debate
about power and the state in terms of the role played by
moral considerations in foreign policy deliberation.
Friedrich Meinecke's Die Idee der Staatsrason
, for in-
stance, explores how the whole tradition of "Realpolitik"
from Machiavelli to Treitschke absorbed within its cal-
culus of state imperatives what arose as questions of
conscience and morality. 22 in critically examining how
"Staatsrason" endowed the state with its own logic and
ethical character, Meinecke casts the issue in terms of
the philosophy of politics and the philosophy of histori-
cism. His study is scholastically masterful, yet it
lacks embodiment. A tradition so imbedded in the realms
of force and warfare calls for a style of analysis that
provides visual representation of what life looks like in
its terms. It ought to portray what the armies of early
modern Europe looked like to those who comprised its
ranks in the name of "Staatsrason" or armed civic virtua
So I have tried in this work to keep one eye cast
upon citizens and their role in warfare. And I have
tried to reconstruct from within what these three think-
ers were doing, or thought they were doing, in their ef-
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forts and arguments on behalf of reliable armies for
their countries.
The point of the title, "The Politics of the Un-
stable Balance-of
-Power," is threefold. First, I want
to show that from the vantage point I have adopted, one
sees recurrent efforts by statesmen and military stra-
tegists to expand the scope and intensity of warfare.
Analysts of the balance-of
-power have only looked at
political decisions for the source of instability: Na-
poleon's, for instance, to create a Continental Imperiunv
or Hitler's, to militarize and expand the Third Reich.
From the perspective of warfare as a continually evolving
phenomenon, however, one appreciates how a balance-of-
power based upon a calculus of force levels tends inex-
orably towards imbalance at ever higher levels.
Second, a functionalist school of equilibrium had
for years viewed international relations in terms of ar-
rangements tending toward stability. Indeed, the search
for stability and consensus characterized the whole post-
war behavioral enterprise of social science. Formal
theorists of international relations like Morton Kaplan
24
were indiscreet—and unreflective—about this bias.
Even a more classically rooted theorist of world politics
like Henry Kissinger sought to define the balance-of-
power as inherently stable, supported by those playing
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the rules of the game and only upset by revolutionary
25
states. in the terminology of Kenneth Waltz, I have
chosen a "second image" approach to the sources of in-
stability: the state itself as the source of interna-
tional insecurity and war. But my approach differs fun-
damentally from Waltz's. His analysis of "second image"
models, of the nature of the states which comprise the
international system, focuses narrowly upon the various
forms of government—democratic, socialist, autocratic,
or totalitarian
—to see whether one of them tends in-
herently to destabilize world politics. 26 By contrast to
Waltz's "forms of government" approach, I have focused
upon the politics within states: a politics of efforts to
enhance military power which was common to all states in
the early modern era.
Third, I show that the constraints imposed upon
citizenship and legitimate discourse in the public sphere
strengthened the ability of states and statesmen to de-
cide when and where their armies were to be deployed.
The relative autonomy which political leadership enjoyed
created the appearance of diplomacy among polite and
sensible men. Yet this realm of appearance was built up
upon a deeper structure of political mobilization. The
courtly rituals of concert diplomacy could not fully ob-
scure the deeper structure of international relations in
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which statesmen assiduously measured one another's power
in terms of population, territory, resources, and Indus-
trial strength.
The point of this exercise in political reconstruc-
tion is to trace the emergence of a discourse on power-
on power as military force. it explores the origins of
the unstable balance-of
-power and it locates that insta-
bility in the realist state. it locates the perpetual
insecurity of the modern state in the political vision of
realism. The result has been what a young German peace
researcher, Dieter Senghaas, has called a condition of
"organized peacelessness : " the systematic negation of
peace through the perpetual mobilization of a society
and through the imminent threat of annihilation. Senghaas
uses this concept to analyze politics in the nuclear
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age. It is time now to locate the sources of "orga-
nized peacelessness" in the tradition whose legacy we bear.
Permanent mobilization on a pre-wartime footing. The
recurrent admonishment of citizens that they are obliged to
render service to their state. The incantation of "si vis
pacem, para bellum," that the only way to achieve peace
is by preparing for war. These elements of peacelessness
in the age of nuclear deterrence have their source in the
realist state of the early modern balance-of -power
.
CHAPTER II
ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF STATESMANSHIP
Rome and the Early Church
The entirely secular discourse of realism which
Machiavelli founded during the Italian Renaissance
repudiated prevailing doctrines of Christian univer-
salism under Papal authority. It forged in their
stead a theory of political action which in part re-
turned to Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptions of
citizenship and virtue. But Machiavellian realism ap-
propriated only parts of Roman legal thought, for it
acknowledged the value of positive, innovative law while
rejecting the Stoic psychology and natural law con-
structs that had guided "ius naturale," the Roman philo-
sophical ideal of natural, rational law. In this brief
survey I want to trace the Roman and post-Roman European
context from which Machiavelli 1 s thought emerged.
My point in this exposition is threefold. First, I
want to explain what has been commonly referred to as the
innovative— indeed, revolutionary—character of Machi-
avelli' s secular theories of diplomatic conduct and of
citizenship as armed civic virtue."1" In this respect
there is little that is new or revisionist in this chap-
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ter on the emergence of modern statesmanship, for I
concur with the conventional wisdom. My second point,
however, is to provide a framework for understanding all
those efforts, of which Machiavelli s was the first, to
articulate in the aftermath of the declining ideal of the
Christian Commonwealth a secular basis for relations a-
mongst the emergent states of early modern Europe. The
full development of balance-of
-power theories had to
await the early eighteenth century. But the problem—
of working out a state system—was posed by the very de-
cline of those Medieval institutions that had found full
expression in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Third,
the state system and the rules of diplomacy that finally
did emerge in terms of a balance-of-power did not do
away entirely with certain elements of the Medieval world
that had, in the era of Church supremacy, underpinned the
international system. Jus-t-war theory, for instance, and
the concept of a universal or international world, did
not entirely disappear in Europe after Machiavelli. In-
deed, though I focus in this dissertation upon the sour-
ces of instability in the balance-of-power , what stabil-
ity and continuity that secular system did enjoy owed
itself more to the cultural heritage of Medieval univer-
salism than contemporary theorists have acknowledged.
Machiavelli ' s radical repudiation of those traditions
itself spawned a reaction on the part of Enlightenment
theorists and Christian diplomats. It is upon this
residue of natural law theory and just-war doctrine that
contemporary alternatives to realism have had to rely in
arguing for a reconstructed foundation for international
relations
.
Both Platonic and Aristotelian political thought
were based upon the goodness of public life in the lim-
ited city-states of ancient Greece. Plato's ideal city,
for instance, was to have a population of only 5,040;
Aristotle makes clear that citizenship for the "zoon
politikon"—man, the political animal—entailed face-to-
face public association among friends and members of a
propertied leisure class, and that the overwhelming
majority of inhabitants, whether women, slaves, day la-
borers, soldiers, or children, are ineligible for citi-
zenship and condemned to political silence. Speech in
the "agora," the public space of markets and parks, pro-
vided the Context upon which true citizenship flourished.
It is ironic, but as we shall see, not unique, that
the very terrain of such citizenship was eroding at a
time when theories celebrating it reached their intel-
lectual zenith. Indeed, for Aristotle the irony was per-
sonal, for this private tutor of Alexander the Great saw
the Hellenic world come under attack from the Macedonian
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armies trained by his former pupil. After their tempo-
rary subjection to Macedonia, the Greek city-states were
conquered more lastingly by the legions of the Roman
Republic. The political units analyzed by the classic
Hellenic philosophers were relatively intimate city-
states whose citizens congregated in one place, in which
leaders spoke directly to the populace, and which could
find security behind walls of clay and stone. Later
writers like Zeno, Polybius, Cicero, Epictetus, and Mar-
cus Aurelius examined very new and vast political insti-
tutions: institutions and legal theories designed to
administer territories on a continent-wide scale.
Whereas Plato had devised the good state in terms
of an absolute, ideal form of justice, Aristotle had
construed the city-state as a natural political commu-
nity logically and philosophically consistent with the
life found in whole nations or the entire universe.
Roman thought refined this view of the political commu-
nity as something natural, but it revolutionized poli-
tical thinking by arguing on behalf of a universe-wide
polity in which prevailed the rule of public law. Be-
cause of the extent of the Roman Republic—embracing the
Mediterranean, and stretching from Britain and Spain to
Armenia and Egypt--and because of the institutions re-
quired to oversee the agriculture, trade, and defense of
these regions, there developed a whole range of consti-
tutional, written, and legislative processes to govern
the republic's widespread affairs. in addition to admin-
istrative, legal, and political innovations, the state
undertook massive road and waterway projects to facili-
tate commerce within its domain. These improvements
were complemented by a growing cosmopolitanism spawned by
increased contacts between the Romans and travelers,
poets, tribal leaders, and slaves.
Cicero, in the first century B.C., defined the new
structure of civic virtue that flourished on this en-
larged political terrain. "Law is the bond which unites
the civic association," he wrote. 2 A "iuris societas,"
a community of law exercised by popular consent, was
based upon the rule of just law. This law, derived from
right reason and nature, was carried by the love of fel-
low men and established the foundations of a just polity.
The classic question which had so occupied Aristotle and
Polybius--which of the three forms of government (king-
ship, aristocracy, or polity [democracy]) was best and
which worst—found a resolution in Cicero's thought that
transformed traditional arguments for a mixed constitu-
tion of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular participation.
The institutional character of any polity had to be un-
derpinned by elements that humbled worldly aspiration
before the more enduring laws of nature. "True law is
right reason in agreement with nature." 3 The natural,
eternal laws of God, reflected in the love which informs
life among all inhabitants of a community, provided for
Cicero the deeper structures of justice upon which a
state's institutions called.
Cicero's tentative formulations about the place of
law in the Roman "res publica" played an important role
in defining the nature of contemporary government. It
placed responsibility for articulating the laws of a
political community in the hands of its various insti-
tutions and in the hands of its virtuous statesmen. The
ability of Rome throughout its republican and imperial
incarnations to govern itself and its far-flung domains
through legislators, governors, councils, senators, and,
ultimately, Caesars, was largely attributable to its
having broken with Hellenic, traditions of relying upon
various gods, wise kings, orators, or ephemeral decisions
of spontaneously assembled councils. Though Roman consti-
tutionalism virtually disappeared under the Empire, the
legacy of procedural rule is to be found in the political
thought to which it gave rise: Roman Law.
Roman constitutionalism also provided a solid ground-
ing for what came to be international law. The Roman
legal system of the law of nations, "ius gentium," was
the entire structure of positive, written laws that
governed its relations with its subject peoples and
lands
.
This conception of citizenship which lay at the
heart of the Roman state was intimately tied to the
philosophical ideal of natural law, "ius naturale." A
much more abstract construct than the specific laws and
practices of "ius gentium," the Roman view of "ius
naturale" played a major role in all of Roman legal and
political thought.
Though elements of this natural law are to be found
in Cicero, the Stoics— Zeno, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius
most prominently among them—developed this concept into
a unique theory of citizenship. The Stoic theory of
citizenship was the first systematic attempt to express
a theory of individualism within a larger theory of the
state. It located political life within an explicitly
natural context, and it sought to reconcile individual
psychology to the enduring structure of the natural
order
.
Zeno 1 s Republic
,
written around the beginning of the
fourth century B.C., was perhaps the most radical state-
ment of Stoic political thought. It offered a view of
the universe as one, united under an embracing state.
Citizenship was founded not on the accidental particu-
larities of nationhood, language, or birth. Citizen-
ship, rather, was of one piece, and neither class hier-
archies nor discrete political interests were to in-
trude upon this universalism.
The Stoic conception of a natural equality among all
men, an equality not limited to Roman citizens, helped
shape the ensuing development of Christian social thought
The Roman concept of love as a constitutive element of
virtuous public association was transformed by the early
Church fathers during the Roman Empire into a sophisti-
cated body of theology and political thought. Epictetus'
conservative view of nature, of interpreting as natural
and then accepting worldly affairs as matters of ra-
tional purpose to which one had to reconcile oneself,
became the basis for a psychology of worldly detachment:
of turning one's attentiton to the inner soul, of disre-
garding the material and carnal temptations of external
events. The distinction he articulated in the late first
century A.D. between inner reality and outer, insignif-
icant appearances, embodied Christ's doctrine of re-
sisting worldly temptation and of pursuing, instead, a
life of grace, humility, and unrequited love so as to
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prove deserving of redemption.
The conversion of the Emperor Constantino in A.D.
332 transformed the heretofore treasonous Christian
preachings into state religion. The problems with which
the Church Fathers and political theorists dealt sepa-
rately became fused, though in an era of profound tur-
moil. The crumbling economic and political institutions
of the Empire rendered it increasingly vulnerable to
forces both on its periphery and at its core. Military
weakness was compounded by internal decay. Cons tan-
tine
' s establishment of a new imperial capital at Byzan-
tium exacerbated the spiritual and material decline of
Rome. And with the collapse of the Western Empire in
476 A.D., there arose the fundamental issue of the basis
upon which a truly virtuous man could build his life.
The collapse of the Roman Empire brought to the fore a
search for new institutions in which natural law could
be located. As St. Augustine was to show, such a search
led to the Church.
Augustine of Hippo, A.D. 354-430, saw justice in
terms of the right relation between man and God, not
merely in terms of reason and natural law prevailing in
the "res publica." Like Plato, he saw the state as a
means to a higher end, not as an end in itself. For
Augustine, true virtue transcended that of the civic
realm; it inhered in the Christian community. By counter
posing Christian life in +-h~x r the communio sanctorum," the
community of the sainflv 4-« i
•
*y ^n t y, to life among the impious in
the "societas impiorum,
-
he was able to show how citi-
zenship in a polity, regardless of its government,
lacked true and abiding adherence to the principles of
Christian virtue.
In God's realm, the "civitas Dei," there could be no
uncertainty for the true Christian. The unmediated reign
of righteous love and piety was a matter known to and
fully embodied only by those blessed with grace. But for
the rest of mankind, a segment of the population, St.
Augustine grimly reminds us, comprising an overwhelming
majority of the population, the task of devising rules
to govern life was a matter fraught with uncertainty,
anxiety, and, indeed, much terror. For those left be-
hind, so to speak, to suffer embodiment in the "civitas
terrena," issues of worldly peace and justice proved
overwhelming in their magnitude.
St. Augustine's profound pessimism regarding the
fate of fallen man emerges from his severe Christian view
of human nature. From this emerges his understanding of
worldly suffering as something deserved. St. Augustine
thus developed from Stoic philosophy a theoiogy of natu-
ral contrition. The mu„dane tlme constituting the real,
of man is filled with a suffering and pain that can never
be done away with. Only by means of force and coercion
can the civil peace be assured; it is a peace enforced
upon citizens, not one built upon abstract justice. We
must look to true Christian law for an explanation of
Jesus' word as the anticipation of true love and eternal
justice. But this hardly serves to eliminate the terror
that overwhelms us every day.
Such knowledge, however, makes sense of human suf-
fering and mitigates it without removing it. This human
suffering is a result of God's will to punish man for his
carnal nature—a nature of fallen grace and sin inherent
in man after the Fall. it is a will that ultimately lies
beyond man's power to control and in which he ought in-
stead to acquiesce. The coexistence with a worldy realm
of a sphere wherein God's love is pure and merited must
comfort those confined to dwell on earth. Yet the issue
is doubly compounded. First of all, grace is unmerited
by self-consciously choosing a Christian life—though in
the absence of such a choice, grace is impossible. Se-
condly, true Christians must await the Last Judgement
before realizing the City of God. What to do without
grace—a grace conferred by God's volition and not neces-
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sarily according to pious action-is thus made all the
more problematic by the knowledge that one must await
Christ's resurrection before the righteous enter the
Holy Kingdom. Meanwhile, chaos reigns in Babylon.
No true justice, St. Augustine tells us, can ever
be found in the City of Man.
S^^f6"1 ' thS Cit^ of the ungodly,which did not obey the command of Godthat it should offer no sacrifice saveto Him alone, and which, therefore,
could not give to the soul its proper
command over the body, nor to the rea-
son its just authority over the vicesis void of true justice.
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In contrast to the admiring love and optimism which
guided St. Augustine's view of the "civitas Dei," de-
spair and grim determination shaped his view of matters
secular. For spiritual questions there was the New
Testament to turn to: by no means indisputable, but at
least the central source of Christ's teachings by which
one can guide one's will. But for political questions
there existed no such guiding source-book. On earth man
was left to his own devices.
The human condition was thus painfully limited. it
was trapped godlessly within its own terms: a realm in
which prevails "cupiditas," the love of and drive for
earthly things and human glory.
There remains, however, a tension in St. Augustine's
bGtWeen ChriSti
- Cachings and worldly politics
between the "civitas Dei" and the oivitas terrena."
Though Augustinian thought does not prescribe a sig-
nificant position for the Church in the conduct of
secular affairs, there remains in his world of states
and citizens certain principles of Christian teachings,
without which the "civitas terrena" would quickly de-
generate into a world resembling Kakos ' cave.
St. Augustine criticizes the Roman Empire for its
use of slavery as the basis of its wealth. slavery can
only be justified in terms of sparing the lives of war
prisoners and enemies and by enslaving them instead.
But Roman slavery, though originating in such an act of
mercy, had long ago left behind its origins, and had
become instead an institution that violated the under-
lying natural equality of all Christian men. Indeed,
the very fault of the later Roman Empire was not, as
contemporary critics had supposed, that she had em-
braced Christianity, but that her rule had been es-
sentially un-Christian. St. Augustine wrote his City
of God to repudiate the view that Christianity had im-
pelled the collapse of the Empire. On the contrary,
argues Augustine, only the charity of Christ's vision
can stabilize and impose a sembianee of justness upon the
terrestrial city of man.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Augustine's
contribution to what became, in the late medieval period,
the doctrine of just-war. 5 Here St. Augustine outlines
an account of the justness of undertaking war, "jus ad
bellum," and sketches, too, an outline of limits upon the
conduct of warfare, "jus in bello," that was to exercise
a profound influence upon relations among states. From
the Christian viewpoint, a war could be sanctioned if it
was declared by a soverign authority, if it redressed or
punished a wrong act already committed, and if it main-
tained its righteous intent by relying upon reasonable
means in the course of warfare with the aim of restoring
the peace.
The full articulation of just-war doctrine, of the
truce of God and the mediation by the Church of private
wars among competing bodies, was to await the emergence
of a unified Christian politics, of a unified Christian
Commonwealth. Only after the Investiture Controversy,
with the thirteenth century advent of Thomism, was the
Augustinian tension between the true Christian realm and
the fallen city to be replaced by an ordered natural
theory of the universe in which a politics informed by
Christian teachings took its full place. But before
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St. Thomas Aquinas could achieve this masterful fusion,
and before the fifth century doctrine of Pope Gelasius I
regarding the "two swords ,» the one imperial, the other
canonical, could be replaced by Pope Boniface's procla-
mation in 1302 of a "Unam Sanctum," of one sword wielded
by the Church, there intervened centuries of profound
change in Europe. The political landscape marked first
by Roman, then by Christian theories underwent dramatic
transformations during the Middle Ages. Feudal custom
and Germanic law interrupted the growth of Church power.
And when, in the thirteenth century, the Church emerged
triumphant, it reigned spiritually supreme over a Euro-
pean continent. And yet, as we shall briefly see, this
Christian Commonwealth was itself about to give way to
the modern, secular world—a state system in which the
teachings of Christ were to give way to the teachings of
the secular prince.
Medieval Europe
The precise origins of the fifth and sixth century
barbarian invasions of imperial lands are far less sig-
nificant to us than their consequences. The over-ex-
tended, financially weak Empire could no longer maintain
the numerous military legions which had enforced the
"pax Romana." Despite the economic and agricultural
reforms of Diocletian, prosperity and trade waned.
Domestic revolts by Jews, Christians, and local nations
-especially in Lombardy, the Levant, Macedonia, and
Illyricum-continued to weaken imperial administration
and to exhaust its treasury. Soldiers, once paid in
silver coinage, became unwilling to accept the debased
coins struck by the financially strapped Empire. The
legions resorted to payment in kind, a system of gaining
title to land and livestock which was gradually to blos-
som into the soldiers' holding landed fiefs in collabo-
ration with the inhabitants. Inexorably, the Roman
Empire bankrupted itself and lost control over its far-
flung armies. It proved unable to forestall the great
influx of non-Roman peoples from the east.
The ensuing barbarian migrations brought great num-
bers to the outermost, and soon, innermost, regions of
the Empire. The overall result was a peculiar concat-
enation of residual Roman traditions overlaid by newly
imported feudal customs and law from the Visigothic,
Ostrogothic, Hun, Vandal, Viking, and Saxon migrations
from lands across the Danube and Elbe Rivers and from
across the Baltic. These peoples, who had never known
either Roman law or Christian thought, brought to an
empire already split between East and West a whole new
range of traditions. 6
The decisive blow to the Roman imperium was de-
livered by these barbarian invasions and migrations of
the Early Middle Ages. They culminated symbolically in
the Vandals' sacking of Rome in 410 A . D . But the extent
and impact of these migrations throughout all of the
Empire's western lands cannot be comprehended in terms
of this or that city. The new populations of heathen
military bands and the entirely primitive agricultural
techniques brought with them to Dalmatia, Lombardy,
Spain, Gaul, and Britain introduced conceptions of law
radically different from any known in the areas formerly
under Roman rule. The later absorption-during the Mid-
dle Ages—of this Germanic law through ecclesiastical
efforts provided the basis of the Christian Commonwealth
Its admixture of feudal customs, Christian teachings, and
Roman natural law traditions was to underpin European
legal and diplomatic practices until the Italian Renais-
sance
.
One hesitates to talk of states and formal political
institutions at all when discussing the loosely organized
Germanic, Slavic, and Scandinavian tribes which over-
whelmed Europe between the fifth and ninth centuries.
With the transient exceptions of the Carolingian Empire,
300-843, and the revived empire under the Saxon emper-
life of the former Roman Empire was marked by a millen-
nium of Germanic, customary law. Scarcely recorded,
and then only in fragmentary fashion, the entirely tra-
dition-bound character of Germanic public law was em-
bodied in assemblies of the tribes, in the folk-memory
of the people, and in the customary adherence of elected
kings to what was called the "good old law."
Such law, governing punishment for offenses, seig-
norial rights to fief, livestock, and grain, and acts of
reprisal or revenge, was the product of public assemblies
called to ascertain-or to recall-which royal oaths had
been sworn and what custom would dictate. in this abso-
lute unification of positive and natural law— though
each concept would have been alien to feudal practice—
and in this context where law was not innovative but
merely restorative, the kings and princes of the various
Frankish, Rhenish, Magyar, and Saxon tribes were obliged
to regard the widely recognized right of popular resis-
tance in the early Middle Ages. This right of resistance
was most strongly recognized by the peoples living well
beyond the Danube and Elbe Rivers and the Baltic Sea.
This tradition, unknown to Roman and Christian teachings
of passive obedience, was so fully embedded in Slavonic
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custom that as late as the seventeenth century the
enormous Kingdom of Poland reqnirea in its govern ingdiet a unanimous vote on anall questions of policy! But
in areas farther west, in Caul, Lombardy, Fianders
, and
Saxony, the political institutions that emerged first
under Prankish tutelage with the Merovingians, and then,
after the Carolingian Empire's breakup in 843, under the
rule of the various German princes, retained certain
Roman constitutional elements. These royal houses, in
vying for control of the former Carolingian lands scat-
tered after the mid-ninth century throughout Lombardy,
Burgundy, Bavaria, and Franconia, were required to
establish hand-in-hand with clerical administrators the
foundations of unified Christian rule. The legacy of
Roman rule in these western areas enabled the uneasy
alliance of the Church with Prankish and German kings to
establish a modicum of economic and political control
over peoples who had migrated only after the collapse of
imperial unity. The farther east, however, the more
prevalent were rural and tribal customs unaffected by the
institutional and intellectual residue of imperial admin-
istration, ecclesiastical literacy and scholarship, and
the techniques of agriculture and irrigation that had
lain at the heart of Roman political-economy.
In these eastern areas, where cities and riparian
trade were essentially unknown, ancient tribal custom
handed down orally and mythically over centuries, called
upon Ostrogothic, Wendish, Hun, and Viking peoples to
adhere to he "good old law." This law
, unenacted ^
unwritten, was only gradually supplanted by Roman,
Christian, and constitutional practices.
The inherent institutional weakness of these Ger-
manic political conceptions expressed itself in what ap-
pears to us today as a virtual hiatus in the existence
of an international system or of international relations.
The dearth of treaties for this era, and the absence of
written records detailing negotiations and diplomacy
among states, testify less to any bureaucratic neglect by
chancelleries than to the simpler fact that such chan-
celleries—or any formal diplomatic procedures among ma-
jor public bodies— scarcely existed at all. with two
major— if short lived—exceptions
, the Frankish Caro-
lingian Empire and the Saxon Empire of the German kings
a century and a half later, Europe between the fall of
Rome and the Second Crusade knew no discernable system
of interstate relations, indeed knew no states at all.
The development of more or less stable states—Capetian
rule over the He de France, the states of Castile, Leon,
Aragon, and Navarre, England after the Norman Conquest,
and the various city-republics of Northern Italy—a-
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waited, first
,
the emergence of a Christian Commonwealth
and, secondly, its decline in the face of those flourish-
ing secular forces which gave rise to the Renaissance.
Charlemagne's coronation by Pope Leo III on Christ-
mas Day, 800, transformed the Carolingian Kingdom, suc-
cessor to the Merovingian, into an empire. The Church's
blessing invested Charles' Prankish rule with the aura
of a second Roman Empire. Clerical administrators played
no small role in consolidating imperial control over
lands newly conquered east of the Rhineland. The
Church's new activism was its response to the natural-law
right of resistance which had been practiced by the
various Germanic tribes upon their settlement in the
West. The Papacy was now developing the view of govern-
ment as a benevolent "patria potestas" headed by a vicar
consecrated by the Church. This conception of sacral
authority, in variance with the Gelasian doctrine of
"two swords," came gradually during the ninth and tenth
centuries to supplant the Germanic view that both the
monarch and the tribal community were "subordinate to
7God and Law.
"
With the breakup of the Carolingian Empire and the
distribution of its lands to the three grandchildren of
Charlemagne according to the Treaty of Verdun in 843,
dynastic politics, especially in the East Frankish lands,
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turned to competition for control of the Central Prank-
ish lands of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Lombardy. Papal
interests in exercising economic and political control
over bishoprics throughout the Prankish lands led the
Church to regard with great concern these disputes of the
various Germanic kings.
The Clunaic reform movement of the tenth century,
and the subsequent eastward spread of the Clunaic monas-
teries, further involved the Church in German princely
politics by elevating to the fore the question of con-
trolling and overseeing these newly conquered lands.
Because the Clunaic movement was particularly skilled in
introducing land reclamation and agricultural techniques
where none had prevailed, and because, too, it possessed
the resources of literacy and record keeping required for
administrating these lands, lands until recently occupied
by un-Christian barbarian tribes, the Church became em-
broiled in the political machinations of the German prin-
ces: in the election of a German emperor, his consecra-
tion at Rome, and the attending importance this conferred
on the imperial body for authority in the Rhineland,
Lombardy, Saxony, and Bavaria.
The gradual intervention of the Papacy in the monar-
chial politics of the German princes culminated in the
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withdrawal of imperial consecration by pope ^^^^
in 1076. The investiture Controversy which ensued far
transcended the immediate issue of who-the Papacy or the
German princes-had the authority to appoint bishops to
the national ohurohes and to confer imperial blessings
The controversy involved issues of central import to the
evolution of a coherent European state system. The de-
bate between Church and Empire was spawned by Papal ef-
forts to introduce among the patchwork, feudal, recur-
rently warring European principalities a modicum of unity
within a universal Christian Commonwe a lth
.
The Crusades, the military campaigns in Jerusalem and
the Levant initiated by Pope Innocent III, established
both spiritually and materially the bases of the Christian
Commonwealth that dominated European diplomacy in the
twelth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The unity
prompted by the First Crusade of 1095-1099 established
throughout the lands of the old Roman Empire a fundamental
shift away from the feudal thoughts and practices which
had prevailed since the barbarian invasions. The invo-
cation of various Christian "signs" conferred upon par-
ticipating lords and their vassals the common blessings
of an institution which until then had remained aloof
from most of feudal diplomacy. The plague of private
wars so characteristic of feudalism-wars of reprisal,
of greed, of revenge-was to come gradually under the'
guidance of Church sponsored laws during this period.
These laws of war were adhered to far more in wars
among Christians than between Christians and Moslem-or
Turkish-armies. But the Crusades provided the impetus
for an alliance of European chivalry under one banner.
These links brought together those disparate European
classes which had come to acknowledge one another through
the military code of chivalry, a code which since the
Carolingian Empire had drawn together on the battlefield
knights who observed a certain collegial code of warfare
among themselves. Arthurian legend was not merely le-
gendary in its celebration of such codes in the highly
ritualized spectacles of court jousting and chivalric
tournaments. As we know from the Song of Roland
, an
eleventh century "geste" retelling Charlemagne's campaign
against the Saracens, the code of chivalry played a
major role in uniting armies in terms of their behavior
in the field. In the High Middle Ages, that one unifying
cause was usually Christianity. We can see in the armies
united under Papal calling that the ideal of the Chris-
tian Commonwealth forged together material forces whose
allegiance was either to an immediate lord or to the col-
legial, military values of common knighthood. But the
code of chivalry merely served to ritualize military
conduct; it did not itself constitute a political force
with cohesiveness and resources sufficient to create in-
stitutions capable of reshaping the European landscape.
The Church, by contrast, was just such a force able
to alter the nature of European politics. Not only did
the Crusades forge a unity unavailable since the Roman
Empire; it also brought to the Continent, particularly
to Genoa and Venice, later to London, Paris, Bruges, and
the Hansa, riches and trade at a level which was to alter
decisively the whole feudal political-economy. The mari-
time trade of the northern Italian city-states was a
direct result of routes secured by Papal armies on the
way to Jerusalem. Entrepots throughout the Moslem world
brought untold riches in grain, jewelry, spices, and silk
to the Italian cities. 8
The residence of merchants in foreign cities brought
with it the need for their protection from the wrath of
native people and local governments. Only gradually did
the legal practice of extraterritoriality emerge, and
this was an important step in the evolution of interna-
tional law from the informal customs and traditions of
feudalism. Moreover, the need to protect tradesmen from
the raids of pirates and overland brigands helped shape
the kind of positive, contract law that took the form, in
contradistinction to Germanic practicei ^ ^^^^^
and treaties.
Because literacy was largely confined to Church of-
ficials and monks, the Papacy, bishoprics, and mas-
teries became the seat not only of learning but of sta-
tutory law and recorded documents. mdeed, the Church
provided a crucial service during this era in the transi-
tion from customary, fragmentary law to legal codes
fully enscribed.
Church efforts were significant in the development of
international law. it emerged in part from the need to
rationalize business practices by providing security to
traveling merchants. But a less material, more spiritual
source produced this development, too. After the cessa-
tion of the barbarian invasions, Europe was plagued by
private wars. Nowhere was this more endemic than in the
Central lands of the old Carolingian Empire: in the lands
of Burgundy, Lorraine, Lombardy, and the old East Frankish
realm—over which a succession of would-be emperors vied
for control and authority. In an attempt to limit the
German civil wars, the Church encouraged the development
of just-war doctrine, of the theory of "jus ad bellum.
"
The hope of the Church was to proscribe the range of wars
that could be deemed legitimate and to strengthen the
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authority of sovereign principalities by establishing
some foundations for stable international relations.
The expression of just-war doctrine, itself a carry
over from Augustinian thought, was part of the Church's
efforts in an era in which it had become a major politi-
cal force. The New Testament injunction, to "give unto
Ceasar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the
things that are God's," which for a millennium had in-
formed Church practice began giving way in the later
Middle Ages to an active role in worldy politics.
The Church's claim to spiritual universalism was
aided by its manifest territorial presence. in Jerusalem,
in the Romagna, in the bishoprics of the Empire, and in
the newly conquered German lands east of the Elbe, the
Church emerged as a prominent element in contemporary
politics and statesmanship. By investing secular au-
thority with Christian sacrament, codifying the rudiments
of international law, overseeing the reclamation of
lands for agriculture, and by itself exercising political
power in Tuscany, the later Medieval Church was able to
present itself as the embodiment of a universal common-
wealth .
The most sophisticated expression of the ideal of a
universal Christian Commonwealth came in the work of the
thirteenth century theologian and philosopher, Tho.as
Aquinas (c. 1225-1274). In a system Qf thought
in the wake of the twelfth century Aristotelian revival,
Aquinas expressed in sublime form a four-tiered hier-
archy of the universe in which all animate life, and the
actions of all institutions, assumed their unique place.
Aquinas, who soon after his death was canonized for his
philosophical achievement, weaved together an all-em-
bracing synthesis by which matter, life, and action were
located in terms of their fulfilling a natural order or-
dained by God. Eternal, natural, divine, and human laws
comprised, in descending order of scope and eminence,
the structure of all existence and action. Eternal law,
the embodiment of divine reason, governed the entire uni-
verse. Natural law established worldly participation in
terms of eternal law. Divine law, or revelation, was
enscribed in the Old and New Testaments as the earthly
teachings of God. And human law, expressed and embodied
in worldy affairs, involved human nature, both individual
and social, and the pursuit of good by men acting alone
or in community. From this hierarchy of laws, St. Thomas
achieved a new theology that defined or interpreted the
law as "nothing else than ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community,
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9and promulgated .
"
Aquinas, having accepted the Augustinian view of
secular politics as a realm in which men would have to
accept suffering, even at the hands of an unjust and
wicked king, was unable to acknowledge tyrannicide as
consistent with Christian doctrine. His study, "On King-
ship," explicitly rejects the forcible removal of unjust
princes. But Aquinas nevertheless provides strong
Christian support for institutional arrangements designed
to keep such tyranny from arising. He argues, too, that
unjust rulers, because they violate natural law, do not
merit God's love. The true Christian may not rebel
against tyrants, but he may pray that God will see that
their reign is shortlived.
Aquinas' theology and political theory united in the
most rigorous and systematic fashion several kinds of law
found in Medieval Europe: Christian, Roman natural, and
written, positive law. By locating these customs and
laws within a philosophy that addressed the entire uni-
verse, and by endowing these divine, natural, and secular
laws within a purposeful cosmology derived from Aristotle,
Aquinas defined the foundations of modern Christian poli-
tical and social thought. His designation of the state
as an essential component in a natural order, and his
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view of human nature as inherently social *u , transformed
the feudal conception of a r-irrh^0t i
^ht of resistance reserved
for the political community. Resistance became
legitimate only when sanctioned by the Church. Secular
authority became fully subordinated to a universal
Church which embodied divine law-itself the ecclesi-
astical expression of eternal law.
Thomistic theology, with its derivative argu-
ments for Church supremacy in secular politics, pro-
vided intellectual nourishment for Papal efforts in its
recurring disputes with the German princes. One
significant doctrinal result was Papal repudiation
of Gelasius' concept of two separate swords. church
authority was now seen as wielding the prince's sword.
Pope Boniface VIII expressed this new view in his
Papal bull of 1302, "Unam Sanctam." Both swords, he
wrote
,
are in the power of the church, the material
sword and the spiritual. But the one is
exercised for the church, the other by the
church, the one by the hand of the priest,
the other by the hand of kings and soldiers,
though at the will and sufferance of the
priest. One sword ought to be under the
other and the temporal authority subject to
the spiritual power. 10
It is characteristic, however, of intellectual sys-
tems that they should capture the essence of a system or
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practice on the verae nf it. j„g o its decay. Much like Aristotle's
celebration of the polls in an era in which the Greek
city-states were about to crumble, the Thomistic frame-
work of universal Christendom sanctified in the form of
a rigorous theology an institution about to decay. The
very forces which helped in the age of the Crusades to
bring the Church to the forpfmnf of wr etro t of European politics
were to undermine it in the later medieval centuries.
The spread of trade and wealth, the gradual breakdown of
a feudal economy and its replacement by cash economies
and secular contract, conspired with divisive forces with-
in the Papacy itself to undermine the Church's position.
The vicious feuding throughout the Empire of Guelph
and Guibelline factions unavoidably brought the Roman
Church into conflict with the princes of the Continent.
The Papal schisms—the fourteenth century Babylonian Cap-
tivity of the Papacy at Avignon, followed by two separate
Papacies at Avignon and Rome—were resolved by the Coun-
cil of Constance, 1414-1417, at a grave price to the
Church. The restoration of a unified Papacy required the
brutal suppression of Lollard and Hussite heresy and the
accommodation of the Church hierarchy to the growing secu-
lar power of French and Italian governments. Seculariz-
ing forces prevailed in a variety of forms; Rome's au-
thority over the national churches and European govern-
ments was unable to reconstitute itself. Vernacular
literature and the subsequent spread of literacy-owing,
first of all, to the European universities and then,
after 1456, to the popularization of the printed word-
undermined the crucial position held by clerical Latin
scribes. The growth of guilds in the manufacturing towns
helped weaken the dependence of formerly unskilled labor-
ers upon the manorial system. The rise of a banking
system to expedite trade and credit accelerated commer-
cialization and weakened the authority of a Church whose
power outside of Tuscany was largely spiritual. The
devastation wrought by the Plague led directly to mass
migrations from farms to cities, and subsequently to the
spread of a secular, cosmopolitan culture. Fabulous
wealth imported from the New World combined with improved
techniques for the mining of silver in Central Europe to
transform the Continental economy into one based largely
upon cash, commerce, and an international market.
The emergence in this era of diplomatic practices--
of extraterritoriality, of ambassadors and bureaucratic
chancellories, of diplomatic immunity, negotiations, and
arbitration among princes and Papal legates—led to the
eclipse of the very institutions which in the High Middle
Ages had helped to produce these recognizably modern
practices. The political weakness of the Papacy was par-
ticularly evident in its inability to compete militarily
with the princes. The crusading armies under the Church's
banner became in ensuing centuries mercenary forces paid
from revenues of the state or of feuding private factions.
The Church was able to draw upon its considerable finan-
cial resources to pay for its armies in the Romagna. But
the terms of levy had changed dramatically from those
based upon the feudal oath of homage and fealty. The
bonds of personal vassalage, of humility before the
Church and of alliegiance to community law embodied in
the king and the lord, became subject in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries to ties of a fundamentally dif-
ferent sort. Secular and commercial relations infused
military affairs; their crassest expression was the mer-
cenary system that prevailed in the early Italian Renais-
sance. The collecting of funds to pay for such armies
required among princes the convoking of representative
estates and, as in Italy, the investment by bankers of
money accumulated through trade. The terms of such rela-
tions entailed the development of absolutist practices
—
of secular dependence upon the landed and wealthy and
upon decisions of princes and their councillors. The
dissolution of feudal and Christian ideals completed the
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spread of secular, material practices.
The customs which had guided the Medieval era-that
the state embodies traditional law, that political au-
thority represents the "good old law" or the principles
of divine word-had subjected the monarch and the poli-
tical community to a superior and transcending presence.
The decline of feudal custom and the attending decay of
Church authority yielded concepts and practices which
elevated secular political action to the highest level.
The product was a political culture stressing innovation
and initiative on the part of worldly agents: particu-
larly absolutist princes beholden to no higher authority
and who acted in their own interests or on behalf of
those most closely allied to them. The political virtue
embodied in such public and diplomatic institutions was
one devoid of divine and eternal inspiration; it was
guided instead by the dictates of wealth, power, security,
and immediate interests.
It is in this sense that the language of Machiavel-
lian politics constitutes a transformation from the
Christian Commonwealth to the realm of the purely secu-
lar. As we shall see in the pages to follow, such a
politics was not without its constraints and appeals to
tradition. But the restraints were those that legiti-
mated the work of the innovator ._of iegisiatQr ^
founder „ho created and ^^ ^^
action, and who acted in terms of ho ur w he perceived the
-cur ity of the political community. The result _ &
conception of politics freed from divine or christian
law and unrestrained by the natural limitations that
feudal and Thomistic conceptions had so valued.
CHAPTER III
MACHIAVELLI AND THE RISE OF THE INSECURE STATE
The claim that violence and power characterize the
modern state system finds its warrant in the Machiavellian
tradition. No one in the history of political thought
has written so passionately of power as did Machiavelli.
The prince of legislator seeking to find and maintain a
polity must not shy away from the uses of violence in
securing a political space. The secular conditions in
which politics takes place burdens the prince by forcing
him to resort to violence as the means of effecting his
will. To secure a political space from rebels or foreign
armies, the Machiavellian leader bears full responsibility
for taming the base human nature of man so as to maintain
his political existence.
Such a burden of political responsibility, however,
can undermine the liberty of those whom it claims to de-
fend. Such responsibility readily transforms itself into
tyranny or imperialism. And when responsibility for
judging the appror iateness of political violence is placed
in the hands of he who deploys that violence, we enter
terrain upon which moral discourse cannot stand up to the
unsheathed, glistening sword.
"Realpolitik, " the single-minded concern for what is
practical and possible in serving the interests of the
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state, traces its theoretical underpinnings back to the
writings of an embittered and outcast ex-Chancellor of th,
Renaissance Florentine Republic. It was Niccolo Machia-
velli (1469-1527), a secretary to the diplomatic Board of
the Ten and its legate to the Holy Roman Empire, France,
and to the court of Cesare Borgia, whose writings, espe-
cially "The Prince," were picked up by later politicians
and theorists as the guiding light for the view that
statecraft is solely that which was possible and necessar,
for the state's continued existence. That which main-
tained power over one's civil society, and that could be
deployed against foreign armies and states, found intel-
lectual justification in certain of Machiavelli
' s writings
whence emerged the image of the Machiavellian prince.
In the pages that follow, I outline the basic teach-
ings of Machiavelli and explain in detail why those who
would brand him a Machiavellian misconstrue the nature of
his concerns. Section one outlines the constitutional and
diplomatic problems that beset the Florentine Republic
after the overthrow of Piero Medici in 1494. Machiavel-
li' s political career will also be examined to establish
his ongoing concerns with problems of governance that are
dealt with throughout his writings. Section two focuses
on the essential categories of political action and legit-
imacy that Machiavelli employed in all of his work. Here
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I concentrate on "virtu," "£ortuna ,„
"ragione."
"necessitd,
" ana n0 state." The third sectiQn
discusses the political geegraphy of Florentine warfare
My concern here is to discuss the relationship between
Machiavelli's critique of mercentary warfare and his
theory of enlightened military leadership. The flnal
section develops Machiavelli's theory of the state and of
legitimacy. it provides a perspective on both Western
politics and political theory by which the work of Machi-
avelli can be appreciated well beyond the customary as-
sumption that he was but a teacher of perfidy and evil.
For it is in his work that realism creates a discourse on
the politics of violence, a discourse that in the cen-
turies after Machiavelli became the basis or international
relations among soveriegn polities.
Crises of the Florentine Republic
Throughout the era in which Machiavelli wrote, the
most important and far-reaching issues were the form which
the Florentine Constitution ought to take and the manner in
which the city-state's new political institutions could be
secured from both domestic factionalism and foreign inva-
sion. The decline in fortune of the once-powerful Medici
family gave rise to civic strife and to enormous insecur-
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ities among the competing Florentine groups.
The overthrow of the Medici family in 1494 did not
so much cause all this strife as merely culminate two
centuries of decline in the Florentine polity. This
decline allowed problems and features endemic to the com-
mune to emerge in all their fullness.
The system of communal governance in the Northern
Italian city-states had emerged in the late twelfth
century as feudal relations receded. 1 The erosion of
feudalism, of the agrarian fief and the indentured
peasant, of military vassalage and the system of political
obligation through homage and fealty before one's lord,
occurred earlier in Northern Italy than elsewhere on the
Continent. With the cessation of the barbarian invasions
in the ninth and tenth centuries, with the end of the
recurring attacks by Visigothic and Hun armies that had
for six centuries plagued Lombardy and Tuscany, the towns
and cities of the once-great Roman Empire began gradually
to flourish in terms of commerce, population, and prosper-
ity. Unlike the extensive manorial systems of the more
sparsely settled Frankish, Norman, and Germanic feudal
estates, Italian developments in this period were not
centered around the landed castle but rather arose within
the city.
An enormous rise in population around the eleventh
and twelfth centuries created pressure for an intensi-
fication of agricultural output. Swamplands were re-
claimed, irrigation techniques spread, and the three-
field system of crop rotation introduced. Outside of
Italy other measures were taken to satisfy the need for
new lands. In Germany this need led to the "Drang nach
Osten," the extraordinary expansion of Germanic feudal
control of new lands in the eastern areas. This imperial
expansion of feudal domains actually strengthened the
military hold of the lord over his vassals, for it re-
warded loyal knights and their serfs with control over
newly settled lands. But such outlets for expanded popu-
lation and agricultural demand could not be found in the
crowded and already divided lands of the Holy Roman Empire
south of the Alps. Here the result was not the strength-
ening of feudalism, but rather its rapid decline. The
fulfillment of feudal military obligations gave way to
increasingly commercialized efforts to expand agricultural
output. And with the growth of population centers not
tied to the manorial system, there emerged trade between
country and city as lords sold their products to complete
strangers. Not only did markets develop in the cities,
but there arose a cash economy, merchants, and bankers to
facilitate trade, for all were needed if the cities were
to be regularly supplied by those on the surrounding farms
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The Crusades of the early twelfth century provided
the final impetus for the expansion of the Italian city-
states. The various marches into the Levant opened the
way both for sea-trade across the Mediterranean and for
the virtual collapse of feudal land tenure; knights abroad
in battle lost control of their land at home, a process
termed subinfeudation. The result was that by the late
twelfth century the Italian city-states were both pros-
perous centers of commercial activity and the home of
merchands and of a growing middle-class of artisans, ship-
builders, bankers, and lawyers.
The First Lombard League of 1167 emerged in alliance
against the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa; via a succession
of wars it forged a nascent state system demanding an end
to its allegiance to German lords. The Peace of Constance,
1183, finally acknowledged this demand, and with it the
Italian system of city-state governance by commune was
officially accepted by the Emperor.
The Italian communes of Venice, Milan, Genoa, Lucca,
and Florence were not what we today would call communities
or popular governments. They were governed by freely
elected councils of the wealthiest and most prominent
citizens. A group of successful men, usually those noble-
men holding great plots of farmland around the city, but
also including the richest of the new tradesmen, collec-
tively held public authority and exercised it through
the city councils. The communes decided matters of taxa-
tion and public law. They also were responsible for
organizing armies, and this they did by calling upon
agricultural workers and laborers, who served without pay
but whose services did not have the public character that
we might associate with citizen-armies. Infantry were
recruited on the basis of their residence in the outlying
farms or in the various urban districts. Each of these
districts, subject to familial rule, would be called upon
by the commune to supply a certain number of troops.
The communes of Italy were still based upon private
authority. Though law was made by agreement of the coun-
cils, the restricted nature of citizenship, combined with
traditions residual of feudal ties, created a situation
in which noble families still held political control
within their districts or lands.
Town ghettos of noble families organized themselves
on clan lines. Sworn armed societies, "consorteria ,
"
staked out an urban enclave and consolidated local rule.
Thus twelfth century Florence was divided up into dis-
crete districts; each noble family built a huge stone
tower in its own district that defined its space and
served as an urban military outpost, through which sur-
rounding streets, secret tunnels, and byways were routed .2
so
r some
in Machiavelli's
"Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca,"
for instanoe, we read how, on the eve of an attempted
coup, "Castruccio cautiously fortified the Onesti tower
and filled it with munitions and with a store of food,
that if he had to, he could defend himself in it fo
days." 3 "The History of Florence" also describes feuding
families, organized by district, frequently taking refuge
in their towers;
...one party adhered to the Buondelmonti
, theother to the Uberti. And because these familieswere strong in houses and towers and men, theyfought together many years without one drivingthe other out. *
Despite the public character, then, of communal governance,
factions and family loyalties remained the basis of ef-
fective political power.
Commerce and trade gave rise, however, to new social
and political classes. The aristocratic communes came in-
creasingly under pressure throughout the thirteenth cen-
tury to share their power with the rising middle-class of
artisans, guild members, shop owners, and smaller merchants.
This new class, called the "populo," appeared throughout
the Italian city-states to demand an expansion of the citi-
zenship lists, the right both to elect and serve on the
city councils, and relief from a tax system which in-
creasingly and disproportionately burdened them. The
political antagonisms and mistrust engendered by the
"populo's" rise were to mar-v fh. urk the subsequent history of
the Renaissance city-states.
The first attempt in thirteenth century Florence-
and in other Italian city-states-to calm the ensuing
factionalism was to call upon a government official who,
brought in from outside the city-state, was elected by the
competing factions. Such a system of government, based
upon a powerful "podesta," was ubiquitous in Northern
Italy until the late fourteenth century. m time, how-
ever, the "podesta" became besieged by the same sorts of
intense factionalism that had plagued both the commune and
rule by the "populo." m many cases a concentration of
public powers (and prayers) in the "podesta 's" hands
helped transform the office into a hereditary despotism, a
"signoria." The shift towards such tyranny was often the
sole means of counteracting the growing militancy of fac-
tions and parties vying for power. But the "podesta" and
the "signoria" invariably came to power with their own
private militia at their side. Private armies, then, be-
gan to flourish as public authority became distrusted by
all. And political power increasingly became the object
of open confrontations among the nobility, the middle-
class, the day laborers, and heads of state.
Labor guilds, like the whole clan system of the com-
mune members, were armed societies in competiton for pub-
»« Power. „ the middle-class „populo „ exued nobi^
xty in reprisal for its politicai intransigence
^
^Uated aristocrats,
_ deprived Qf ^
contract from foreicm soilrgn n the services of private armies
comprised of mercenary soldiers >„h ky ia . And where the communes
or "podesta" remained or returns <-urned to power, their first
task was to disarm the "populo" and the guilds.
The Italian city-states could not trust their own
inhabitants to provide for their military defense. The.
rise of mercenary armies is attributable to the lack of
Public political unity of the early Renaissance city-state.
in lieu of legitimate public power the city-states were
marked by weak and fractious governance
, vith class power
exercised by ruling families or held in check by acknow-
ledged despots.
In Florence the Medici family held political power,
though it did not serve elected office. m 1378 the
aristocratic govenment was challenged dramatically by the
Ciompi Revolution, a short-lived linen workers' uprising
against the heavy tax burden placed upon day laborers and
upon the surrounding towns. 5 Budgetary problems had long
plagued the Florentine state, and the relative decline in
export industries resulting from the rise of Dutch and
Hanseatic League trade cut precipitously into the local
economy. Heavy indeptedness to the Medici banking family
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to pay condottieri and mercenaries and to subsidize a
flagging export trade forced a gradual consolidation after
the Ciompi Revolution. Both at home and abroad the Medici
family and its wealthy partisans came to run the city-
state, its diplomatic corps, one of the first in Europe,
was recruited entirely from the banking staff, and after
the establishment of family rule under Cosimo Medici in
1434 the interests of the family, in Italy and on the
Continent, were one and the same as those of Florence. 6
For the next sixty years Medici rule was ensured by
its complete domination of the "Accoppiatori , - the list
of eligible property holders who could legally take part
in government. But the death of Cosimo 's son, Lorenzo
Medici, brought to power a weak and indecisive successor,
his son, Piero Medici. Once again the voting lists were
altered, as they had periodically been in earlier centu-
ries of communal and Podestral rule.
Fiscal problems also mounted as Florence sought to
keep its obligations with the other Northern Italian city-
states bound by the Treaty of Lodi of 1454. The armed
invasion in 1494 by France under Charles VIII, who had
been persuaded by the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, to
help him wrest control of the Duchy from the nobility,
only exacerbated Florentine insecurity. Without a defend-
ing army, scarcely able to contract mercenaries, the
Florentine nobility succumbed to an uprising of the
"populo." Popular sentiment against Med . c . ^ s
ther whipped up by the massively popular Christ ian-repub-
licanpreach^gsof Savonarola. By November 1494 the
middle-class of merchants and skilled laborers forced
Piero Medici from the city. On Dcember 22 a guiding
constitution was established by both the old wealthier
families and by the new middle-class.
The new Florentine Constitution, more a set of guide
lines for governance than a formal document establishing
sovereignty and legal rights, prescribed the composition
of ruling councils, the qualifications for serving on
them, and the duties of the particular councils created
to oversee public affairs. 7 A Grand Council, a Council
of the Commune of the People, was formed. This Council,
the seat of legislative approval rather than a delibera-
tive body, was comprised wholly of Florentine citizens.
About one out of every four to five males, 3,000 out of a
total population of some 70,000, could sit on the Grand
Council to vote on legislation. Property qualifications
far less restrictive than those prevailing under Medici
rule determined eligibility for citizenship. Thus the
new "Accopiatori , " still providing the eligibility list
for the Grand Council and its numerous boards, was democ-
ratized along with the entire procedures of governance.
The chief executive board under the Grand Council
the Si.noria," was comprised of eight Priors of Liberty
and chaired bv a "r=>^-F~iuy banrolaniere " pan v, ~
^
*
Each °f these nine of-
floors served a two-month term and was elected by ballots
drawn from the
"Accoppiatori .
" Such two-month rotating
terms characterized all executive board positions under
the new constitution. They helped to rotate the exercise
of political power and to obviate the emergence of ruling
factions. But these short terms, while justified in terms
of truly republican civic participation, proved all too
effective only in fragmenting Florentine political power.
Among the most important executive boards of the
Republic were the Board of Ten ("Dieci di Balia") for
diplomacy and command of the army, a Board of Eight ("otto
di Guardia") to administer justice, and the Monte ("ufici-
aldi di Monte") for financial matters. In 1506 a Board of
Nine ("Nove di Milizia") was also established to draw up,
but not to command, a native army.
Machiavelli gained his first-hand experience in
government in 1498 as unelected secretary to the Board of
Ten. His detailed communications with the Board and with
other legates and ambassadors while on diplomatic mission
to the courts of France's Louis XII, the Holy Roman Em-
peror Maximilian I, Cesare Borgia, and Pope Julius II were
widely read and admired in government circles. They also
earned Machiav^i 1 ituavelU the respect and confidence of the first
"Ganfolaniere a vita" ("Ganfolaniere" for life), Piero
Soderini; upon his appointment in 1502 he began relying
heavily on Machiavelli as his personal advisor in diplo-
macy. After assuming the secretaryship of the Board of
Nine, and until his removal from his offices after the
Medici restoration of 1512, Machiavelli played a conspic-
uous role in the statecraft of the Florentine Republic.
The Florentine Republic was hardly a stable govern-
ment during its eighteen year existence. Domestic con-
flicts between the older aristocratic families, the
"ottimati," and the republican-minded middle-class advo-
cates of commerce and civic participation appeared immedi-
ately. The "ottimati," the long-established Florentine
families who had moderately supported the Medici regime,
stood for Florentine government by the aristocratic few,
by those informed by the ideals of civic virtue among the
well-endowed and enlightened. They resented the rising
middle-class merchants and tradesmen, for these new groups
gave voice to a more representative government, "il governo
largho," and were viewed as unworthy members of the new
Grand Council.
The great mass of the Florentine populace, the im-
poverished plebian workers ("plebe," "Infima plebe,") was
excluded completely from this debate between "il populo
79
grosso" and -±1 populo minuto „ over ^^ ^ ^
constitution.* However democratizing the Pontine Re-
public was in bringing several thousand townsmen into the
governing circles, the prevailing language and practice
of Renaissance politics provided no framework for the
incorporation of the masses, the mob, "il vulgo ,„ into
the polity. it was Machiavelli
' s contribution to modern
political thought that he provided a secular grounding
for theories of national patriotism, legitimacy, and
citizen-armies. These theories formed over the next four
centuries the rudiments of a popular constitutionalism
within a recognizably modern state system. 9
Besides being torn domestically, Florence, along with
the other Italian city-states, suffered at the hands of
foreign invaders. in Machiavelli
• s life alone, 1469-1527,
Northern Italy was invaded or occupied by French, Spanish,
Swiss, and Imperial armies, as well as by roving mercenary
bands organized by Ludovico Sforza in Lombardy and Cesare
Borgia in Tuscany.
The invasion of Milan in 1494 by French troops under
Charles VIII illustrated Italian diplomatic and military
weakness. Italian diplomacy had always been more con-
cerned with trade routes and banking than with protection
of its own land and people. For several centuries its
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-ty-states had en joyed ilranunity from foreign^Itauan statesmen had grown indifferenfc ^ ^^
o nationai power fcetween their own
thQse
the Continent. 10
The patterns of modern diplomacy afid
relations emerged in the late fiffceenth^ ^ ^
outposts ana trading networks among London, Paris, F1orenc,
Venice, Rotterdam, and the Hanseatio t 0=,n c League. Between
France and Plorenrp f^v-ce, for instance, there existed a strong
trading relationship that became the basis for a tacit
alliance that greatly affected the Republic's affairs.
Anti-Roman sentiments, fed by more than half a century of
Papal residence in Avignon and the subsequent ecumenical
schism, encouraged French ties with those Italian city-
states seeking control of Romagna lands. But after the
Hundred Years War (1335-1453) with England, France became
a centralized nation-state with an enormous military ca-
pacity, its strength dwarfed that of the Italian cities.
The French invasions of Milan and Naples, the subsequent
creation of the Holy League under papal sponsorship, and
Florence's failed campaign to restore Pisa to its control
all severely challenged Florences position around the end
of the fifteenth century.
The Milanese invasion threatened Italian security and
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underscored its military unpreparedness. France's suc-
cessful conquest of Naples the next year despite military
assistance by Venice forced the Italian states to rethink
their traditional diplomacy and to prepare a defense of
their borders. Venice was the first to recognize this
dilemma after it could no longer successfully defend its
extensive Neapolitan commercial interests. m reaction to
the French threat an alliances was concluded in 1495 among
England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacay, and
Venice. Known as the Holy League, it constituted Venice's
concession to the larger demands of European balance-of-
power politics. Though nominally aimed at the Turkish
threat to southeastern Europe (a threat made all the more
apparent after the fall of Constantinople in 1453), it was
understood by all really to be targeted against France.
The Treaty of Venice banded these powers together under
the multilateral promise of aid in case of foreign inva-
11
sion
.
The protracted and frustrating Pisan campaign focused
attention on a widely suspected struggle of Florence to
retain hold over that small city. Pisa was an important
commercial outpost. It lay close the the Mediterranean
Sea near the mouth of the Arno River. Much Florentine
trade passed through the city. Pisa had been something of
a Florentine colony ever since the reign of Lorenzo Mag-
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nifico. Domestic uprisings, aided by the French (1)
however, throated Florentine hegemony there. From 1495 to
1509 the Republlc
.s mercenaries, later aided by a small
Provincial mllitia
, were engaged .„ &^ ^
supress the revolt and to ensure Florentine rule. A
series of treaties, none of them conclusive, was signed
between Florence and France throughout this period in an
attmept to limit the conflict. Florence fH„-„ii •noren inally triumphed,
but not before its treasury was drained due to its inef-
fective-and very expensive-mercenary army. 12
The failures of the Pisan campagin illustrated
Florence's diplomatic and military impotence. The colo-
nial war, more dramatically than the French invasion,
showed the profound limits of Florentine power. mde-
cisiveness at home, due to class antagonisms and a weak
treasury, was exacerbated abroad by an expensive and
bumbling mercenary army unable to complete the siege of
Pisa. For Machiavelli the lesson was unmistakable; a
citizen-army would be far superior to a purchased militia.
It fostered loyalty and conviction among the soldiers, and
it required that the government be legitimate enough to
motivate public participation in both military and fiscal
affairs
.
Renewed foreign invasion underscored the city's mili-
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tary weaknesses rm,A1mu +. u. Though the invasions by France under
Louis XII, and soon thereaf
f
Pr k, e •rn te by Spam under Ferdinand
and Isabella, never touched directly upon the republic's
territory, their ability to occupy regions of the Penin-
sulu, coupled with the campaigns of Cesare Borgia in
Tuscany, worsened Florence's position.
Cesare Borgia, also known as Duke Valentino (by which
name Machiavelli calls him in the famous seventh chapter
of "The Prince"), organized in the early sixteenth century
an army seeking establishment of a papal territorial state,
the Romagna, in the Tuscan Plain around Florence. He
campaigned with papal blessing from the Borgia Pope, Alex-
ander VI, who happened to be Cesare 's father. Cesare
Borgia successfully exploited diplomatic and military
weaknesses throughout the region of the sort that Florence
now suffered from. Before his untimely death in 1503, he
had conquered his way through most of the small Tuscon
city-states and towns and now stood but a few miles from
the walls of Florence. This latest challenge proved yet
another crisis which helped weaken republican rule.
Machiavelli
' s extensive reports to the Board of Ten
show great admiration for the means by which Cesare con-
solidated his power over regions: replacing local rule
that could not be trusted with allies whose support was
assured. The training and loyalty of his troops and the
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decisiveness of his actions greatly ^
tine legate. "The Duke cannot be considered like other
petty princes," wrote Machiavelli after a month with
Cesare Borgia, "but must be regarded as a new power in
Italy." 13 compared to the other Italian princes, the Duke
alone was a force to be reckoned with. Machiavelli ad-
mired "the Duke, with his unheard-of good fortune, with
a courage and confidence almost superhuman, and believing
himself capable of accomplishing whatever he undertakes.'14
Though withholding judgement on his ethics and the poli-
tical legitimacy of his rule, Machiavelli respected
Cesare
>
8 political skill and the acumen with which he
enhanced his power over weak princes and republics.
The passing of the Borgia family from Italian poli-
tical ascendancy only temporarily relieved Florentine
problems. At home, "il practica," the advisory board of
the most elite citizens, grew in its influence, and the
overburdened treasury appeared in 1505 incapable of sup-
porting future mercenary adventures. Small wonder that
the next year Machiavelli, as secretary to the Board of
Nine, took responsibility for recruiting a militia of
20,000 men from the lands surrounding Florence.
The creation of this force, not a citizen-army but
rather a standing militia, helped to complete the siege of
Pisa, though not until 1509. But even with the end of
the Pisan campaign Florence's diplomatic and domestic de-
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dine continued. Payments to ^
x ^
forestall invasion from the north proved ^^^
tive means of "defending" the republic, for persistent
Political and military pressure by ^ ^^^
the city-state on precarious ground. The ascendancy of
the Medici family to the Papacy in 1512, combined with the
continued pressure of the Holy League, ultimately forced
the republic's demise. m November 1512 the constitution
of December 22 was junked completely when the old "ot-
timati" conspired with the Medici family. The Holy
League's troops stood, quite literally, at the city's
walls, ready to overrun them if necessary. it was not
necessary. Soderin fled the city in panic, as did many of
the most ardent republicanists
.
Soon Machiavelli was branded the "mannerino," the
lackey, of the "Ganfolaniere a vita." His close associ-
ation with the discredited Soderini placed him in Medici
disfavor. Despite his efforts at building up the Floren-
tine militia his continuation in public service proved
impossible. So suspected was he, in fact, of favoring the
overthrow of the newly restored Medici regime that he was
briefly tortured and forced to confess his role in a sus-
pected coup d'etat. There was nothing for Machiavelli to
confess. He never had, nor ever would, conspire against
the Medici.
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.ess
Machiavelli. s republican sympathies neverthelc
remained with him throughout ^^^ ^^
reticent. For fourteen ygars he _ ^.^.^ ^
held in low esteem, forced to write plays, poetry, and
histories, rather than his diplomatic correspondence.
But he also wrote "The Prince" and the "Discourses."
The specific themes of these two central works we
shall explore in the subsequent section. But first we
need to not here how formative for Machiavelli • s thinking
were his own experiences in government. The several cri-
ses of the Florentine Republic provide the backdrop for
his later writings. In his work he concerns himself
centrally with those political problems the city-state I
encountered after the Medici overthrow of 1494. Machi-
avelli 's support of limited republican government never
left him, and if he writes so passionately of centralized
authority it is to compensate for the factionalism ed-
demic to the Italian commune and the later Florentine
Republic. He reminds the admirer of such decisive leader-
ship that real power, to be virtuous, must always embrace
the customs and traditions of the polity which it governs.
The Central Concepts of Political Action
It would indeed be difficult to interpret Machiavelli
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as
no
as anything but a villainous teacher Qf ^ ^
Prince" were the only work he had written. Thosw who
read Machiavelli in such a light, as the preacher of evil
and cunning, do not by accident treat this brief work
if it existed alone, as if Machiavelli had written
other. But of course he wrote many others, and in this
section I explore themes and concepts that run throughout
his writings and thought. By developing the several cate-
gories of Machiavelli- s approach to legitimacy, statecraft,
and political action, we shall see how this early modern
version of realism emerges from an understanding of vir-
tuous statesmanship in constant tension between domestic
corruption and foreign threat.
"The Prince," Machiavelli
• s most famous work, ex-
hibits all of his historical knowledge and analytic skills
from the perspective of a prince and of great men, both
ancient and contemporary. The choice, at the ouset, of
the prince's point of view is not for Machiavelli the sole
perspective one could develop. Others are available, for
example those from the standpoint of republics or cities
undergoing corruption. One should on occasion make use
of these different perspectives, as indeed Machiavelli
did. 5 But in this work the prince's point of view pre-
vails. It is hardly coincidental, one should add, that
the work is dedicated to the new Florentine Prince,
L°renZ
°
MSdiCi
' ~ ° f «a=hiavelU, suffering
banishment from public ^^ ^
wor* as both a birtMay present tQ LorenzQ ^d ^^
of his loyalty to the Medioi after their r«ti n estoration.
Accept this little an ft- T ,
Magnifioenoe, In thl fp? r?t ?^ h^H Y°Urit... And if from the
S
^2 £ y^f^^
eyes'tS'these f^nificence eve/turns yoLt o n low places von tniihow long I oontinue' withoufLlert ^bLTthe.burden of Fortune's great and stead'y^
The author is practically begging for a return to poli-
tical life. What better manner of demonstrating one's
loyalty than with a work extolling principalities? 17
The book appeals to the virtues of a principality
as superior to both a popular democracy and an aristo-
cratic, oligarchic regime. The prince alone manifests the
necessary qualities of leadership and fortitude, combined
with clearsightedness of intent and knowledge of what con-
stitutes the territory's needs. He knows how to protect
the populace. And as in the "Discourses," the author
appeals to historical examples, especially those of the
Roman Republic and of Athens and Sparta, to illustrate the
principles of virtuous action he is advocating.
The method appears inductive. As such it has been
lauded as the first modern example of empirical political
18
science. Machiavelli is careful throughout his work to
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induce from particular occurrences universal principles
and to advance then, as maxims which might guide the ac-
tions of princes. But one discerns a pattern in Machia-
velli.
s
principles, however inductively he may have ar-
rived at them. For he worked within the prevailing frame-
work of Renaissance historiography.
One finds in his political writings certain tenden-
cies, and they lead one to believe his methods were not as
purely inductive as claimed by those who see Machiavelli
as a political "scientist." Like his contemporaries Ber-
nardo Rucellai and Marcantonio Sabellico, Machiavelli had
a profound sense of the ancient world as superior to the
modern. Historical recurrence was widely acknowledged
with respect to the actions of public men and to the
fates of armies. History tended towards no "telos,"
progress in human affairs was a chimera. Instead man was
condemned to periodic ascendance and decline. Neither
permanence nor evolution marked human affairs.
In their normal variations, countries gener-
ally go from order to disorder and then from
disorder back to order, because—since Nature
does not allow worldy things to remain fixed--
when they come to their utmost perfection and
have no further possibility for rising, they
must go down. Likewise, when they have gone
down and trhough their defects have reached
their lowest depth, they necessarily rise,
since they cannot go lower. 19
This cyclical image of human affairs has charac-
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termed all epochs. Great men, then can l. .' LIlfc;n / earn from
actions of outstanding leaders in the past, for neither
human nature nor human values have processed or evolved
from ancient days. Manhi«w«n-Y Machiavelli summarizes his views in
"The Prince:"
I. bring up the nob^st examples"
s
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The inductive method of Machiavelli, then, reflects cer-
tain predilections of philosophical history that condi-
tioned his views of leadership and action.
The book is not intended for anyone, however; these
are not principles of action to employ at will outside the
context of maintaining a principality. for underlying all
cf Machiavelli'
s work is the need to ensure stability, to
facilitate effective foreign policy: "effective" under-
stood throughout as security of territory in the face of
armed invasion, and as protection of the regime's rule in
its own domain. Political security is the "sine qua non"
of good governance.
A built-in ambiguity on this point persists. For
Machiavelli clearly emphasizes the dual nature of poli-
tical security. such security is to be understood as
both the territorial security of a particular province,
region, republic or principality and-simultaneous with
this security-as the continuation of the legitimate
regime's domestic rule. The overriding concern of vir-
tuous rule, as „e shall see, is to preserve these two
spheres of security.
The state, »lo state/' whose security is the goal of
good governance, entails both a social community and a
political regime. Throughout the late Middle Ages and the
(early) Renaissance the term "lo state" referred to both
the territorial estate of an effective sovereign and to
the rights and powers belonging to that ruler. The gradu-
al overturning of feudal relations and its replacement by
communal of Podestral governance weakened the proprietary
sense of the state, though, and it became Machiavelli
'
s
contribution to political thought that he politicized the
traditionally possessive and personal conception of the
Renaissance state. Machiavelli seeks to locate the state
within the public space of modern urban life.
In his writings Machiavelli tries to root the founda-
tions of the state in the traditions and customs of the
people who are governed. The prince's power depends upon
the support he receives from the citizenry. One must have
military strength in order to protect the state, for in-
stance, but such oowpr ; e r,^4-n p e ls not merely some empirical phe-
nomenon of soldiers and materiel. If this were SQ
,
cenaries and fortresses would fulfill the prince's re-
quirements, yet far more is needed
. ^ternis of estab-
lishing legitimate domain, "even though a new prince^
very strong in armies, he must have the inhabitants' fa-
vor when moving into a new province." 21^ protect the
province one will also need the continued respect of the
inhabitants. "Even though you have a fortress," warns
Machiavelli, "if the people hate you, it does not protect
you, because the people when they take up arms never lack
foreigners to aid you." 22 Thus "the people's friendship
is essential to a prince. Otherwise in adverse times he
has no resources." 23
A particular kind of respect is required, then, to
allow the prince to protect "lo stato." it is fear,
neither hatred nor love, which gives rise to respect from
the people; "from such fear flows respect, and this the
prince can hope to bring forth more than love itself." 24
These themes emerge in the famous sixth chapter of
book three of the "Discourses," "On Conspiracies." After
discussing every conceivable manner of overthrowing a
regime and of assassinating princes, Machiavelli concludes
that,
Of all the dangers that can appear after the
deed, there is none more certain or more to
be feared than when the people love the
rhavTn!;"
6 for *his, conspira-tors ha e no remedy, because they can nevprmake themselves safe from the peop?e?2§
Ve
The prince seeking support of the citizenry has to
express, embody, and at times simply appear to embody,
traits peculiar to politics. One nutfU&JjQthclever and
powerful, strategic and forceful f ginninq andjH^ ..The
Prince must be a fox, therefore, to recognize the traps
and a lion to frighten the wolves." 2^ One must be able to
act generously, in a liberal manner, with mercy, with
truthfulness, seriously, and religiously. But for a
prince, "it is not necessary actually to have all the
above-mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary to
appear to have them.'27
This familiar litany of the cunning prince, however,
does not suffice to enumerate the qualities of successful
rule. For the prince's ability to be good, and his know-
ledge of how not to be good, are not enough to secure a
state, nor a citizen's respectA Even in "The Prince,"
Machiavelli suggests that a ruler can best consolidate
his hold of the state by promulgating laws that conform
to the customs and traditions of the territory; "The
principal foundations of all states, the new as well as
the old and the mixed, are good laws and good armies." 28
Only good laws, in conjunction with good armies, will
enable the prince to protect his doraain in both politics
and diplomacy. His vigorous and decisive action, his
Prudent consideration of the constraints in which he
operates, can help him overcome the vicissitudes of
history and nature and thus to secure "lo state." He can,
in other words, overcome "fortune" through use of "ragione"
and thereby manifest "virtu" for the glory and strength
of the state.
"Fortuna," invariably translated as fortune, is the
realm in which non-rational forces hold sway over history
and politics. it embodies far more force and sweep than
mere luck or fate; "fortuna" encompasses not just one or
a few people in its dramatic consequences but affects
whole regions, continents, even eras. In reversing trends
of history, it establishes a whole new design of human
affairs
.
One should distinguish between events of nature, such
as floods, plagues, and famines, and those that affect the
course of human events through shifts in power and pres-
tige. "Fortuna" implies the unforeseeable character of
this latter class of events. The status of leaders, so-
cial classes, armies, and governments remains subject to
the vagaries of public life; it is the sudden turnabout
in political and military affairs not fully within human
grasp. The force of history constrains human action, and
in
" ar
^ control it. Neither a product Qf
God's will nor punishment for earthly sin, "fortuna-
te Maohiavellian framework stands as a profoundly secul
coonept. History as an immanent category embodies itself
in "fortuna;" "Things come up and events take place
against^which the Heavens do not wish any provision to be
made." They sweep over human affairs like a river surg-
ing over its banks, establishing its course anew. Cesare
Borgia, for instance, who profited from "fortuna" in his
attempt to establish a Papal state throughout Tuscany,
was towards the end of 1503 suddenly its victim. His
father, Pope Alexander VI, suddenly died, and then the
Florentine state unaccountably held off his armies when
the Borgia Duke took ill and died. The Tuscan Plain was
suddenly freed of Borgia rule. Thus "fortuna" is fickle
and unknowable. Those who ride well upon its crest may
some day find themselves in its trough. Machiavelli
warns us that "any prince who relies exclusively on For-
tune falls when she varies." 30
The fate of a Guelf leader plotting against the
Florentine state in 1378 exemplifies "fortuna' s" curious
ways
.
Piero degli Albizzi received no aid from the
greatness of his house or from his longstand-
ing reputation: for years he had been honored
and feared above every other citizen. Once
when he was giving a banquet to many citizens,
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Yet "fortuna" does not always turn so regularly as
Ixion in Hades, chained to his revolving wheel. 32 its
very unpredictability provides man with a moment of
political recognition: the consciousness that timely ac-
tion might yet seize the day and reverse the direction of
events apparently immutable.
...it is very true, according to what we seein all histories, that men are able to assistFortune but not to thwart her. They can weaveher designs but cannot destroy them. They
ought, then, never to give up as beaten, be-
cause, since they do not know her purpose and
she goes through crooked and unknown roads,
they can always hope, and hoping are not to
give up, in whatever fortune and whatever
affliction they may be. 33
But "fortuna" does not determine human affairs; she
only alters their course and delimits the sphere in which
human action might be decisive. Especially when one's
fortune is on the rise, political action can lend a shape
to events. But such opportunities for action are limited,
and when fortunes are in decline man seems to act in vain;
97
rewara, fame
, glory
, „ virtue bestQwed ^
who fans from grace
, and even if one , s ^ ^
contrary help cusnion the ^^ ^ ^
taken when strugglinq to le^n h-v^ • ^ •g essen the indignity of falling
from a high and respected place.
How much of political history results from bold ini-
tiative, how much from fate or mere chance? Political
man is condemend to insecurity about when to act deci-
sively, or whether one's efforts have made a difference.
As I am well aware, many have believed andnow believe human affairs so controlled SyFortune and by God that men with their pru-dence cannot manage them—yes, more, thatmen have no recourse against the world's
variations. Such believers therefore de-cide that they need not sweat much overman s activities but can let Chance governthem... I myself now and then incline in
some respects to their belief. Nonethe-less, m order not to annul our free will
I judge it true that Fortune may be mistress
of one half our actions but that even sheleaves t^e other half, or almost, under our
control
.
"Fortuna" requires that a prince master her to the great-
est degree possible. Here he must use "ragione:" the
mental ability to reason and deduce particular actions
from the chaos of politics and history. Not a product of
personal desire or will, "ragione" entails the dispas-
sionate comprehension of the political vortex confronting
the prince and the state. It was the characteristic
Florentine term for the rational quality of mind which de-
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cides and directs statecraft. Ragione," the reasoned
alternative to rhn'^i LChristian humility or resignation," com.bmed prudence with analytic powers- it ind- . ,i fw , icated the
ability to deduce the appropriate particular from the
universe of action, with "ragione" one dispenses „ith
rllusory hopes and overwhelming fears to uncover patterns
of human behavior in politics and warfare, with incon-
sistencies and superfluities revealed, a continuity is
arrived at; therein lies the basis for actions that will
ameliorate the conflict. With •ragione" one tames "for-
tuna." The cry for it calls out against the feeling "of
helplessness in the face of non-rational forces." 36
"Ragione" stands opposed to "fortuna" from the stand-
point of rational and deliberative policy-making. But
sometimes "fortuna" works so dramatically that there re-
mains no time for relying upon "ragione." Sometimes the
very force of circumstances compels men to strike out
almost impulsively, certainly boldly, against "fortuna."
Such compelled action occurs in the sphere of "neces-
sity," necessity. m Renaissance Italy "necessita" was
said to have developed when the build-up of adverse circum-
tances became so great that no free choice to act re-
ined. Rational human calculations like those of "ra-
gione" were rendered ineffective and inadequate before the
s
ma
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overwhelm force of events. Under
"necessita" act
emanated not from careful reflection but from a sponta-
neous, reactive impulse that inchoately comprehended
exactly what had to be done and that began to do it In
the struggle to tame "fortuna," " ragione ,„ tne contempla .
tive dimension in relatively guiet times, gave way to
"necessity
»
the impulsively active dimension.
Acting from "necessita," thought Machiavelli, was
more certain and forthright than acting from "ragione" or
from mere fancy. Machiavelli explains this when speaking
of where a republic may be most securely established.
And because men act either through necessityor through choice, and because ability ap-pears the more where choice has less powerit must be considered whether for the build-ing of cities it would be better to choosebarren places, in order that men, forced tokeep at work and less possessed by laziness
may live more united, having because of the'poverty of the site slighter cause for dis-
sensions
, . . .
J 7
The coarseness of a people's life renders it less
subject to corruption and more subject to the bare neces-
sities of existence. In fact, when a people is reduced
to its most basic condition it responds most fitfully of
all. Witness the Britons, driven off their island by the
Germanic Angles under King Vortiger. These dispossessed
inhabitants, being deprived of their native
land, of necessity became courageous and de-
cided that though they had not been able to
100
defend their own count™ fKQ
conquer that of others t^ ^^6 able totheir families crossed * the 2 theJefore withthe region nearest to tS%S *nd conc3ue^dtheir own name cabled STt^S^t^.
"Necessita" drives men to action. Motivation under
it i. the strongest affect an army can know; on the bat-
tlefield it powerfully conditions the outcome of battle.
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Fighting out of necessity, fighting desperately for
one's own land and state, creates not only fierce war-
riors but a war whose cause is just. m the Machiavel-
lian world, citizens and soldiers know no greater good
than public life in their own city-state. When this is
threatened they respond with a fervor not merely vigorous
but ethically sanctioned. Machiavelli articulates this
in the form of a plea for military aid made by a leading
exiled Florentine citizen to Duke Filippo, a mercenary
leader; the exiled plotter seeks reconquest of his city
from the hands of the tyrants who now occupy it.
In the body of a republic what illness can be
more serious than servitude? What medicine is
more necessary than that which relieves it
from this disease? Only those wars are just
that are necessary; and arms are holy when
there is no hope apart from them. I do not
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know what necessity can be greater th„n
S£"i- 0£ "hat hol^ss =an surpassthat which takes any man's native cityIt is therefore most certain that onrcause is holy and just. 40
For Machiavelli, these concepts of "fortuna," "ra-
gione," and "necessita" are internally related. None
would make sense without the other unless we were to
distort completely the purposes they serve in Machia-
velli- s work. "Portuna" alone would place history beyond
conscious human agency.
"Ragione" by itself would be mere
contemplation, outside of a temporal and political realm.
And "necessita" alone would be sheer expediency: just that
sort of instrumental rationality so detested by anti-Machi-
avellians
.
Men within this conceptual framework are not intrin-
sically evil; nor are they without scruples. But "neces-
sita" in the face of "fortuna" may force the prince's hand.
Cruel acts that eliminate usurpers or that instill fear in
the hearts of a newly conquered populace are occasionally
required to ensure the state's security. Deceptive or
violent acts to rectify an otherwise overwhelming situa-
tion may be demanded, then, by "necessita." And for this
alone the prince must have recourse to acts of political
evil. But the capacity to commit evil when "necessita"
demands it is distinguished from always acting evilly.
The prince
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Men are not by nature villainous, though they have
the capacity to do evil if their power is threatened o
their territory endangered. But the virtuous prince do
not seek out the mere accumulation of power. Rather, h
seeks glory in the eyes of the people. Glory is to be
found in legitimate political power, and only "virtu-
will help the prince and the republic attain it. The
prince who is completely cunning and terroristic does not
manifest "virtu" and cannot hope to achieve legitimate
power. Success on the battlefield, always a prerequisite
for secure power, does not exhaust for Machiavelli the
achievements that give rise to "virtu."
In the broadest sense "virtu" is the skill and cour-
age by which men come to dominate human events and "for-
tuna." it indicates the innate quality of the prince that
helps him to overcome "fortuna" and by which innovations
of established political structures are made through
statecraft and arms.
Throughout "The Prince" Machiavelli 1 s men of "virtu"
, 43are predominantly warriors. They emerge unscathed in
the face of extreme danger by exhibiting in battle the
special qualities of foresight and strength of will, de-
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cisiveness and determination, and bravery ^
Military prowess is an essential Qf ^ ^ ^
manifests "vi^." for given ^ unpredictabmty ^
»f=rtuna» ana the primacy of territorial security ^^
Power is ever safe without ultimate recourse to arms when
necessary. But one who does not litest "virtu" may also
gam power, and though the enjoyment of power be short-
lived it still may be sought unvirtuously
_ Maohiavelli>
however, condemns this possibility. Agathocles, for in-
stance, the anoient Prinoe of Sicily, achieved his pQsi .
tion by ruthless ambition and by slaughtering his oppo-
nents, whether senators, civilians, or soldiers. He then
maintained his power by suppressing civil strife and by
attacking the Carthaginians. Machiavelli comments on his
rule
.
It cannot, however, be called virtue to killone s fellow-citizens, to betray friends, tobe without fidelity, without mercy, without
religion; such proceedings enable one to qain
sovereignty, but not fame... his outrageous
cruelty and inhumanity together with his
countless wicked acts do not permit him to behonored among the noblest men. We cannot,
then, attribute to Fortune or to virtue whathe accomplished without the one or the other. 44
"Virtu" comes from the Latin "virtus;" the "virtus"
of the citizen was his "manliness:" character that quali-
fied a man for citizenship and that led to effective civic
participation. in the Machiavellian framework that "vir-
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tus» becomes the quality of personal force and energy
manifested by a leader „ho commands good "fortuna" and „ho
deals effectively and nobly with whatever
"fortune" br
"Virtu" is that political quality which secures the par-
ticularity of the polls within the settino of »i-iie b g a universal
"fortuna" that is inherently destabilizing. it thus
transcends the capacity simply to wield the instruments of
power for the sake of maintaining »lo state." For the
virtuous man has an intuitive grasp of the republic's
first and foundational principles. His striving for
these, most conspicuously in military affairs, but also
in domestic politics, elicits both support for his actions
and the desire of the populace to follow him.
"Virtu" manifests the strength and vigor from which
political actions arise. It is a prerequisite for leader-
ship that becomes established collectively by first postu-
lating, then exemplifying, the coherence of the political
community. Government could not function, let alone ex-
ist, without it. "Virtu," the principle of secular spiri-
tual dynamism that underpins the polis, is inspired among
citizens by acts of leadership, of which courage in bat-
tle is the most enobling.
This movement of republics back toward their
beginnings is accomplished also by the mere
excellence of one man, without reliance on
any law that spurs people on to action; yet
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These are two senses of "virtu," then, in Machiavel-
ix's work. The flrst one
, primarily Qf „ The ^
the basically nonmoral action of the prince who secures »lo
state" in the face of impending doom. Here the innovator
imposes order upon "fortuna," and "ragione" supplies for
him the practical dimension which "virtu" carries out in
statecraft. The second sense of "virtu" places the vir-
tuous leader squarely within the political community.
Through the institutionalization of civic virtue by means
of "good laws and good armies" 46 he establishes legitimate
rule. Here the republic or principality is provided a
secure foundation from which develop commerce and trade in
civil society and animated public political activity in
which all citizens partake.
This second aspect of "virtu," which relates the in-
novator working against "fortuna" to the innovator working
within a political community with customs and traditions
to affirm, is the most important conceptual transition
from "The Prince" to the "Discourses." In the former
Machiavelli presents all he knows from the standpoint of
the prince and of great men; in the latter his perspec-
tive is that of the affairs of the world in general, and
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of the Roman Empire in particular th
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T e concept of "vir-tu" is expanded: from the skillc, .lls and policies of the mili-tary commander to the soii-it- ^ = 4.n p r t that guides the republic
"n
' «- ideal of active citizenship in the
"public. is developed Machiavelli , s ^^^^^ ^
the realm which embodies "virtu."
The "Discourses" is the work where Machiavelli de-
velops fully his concepts of active citizenship in the
republic. unlike principalities, republics are democra-
ts, aristocracies, or elective monarchies having legis-
lators who make laws governing a people's security.
Principalities are ruled by administrative arms of the
prince who himself is sovereign, whereas republics are
constitutionally founded and governed by laws, under which
sovereignty the legislators preside. Very often, Machi-
avelli notes, an overlapping system of limited rule will
enable a state to avoid the Polybian degeneration of
government, from monarchy-tyranny to aristocracy-oligarchy
to democracy-anarchy. The Florentine Republic enjoys such
a mixed system; the legislative chamber, the Grand Coun-
cil, has an appointed overseer, "il Ganfolaniere a vita."
Good laws result from public disagreement and debate
between the nobility and the people of a republic. And it
is "animo," political soul, the vital core of political
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action, 48 that impels men to public snirif^Dx p ritedness and that
conduces man to l iberty
.
..Animo „ is ^ energi2ing^
of action inherent in political man. The drive behind the
desire to excel in politics and warfare, it impels men to
greatness and to defense of the polls; without it "virtu-
would cease to appear. But "animo" differs from "virtu"
by its being essential to, indeed, definitive of, human
nature as Machiavelli knew it. "Virtu," then, charac-
terizes "lo state- whereas "animo" is characteristic of man
But private ambition often undermines "animo," the
spark of politics. The force that impels political ac-
tion, that characterizes republican liberty can easily
become corrupted by fortune seekers who display excessive,
private ambition. Machiavelli calls this "ambizione." Ke
accords it an instrumental quality that is not to be found
in "animo." 'Ambizione" expresses the self-serving desire
to accrue power and wealth in competition against others
that benefits not the public but the purely private sec-
tor. By its very nature "overreaching and overweening,"49
"ambizione" poses a major threat to the liberty of the
republic; it results in forms of personal or class domi-
nation whereby politics becomes suppressed. "Ambizione,"
whether manifested by individuals, classes, or states,
destroys politics and public life by orienting all action
towards private fain of wealth and power.
108
in domestic politics the "ambizione" of the nobility
tends to constitute a greater threat to republ iCan liberty
than the "ambizione" of the common people. The only ef-
fective constraints on the appetites of one class appear
to be the appetites of the other. Thus republican liberty
is always marked by some domestic conflict. To the ques-
tion which class, the nobility or the people, should the
guardianship of liberty be entrusted to, Machiavelli has
no consistent answer.
There is, then, a tension inherent in the structure
of the republic. Liberty is a precarious phenomenon.
Both "fortuna" and domestic political strife may threaten
it. But civic virtue and public discipline, inspired by
"virtu" and flowing from "animo," can secure the repub-
lic's moorings.
I say that those who condemn the dissen-
sions between the nobility and the people
seem to me to be finding fault with what
as a first cause kept Rome free, and to
be considering the quarrels and the noise
that resulted from those dissensions ra-
ther than the good effects they brought
about; they are not considering that in
every republic there are two opposed fac-
tions, that of the people and that of the
rich, and that all the laws made in favor
of liberty result from their accord... Nor
can a republic in any way reasonably be
called unregulated where there are so many
instances of honorable conduct; for these
good instances have their origin in good
education; good education in good laws;
good laws in those dissensions that many
thoughtlessly condemn. 50
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But "ambizione," or excessive ambition, threat,
the very foundations of the remihUn kn Public by undermining the
customs of libertv wh-i^Ky ich arouse civic virtue and which
are embodied in the laws. The delicate balance of repub-
lican liberty can be upset completely through the cor-
ruption of public spirit;
"...where the matter is not
corrupt, uprisings and other disturbances do no harm.
Where it is corrupt, well-planned laws are of no use,...^ 1
Such corruption develops from powerful factions that
fragment the political community. The wealthy cl;
and those whose power is founded on personal influx
rather than on merit and legally sanctioned sources give
rise to this corruption. By deceiving the people and
doing them wrong with impunity, the unrestrained passions
of men corrupt the once virtuous political community.
The Roman people, for instance, once corrupted, began,
...in awarding the consulate, no longer to
consider ability, but favor, putting in that
office those who knew best how to please men,
not those who knew best how to conquer ene-
mies. Then from those who had most favor,
they descended to giving it to those who had
most power, so that the good, because of the
weakness of such a procedure, were wholly
excluded from office. 52
The corrupted republic also begins to seek empire.
Only an expansionary goreign policy that enlarges the
republic's domain and that brings in more resources to
satisfy widespread demand can result from such corruption.
110
The desire for power ana wealth by the nobility
sxtates external expansion; and from the standpoint of
the people empire is oraved so as to aggrandi 2 e the re-
public.
But even if the one republic is not imperious from
corruption, surely see others will be. We confront once
again the uncertainties of diplomacy over which "fortuna"
reigns. And to the insecurities of statecraft we add the
uncertainties caused by "ambizione" as the product of
corrupted "virtu." The republic, then, which desires the
security (if not the aggrandizement) of its own existence
must struggle even harder against "fortuna," and follow
"necessita," in anticipating diplomatic currents. A
tough, forecful, perhaps even expansionary foreign policy
is needed to forestall the ambitions of other states and
to ensure its own safety. Republican politics and the
desire for liberty as manifested in "animo" motivate the
state here to maximize its security in a sea of "fortuna"
and "ambizione."
How much harder, then, to ensure such security when
the republic itself suffers corruption! "From all the
things explained above," writes Machiavelli, "comes the
difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a government
in a corrupt city or of setting up a new government
Ill
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^^-Z^iitic^ofa Citizen-Army
The corrupt nature of Italian
.ilitary practices
Plays a central role In Machiavelli s thought. After
1494, after the first French invasions of Charles VH1
into Milan and Naples, the once-powerful Italian city-
states fell defenselp^c; +- 0 f^^ar nseiess to foreign armies. Swiss infantry
under contract to France fought the armies of the Holy
League. The tactics of Italian mercenary warfare proved
ill-suited to fend off either the French or the League's
armies led by Spain. Though cities like Florence sought
an alliance with France, and while other cities sided
with the League, the armies of Italy were largely en-
gulfed by wave upon wave of invasions. The European
armies took to battle in Lombardy and Tuscany. For Machi-
avelli this constituted a political and military disaster
that could only be counteracted by reforming Italian
practices. The politics of rebuilding the Italian system
of warfare thus became a central theme of his work.
The genius of Machiavelli 1 s "The Art of War" is that
it construes warfare in terms of political relationships.
He studies here not simply weapons and tactics but also
the political conditions in which good armies might pre-
serve good states. while at one level he details ad
absurdum military formations, the size and shape of en-
campments, and proper techniques for walling in a city, at
another level he relates the structure of a well-trained
infantry to a citizenry animated by love of its republic.
To reform the system of warfare endemic to Renaissance
Italy, then, one had to reform the political relation-
ships of which armies are a part. That meant both devel-
oping a theory of legitimate public violence and estab-
lishing state institutions and practices responsible for
executing it. in Machiavelli
• s work, particularly in
"The Art of War," that entailed a citizen-army.
At the outset of his dialogue Machiavelli disputes
the prevailing view of an unbridgeable gulf between citi-
zenship and military life. The ancients knew no such in-
compatibility between public action and affairs of war.
When called upon the Romans would join the army, and when
the war was over they would, like Cincinnatus, return to
their fields or cities. But in the modern age, in Renais-
sance Italy, custom preaches that the refinements, dress,
speech, and demeanor of the city are totally at odds with
the accoutrements of war. Custom here sees that the good
warrior cannot be a good citizen, that a tradesman or
scholar has not the character demanded of modern combat.
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A gulf opened up between the military professional and the
citizen, a gulf f inding justif ication ^
taste for the brutalities of army life.
Machiavelli does not dispute the horrific character
of Renaissance warfare. But he does mistrust the conse-
quences of citizens turning away from activities so cen-
tral to public security. For it is just such popular
antipathy to organized violence that seems to legitimate
the reliance upon professional, mercenary warriors and
upon despots trained in the arts of war. Such reliance
upon professional soldiers can only perpetuate a state's
corruption and insecurity, for the government has not a
virtuous army defending it. If not overrun by foreign
armies it will be betrayed by its own forces as they con-
stantly seek out new wars or impose their own tyranny.
...he will never be reckoned a good man who
carries on an occupation in which, if he is
to endeavor at all times to get income fromit, he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent,
and must have many qualities which of neces-
sity make him not good; nor can men who prac-
tice it as a profession, the big as well as
the little, be of any other sort, because this
profession does not support them in time of
peace. Hence they are obliged either to hope
that there will be no peace, or to become so
rich in times of war that in peace they can
support themselves.
. .and from not wishing
peace come the deceits that the generals
practice against those by whom they are em-
ployed, ... 54
War, then, is too brutal to entrust to private citi-
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-ns, in their concern f„ boQty> ^^
egos, in their recurrent search for grandeur and power-
over other armies, over whole regiQns they
will lead more likely to tyranny than to security against
mvaders. War, then, being too important for private
citizens, must return to the responsibility of the state
It must become a public matter, for only states, led by
councils of citizens, can conduct warfare in a manner
appropriate to defeating aggression which win not arouse
mistrust among the populace and dissension among poll-
tical rivals.
...because this is a profession by means ofwhich men cannot live virtuously at an timesit cannot be practiced as a profession except'by a republic or kingdom; and neither 0 f
XCS
these, when they have been well-regulatedhas ever allowed one of its citizens or sub-jects to practice it as a profession, nor hasany good map ever engaged in it as his specialprofession. D F d
Signorial governance, replete with its privately re-
cruited armed guards surrounding a hereditary or foreign
despot, had for too long marked the Italian city-state's
response to the crisis of the commune. Domestic dissen-
sion had perforce led to the disarming of citizens and
the dependence of the state upon mercenary armies for
defense in the North Italian plains. Citizens grew too
comfortable in their pursuits of wealth and had developed
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an abhorence of th*» ^v-^ *.e arts of war, mUch to the detriment
of the state Mot-o tt-i-ii •re wilUag to pay an added levy than to
volunteer themselves for duty, too absorbed in the die-
fates of a chn'cf -, .C rrstran moralxty that preaohed oonoiliation
-ther than fitness in war ," the civic ^ ^
early modern Italian city-state had abandoned mii itary
-kill, and had developed in their stead a trained
rior olass. with the teohnioal sophistioation of
weapons, particularly huge cannons and hand guns (..arque-
buses"), the tasks of war increasingly had become the
exclusive preserve of specialists, professionals, and
tose troops more concerned with their own private advance-
ment than with love of country or city.
The politics of a citizen-army depends entirely upon
organizing an obedient, well-trained infantry force, one
that emulates Roman tactics and that will avoid the cor-
rupting influence that so beset the Italian mercenary
armies. And here we see not simply some longing for anti-
quity; rather we see an appreciation of the role played by
courageous soldiers who can be recruited, trained, and
called upon in wartime and who would prefer returning to
private affairs as soon as their triumph afield secured
the state.
"Men, steel, money, and bread are the sinews of war;
! If,
but of these four the most necessary are the first two,
because men and steel find money and bread, but bread and
money do not find men and steel." 57 Machiavelli
• s pre-
ference for infantry, for battle formations and tactics
organized around the shock-power of men, emerges clearly
in "The Art. of W.i r . "
In 1506, during the siege of Pisa, Machiavelli had
organized a militia of 20,000 men from the provinces sur-
rounding Florence. In his treatise he articulates the
concerns that guided him then and that reside at the
heart of all good armies. m peacetime one needs no
standing army, only a relatively small core of soldiers
guarding fortresses and cities. Armies, on the contrary,
are drafted for purposes of fighting decisively in bat-
tle. Conscripts, drafted from the countryside, comprise
the best infantry. since most of contemporary warfare
required long marches, encamping, digging trenches, build-
ing bridges, and having to live for months at a time out
of doors, those already accustomed to such a lifestyle
wore most naturally suited to army life. The wise general
shunned foreign volunteers, for they have left their home-
land for reasons of exile, disloyalty, fortune hunting, or
to escape punishment; these men, though able to fight
,
cannot be trusted to obey the orders necessary for suc-
cessful Lnfantry tactics. Citizens should assemble and
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train periodically in peacetime, but not to the point
where they will be diverted from their jobs at home.
During service they receive a modest pay, but upon re-
turning from battle they lose their salary, though not,
suggests Machiavelli, their weapons. And leaders, cap-
tains, responsible for command of each district are to
be rotated periodically lest personal allegiances between
soldiers and leaders arise to endanger the state.
In Machiavelli 's time the Swiss infantry were the
envy of all Europe. In Switzerland, owing to the cold,
icy, mountainous terrain, cavalry had never been devel-
oped as systematically as in France or Austria. Orga-
nized by cantons, democratically electing their own
leaders, Swiss soldiers had developed battle formations
that made them nearly invincible. The Swiss tactics of
pikemen and halbrediers were perfected to the point of
transforming the whole European art of war in the fif-
teenth century. In battles against Burgundian cavalry at
Granson and Morat
, for instance, in 1476, the organized
shock tactics of Swiss infantry easily overwhelmed a nu-
merically superior army led by mounted knights and sup-
5 8ported by foot soldiers and heavy guns.
The Swiss infantry formation relied upon ten rows of
pikemen. Marching solidly in rank, perhaps 250 abreast,
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they held out before the, a wooden rod some eighteen
feet long that was fitted with a steel-pointed head
compactness of each row upon row of infantry enabled thei
P^es to extend out over four lines of soldiers. The
Pikes in the front line extended the farthest, those pro-
truding from the second line some three feet less, and
those of the third, fourth, and fifth lines corresponding-
ly less. Behind this first phalanx of five rows of pike-
men stood yet another, though less densely organized,
ready to setp in in full formation as the first phalanx
gave way, stepped aside, or retreated. Behind this se-
cond phalanx line, and between the battalions of pikemen,
stood men armed with halbreds, a sharp ax edge on one
side, a metal hook on the other, affixed to an eight-foot
wooden shaft. The mere sight of such an army afoot must
have terrified an advancing army. The first ranks of
pikemen, with their pikes held out at full length, ad-
vanced as if a moving wall of spears: the rear ranks, with
their pikes held upright, appeared as if a marching forest.
Behind and between them one saw row upon row of gleaming
metal. When cavalry were halted by the phalanx of pike-
men the halbrediers stepped in and with two hands swung
their halbreds through the armor of the knights. Plate
armor, less than l/64th of an inch thick, proved no pro-
tection against these lethal axes.
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The key to Swiss tactics was the pikemen 's ability
to force knights to dismount. In "The Art of War,"
Machiavelli expalins why horses cannot be made to charge
into the lines of pikemen, and why they halt and throw
off their riders.
Nor should anybody be astonished that a knotof infantrymen can resist any charge of caval-rymen because the horse is a perceiving ani-mal which recognizes dangers and is unwillingto entre them. And if you will consider theforces making him go forward and those holdinghim back, you will see without doubt thoseholding him back are greater than those urginghim on, because the spur drives him forward,but on the other hand the sword and the pikekeep him back. So... a knot of infantrymen is
secure against cavalry, indeed it is uncon-
querable by it... If you wish to experiment
with this, attempt to run a horse against a
wall; seldom will you find, no matter what hisimpetus, that he will run against it. 59
Swiss infantry comprised a formidable army indeed.
Their pikemen and halbrediers wore little armor; at most
a light breatplate and not even a helmet, for any undue
weight would retard their march into battle and thus
diminish their shock momentum. Their line formation and
their order of retreat to let through the halbrediers
entailed a truly rigorous adherence to precise tactics:
tactics that other European armies were incapable of emu-
lating .
Machiavelli
' s admiration for Swiss tactics did not,
however, prevent him from criticism. For when the Swiss
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met up with other infantry they proved not terribly
adept at close battle. Their emphasis on long weapons
wrelded only with two hands and their disregard for armor
rendered them vulnerable to early sixteenth oentury
Spanish infantry armed with shields, short knives, and
swords. The difficulties of the Swiss mercenaries in the
employ of Louis XII, when in battle with Spanish infantry
during the Italian campaigns, highlighted this problem for
Machiavelli. m » The Art of War „ he suggests ^.^
fantry with Spanish weapons, weapons copied from the
Romans
.
Machiavelli 's respect for well-trained infantry led
him not only to recognize the shortcomings of cavalry; it
also led to his crituqe of artillery. In the early six-
teenth century the technology of cannons and firearms had
not progressed to the point where these weapons were reli-
able instruments of battle. 60 The first cannons, cast in
bronze or iron, were enormous, clumsy, and fickle tools of
war. Owing to the necessity of casting thick gun barrels,
cannons until the Thirty Years War (1618-48) weighted from
four to thirty tons, had to be hauled by dozens of oxen,
required at least a dozen men to load the shell (more
often than not a stone!), and could only be fired after
waiting more than hour for the breech and barrel to cool
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down from the last firing
. shells were^ ^ ^ ^
cannon by huge deposits of gunpowder placed directly in
the breech, and the enormous heat generated from com-
bustion would often cause the cannon to crack or explode
after just a few firings. Beyond these problems, the
cannon had very limited range: no more than 1,000 yards,
and this with little consistency. Little wonder, then,
that Machiavelli complains of how, with the exception of
besieging a city by battering its walls for days or weeks,
the cannon was a weapon hardly to be called upon by a
general trying to outwit an army on the battlefield. The
clouds of smoke these early cannons bellowed forth often
obscured the attacking army's own view; its shot was
terribly inaccurate, often firing shells that landed
short upon the very army deploying artillery. The cannon
itself was immobile or absurdly clumsy afield, and it all
too frequently lured generals to neglect the more funda-
mental art of infantry. 61
Tactical formations for encampment, marching, and
fighting required, in Machiavelli ' s view, rigid organiza-
tion; only when each man knew his role and perfomred it
in cooperation with his fellow soldiers could an army be
successful and virtuous. In his discussion of camp life,
for instance, Machiavelli specifies the size, shape, and
structure of quarters for armies in the field. A camp
is best thought of as "a movable city;"" ±- ^ ^
Precisely, its streets have names, each block of tents
is numbered, each inhabitant has an address. The general
Presides literally at the center of this camp, and by
dispatching his aides to each corner of the symmetrical
city he can establish a form of social control. He can,
for instance, prevent contact between soldiers and out-
siders who might spy on or conspire against him. Nightly
checks on the whereabouts of each soldier will assure that
one can neither flee nore neter furtively without immedi-
ately drawing the attention of the general. And harshly
enforced laws for all violations of camp rules will in-
still fear of love of country does not already govern
soldiers' actions.
Obedience is also assured by paying soldiers only
two-thirds of their pay when they serve in the field.
The remaining third remains deposited with the paymaster,
to be remitted only at war's end. And all booty collected
in warfare becomes not the private property of the soldier
collecting it but rather the public property of the en-
tire army. Valorous men should be financially rewarded,
however, if they are the first to scale the wall of a
besieged city or recapture a flag taken by the enemy.
But too great an opportunity for economic gain will dis-
tract an army from its duties. In 1439, recounts Machi-
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avelli, Niccolo Piccino, in command of the Milanese army
occupying Verona, lost the city's fortress when Count
Francesco descended upon him while the defending soldiers
were busy looting. when Niccolo
Vernn^
tUrn his soldie^ towardrona, he gave orders to prepare for de-fense. But he was tQo ^ ^ecause Ibarricades cutting off his castle were notmade, and in ther lust for booty and ran-soms the soldiers were scattered, so thathe could not bring them together quickly
enough to prevent the Count's soldiersfrom reaching the fortress and thencedescending into the city. Thus the Counttriumphantly regained Verona, with shameto Niccolo and harm to his soldiers. 63
Obedient soldiers, then, remain reliable in battle.
By keeping them away from sources of private gain the
general knows his troops are ready to fight for the
state's safety, not for their private aggrandizement.
Infantry tactics and obedience, however, are not the
only arts of war at which a general and his army need be
adept. Sophisiticated strategems, maneuvers of outright
deception, will often enable an army to steal a victory
or to retreat without suffering a rout. The art of de-
ceiving your enemy about your own intentions is crucial
to successful warfare. Numerical superiority alone in
arms or men will never suffice to decide a battle when
human intelligence is at work guiding armies. Here we
encounter warfare not as the clash of metal against metal
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but as the human struggle of vi rtu0u s and clever men
seeking advantage over their adversaries.
What do stratagems in warfare look like? when an
encamped army wishes to deceive an enemy about its size
the wise general will not alter his camp routine after
receiving reinforcements or upon losing many men. Do not
tell anyone but the narrowest circle of confidants exactly
your intentions for tomorrow's battle, for your own men
fight best when instructed only at the last moment, and in
this manner you obviate the problem of spies or informers
getting early word of your formations. Do not dispatch
ambassadors in noble garb; disguise them, instead, as
servants or commoners who can thereby gain valuable infor-
mation surreptitiously. Machiavelli also suggests the
strategem of "disinformation," though he does not describe
it as such; plant mistrust among the enemy by spreading in
your own camp rumors of your plans and then allow some
prisoners to escape with false word of what you plan.
When on campaign in search of an enemy on the march, send
off some men to attack the adversary's homeland, when
besieging a city on the brink of starvation, allow a fat-
tened-up cow to be captured by the townsmen; when they
slaughter it and open up its belly they will see how well
fed is your army, and they will despair even more of
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their plight
.
Should your own auguries on the eve of
battle turn out to be unfavorable, dece ive your troops
and interpret the signs positively lest your men fall into
doubts about their fate. if you need tQ ford a^
while retreating, instead of having half of your army
stand by idly waiting to cross, send the, to the rear so
they can build a diversionary fire or ditch that will
stand in the way of your pursuers. And do not hesitate
to confuse the opposing army; send into battle, for in-
stance, elephants or camels, or have your men scream
wildly as they charge. All of these measures will give
you a psychological advantage and enable you to throw the
enemy off stride. 64
In the cultivation of such strategems, as well as in
developing an infantry required for warfare, the mercenary
system had left the Italian city-states in a backward con-
dition. They stood helpless before the far superior
forces of France, Spain, and the Empire. The Machia-
vellian general, skilled in the art of war, had thus not
only to lead his troops; he had actually to create them.
Only then would Italy emerge as a serious contender in
the politics of Renaissance Europe. If infantry could not
be recruited, if men would not obey a general, if generals
would not learn the tactics of modern warfare, then all of
Italy, no less than each of her city-states, would be
126
rendered impotent. The decline of Florentine greatness
"as due to a negleot among its citizens of^ ^ ^
war so crucial to security in the early modern world
The Romans. concern for mounting a fit army had given way
to a civic humanism of intellectual li fe that disdained
the life of the soldier; annuity's contempt for the
pursuit of wealth and private status had been replaced
hy the ethic of commercially minded middle and artisan
classes. The resulting disregard for good armies had
contributed greatly to the ease with which foreign^
after 1494, had overrun Italy. „ords which MaohiaveU .
had placed in the mouth of a Lucchese nobleman, when that
republic was attacked by Florence in 1437, returned to
haunt all of Italy.
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The vicissitudes of "fortuna" had now turned against
Florence, and with it against all of Italy. Small wonder,
then, that each of Machiavelli
• s major works concludes
with a passionate cry for the creation of political unity
transcending the old bases of the Italian city-based com-
munes. The political disputes and feuds that had made it
impossible to mobilize a militia could only be overcome
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by uniting the walled city with the provincial far,, and
the warring city-states with one another. The creation of
a Public militia required ties of patriotism and love that
transcended the geography of late-medieval politics: a
militia built not upon guilds, noble families, or com-
peting urban elites but upon nationwide ties of common
language and culture. Only under the leadership of a
virtuous general could such a new polity survive in the
world of the early modern European state system.
Machiavelli
' s Legacy
mo-
The claim that violence and power characterize the
dern state system finds its warrant in the Machiavellian
tradition. "Realpolitik ,
- "Staatsrason , - are two views of
international relations that have emerged in the wake of,
and that first found support in, the writings of this
Florentine diplomat.
No one in the history of political thought has writ-
ten so passionately of power. The prince or legislator
seeking to found and maintain a polity must not shy away
from the uses of violence in securing a political space.
Machiavelli *s work, of course, especially "The
Prince," abounds in counsel to the manipulative political
leader who is impelled by ambition and who searches for
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glory by becoming the head of state. But though a would-
be tyrant may find license in Machiavelli , s^ ^ ^
do so only at the price of misconstruing the larger pur-
pose of those writings. For Machiavelli s realism is
considerably more complicated than one finds by pulling
out this or that quotation from his most-read work.
Machiavelli, in fact, was not a Machiavellian. His
work in its entirety displays remarkable ambiguity about
the use and propriety of violence in founding and main-
taining a state. While having no doubts that a well-run
principality or republic had to be founded by the use of
force, Machiavelli repeatedly stresses that without good
laws and respected institutions, sufficient arms and
resolute leaders are to no avail. The language of poli-
tical virtue that informs a well-run state is not that of
military conquest but of a people's willingness to defend
when necessary the land and laws they respect. To found
such a state the forceful prince must not shy away from
eliminating corruption and greed. But Machiavelli repeat
edly makes clear that a state based entirely on violence
is tyrannical and unworthy of merit. In short, the Machi-
avellian leader, whether a prince or I a republica, must
always agonize about the political nature and consequen-
ces of the force he uses in securing and maintaining a
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polity.
-
exploration of MachiavelH-s thought reveals ^the power available to the statg ^^ ^
can achieve. Because violence and war may be abused by
leaders, a virtuous prince or, car a sagacious leader will fi
it neither wise nor useful tQ rely ^
enxng or using the. in seeking to preserve
Power, security, then, is not alone dependent upon mili-
tary power. tad while a state would ^ ^
itself, it would never be served well by arming to the
hilt in an attempt to intimidate adversaries.
To recast this slightly in terms more familiar to
modern statesmanship, the Machiavellian leader is com-
pelled by the nature of the secular state to balance the
quest for legitimate policies with the need to establish
the credibility of his willingness to resort to arms
should the polity's security be threatened. The "virtu"
of which Machiavelli speaks so often stems from the know-
ledge among a polity's citizens that a state is able to
preserve its liberties and institutions should an attack—
whether by domestic conspirators or foreigners—ever be
launched upon them. Such virtue is political insofar as
it pertains to the recognition that a set of political
values exist, are widely acknowledged, and are cherished
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dearly by a populace
. And ^^ ^
-sofar as adherence to those values entails an obliga-
tl0n
'
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of a people to fight for and
defend their own country when necessary.
This should not be mistaken for militarism; it is
rather patriotism on constant guard. A republic or princi-
pality unable to raise a citizen-army, that must in its
stead rely upon mercenaries paid by and contracted through
condottieri of dubious allegiance who merely seek commer-
cial gain, is a state neither legitimate nor likely to
preserve for very long what few liberties it may have.
Foreign powers and potential rival claimants to power will
be dissuaded from launching attacks on republics or princi-
palities only when these are imbued with virtue.
Virtue also enhances the respect one requires in di
plomacy. The daring legislator, in the act of founding
the state, had to rely upon strategic violence, a selec-
tive economy of force, that through one quick dispatch
established the political space upon which a state, a new
state, arises. Machiavelli counsels in this regard that
it is better to use violent means only at the outset, at
the moment of founding a state; this will impress the
doubtful and confirm to your supporters that you are in-
terested in establishing a political realm rather than
ruling over it tyrannically for decades. Political
Power is best secured by creating the impression of your
willingness to resort to force-If need be-to defend the
state. The prince, l ike the republican leader, cannot
avoid wearing the mask of power to create the appearance
of resolve. The best way to ensure the peace is to pre-
pare for the possibility of war. But the levels of
armaments and national mobilization required to create
this appearance should never be enough either to absorb
all your resources or to make a potential adversary be-
lieve you seek to conquer him. The Machiavellian states-
man, while willing to resort to force, is most of all
concerned to preserve the political virtue of the polity
over which he rules.
Above all, then, Machiavelli was concerned with the
political purposes of violence. In this he establishes
the theme of a discourse which has resounded throughout
the whole realist tradition. The dilemma of the states-
man's responsibility to secure the peace by preparing for
war has vexed all those since confronted with the tools
of political power.
As the pre-eminent theorist of political-military
strategy, Machiavelli devotes equal attention to the do-
mestic purposes served by well-prepared armies. He is
acutely aware throughout his work of the polity that
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adroit princes and motivated infantry serve. The charac-
ter of his political-military strategy, however, is one
construed entirely in terms of power as force and public
mobilization. It is a strategy that concedes nothing to
those traditions of just-war theory that had served for a
millennium to shape thinking about war. It is a strategy,
too, stripped bare of those cultural constraints that had
informed chivalry and feudal warfare. The entirely secular
terms of this discourse on public power ushers in an era-
which we are still in-of power in the state and power
among states measured in terms of existing and potential
force
.
CHAPTER IV
FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE
POLITICS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER
One of the most famous critiques of Machiavellian
statesmanship, of the cunning and artifice perpetrated
by the ambitious prince, was written by a man who soon
after completing his devastating work proceeded, in
1740 as the new King of Prussia, to violate every ethical
norm he had expressed in his early study. On the day
King Frederick II set out to conquer Silesia, his per-
sonal secretary, Charles Etienne Jordan, wrote him from
Potsdam. "some critics think that this venture is in
direct contracdiction to the last chapter of the
' Der
Antimachiavell'. 1,1
Indeed, it has long been considered an intellectual
oddity—and a profound hypocrisy--that the enlightened
philosophical moralism of the young Crown Prince could
be so thoroughly violated by the First Silesian War of
1741-1742, the invasion of Saxony at the outset of the
Seven Years War (1756-1763), and by numerous breaches of
treaties binding Prussia to France or the Empire. But
as I want to show here, Frederick the Great's apparently
devastating critique of Machiavelli
' s "The Prince" con-
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tains within it the terms of that very
"Staatsrason"
which the King subsequently deployed in his-admittedly-
expedient realist statesmanship. i want< then
, to „.
Plore within Frederick's ostensibly moralistic critique
of Machiavellism the basis of what became in the course
of his reign an enlightened absolutism based upon mili-
tary power.
After examining briefly "Der Antimachiavell , " I
develop Frederick's version of "Staatsrason" within the
context of eighteenth century European balance-of-power
politics. Of particular interest here will be the ef-
forts of the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg-Prussia to
consolidate and expand their patchwork state after the
era of religious wars. The geographical disunity of
these lands scattered across the North German Plain was
overcome under the direction of a state whose political
unity and economic development were entirely dependent
upon the consolidation and perfection of Europe's most
disciplined standing army. Section two explores the
nature of contemporary warfare and the efforts under-
taken by the Prussian state to maintain a competitive
army. Section three looks at the evolution of the Prus-
sian state in terms of the relationship between the
political-economy of state building and preparing its
army for combat. My thesis here is that preparation for
war played a decisive role in shaping the Prussian state.
I also show how a political-economy of mercantilism im-
posed restraints on the wars that could be fought. The
fourth section extrapolates from the experience of
Frederician Prussia and examines the inherent instability
of a balance-of-power state system that relies upon
limited warfare. Prussian success in mobilizing the
state for war, I argue, was but a compact version of what
is guaranteed uner realism: continued efforts at inten-
sifying warfare through technological advancements, ex-
panding the size of armies, and more vigorous mobilization
of public resources. A brief epilogue explores the
general European crisis that arose when the national
armies of post-revolutionary France brought total warfare
to the continent.
My point in developing this chapter is to trace the
evolution of standing national armies in the era of the
European transformation from absolutism to the modern,
nascent republican state. Recurring efforts to train and
discipline ever larger and better equipped armies rendered
unstable a balance-of-power state system.
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"Der Antimachiavell"
A year before his accession to the kingship of Prus-
sia in 1740, the twenty seven year old Crown Prince of
the Hohenzollern Dynasty composed a scathing attack on
the dictates of ruthless statesmanship as expressed by
Machiavelli in his most famous work, "The Prince."
The incarnation of the perfidious prince had long
been an object of intellectual derision when young
Frederick put pen to paper. 2 During the two centuri*
after Machiavelli there had proliferated a vast lit<
ture arguing for a more moderate and honest diplomacy
than that of the Machiavellian prince. But the literary
achievements of Juan de Vera, Abraham de Wicquefort, or
Francois de Callieres had done little to efface the repu-
tation of this singular product of the Florentine Renais-
sance. Indeed, quite to the contrary, for the over-
whelming emphasis in such works upon the genteel tradi-
tions of courtly respect and admonishments to negotiate
politely, disdain threats, and adhere to treaties and
international law made Machiavelli 1 s prototypical prince
all the worse off by comparison. 3
A standard view of the immorality and cruelty charac-
terizing the Machiavellian prince can be found in Shake-
speare's Third Part of King Henry the Sixth
. King
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Richard III, formerly Duke of Gloucester, reveals hi,
intentions in a famous soliloquy:
Deceive more slyly than Ulysses could,And, like a Sinon, take another Troy
I can add colours to the chameleon,Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,And set themurtherous Machiavel to school.Lan I do this, and cannot get a crown''
Tut, were it farther off, I'll piuck it down. 4
In writing his tract against Machiavelli, Frederick,
who could not read Italian, relied upon a French trans-
lation published in 1696. The embitterment of the French
over their short-lived subordination to Catherine de
Medici in the mid-sixteenth century had its legacy, in
part, in their complete contempt for those Italian move-
ments associated with her family. This cultural residue
did not bode well for balanced assessments of Machiavelli:
neither for the prevailing view of his work nor for the
subtlety with which his work was translated into French.
Moreover, outside of Machiavelli
' s literary works, par-
ticularly the bawdy theaterpiece
,
"Mandragola , " his other
works, especially the "Discourses" and his studies of
Florentine republican constitutionalism were virtually
unknown, even in Frederick's day. And even if known to
a few, these works were overlooked. The result, so repre-
sentatively embodied in Frederick's "Der Antimachiavell ,
"
was outrage at the instrumental and cruel lessons of
138
statesmanship found in one work: "The Prince." Small
wonder, then, that throughout Frederick's work he
neither locates "The Prince" within Machiavelli
«
s
"ouevre" nor considers the nascent modern secular vocabu-
lary of public life captured in such concepts as "virtu,"
"necessita," "fortuna," "ambizione," and "animo." On
the contrary, Frederick explores "The Prince" as a work
hopelessly immersed in the bloodstained politics of the
northern Italian Renaissance.
"Machiavelli planted the seed of corruption in the
life of the state, and he undertook to destroy the rules
of sound morality." 5 He has written "one of the most
dangerous books of all those in circulation." 6 His
single-minded concern for how one man can conquer and hold
power over a subject and terrified people is an outrageous
violation of all concerns for justness. In codifying the
sanguinary politics of his age, he has broken the trust
that must bind a good ruler to his people. The pettiness
of his egoistic rules for holding on desperately to
political power is an outrage perpetrated upon those whom
he rules and an affront to all those who today seek just
guidance in their conduct of statesmanship.
Frederick's work sets out to refute, chapter by
chapter, the teachings of this ignominious monster. He
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wants to counter those courtiers and kings who still
insist upon admiring Machiavelli
' s work as the paradigm
of effective statesmanship. Against those flatterers,
careerists, would-be spies, and diplomats who find in-
spiration in "The Prince" for their craft, Frederick
seeks to undermine their traditional argument that
Machiavelli has, if not ethically, at least pragmatically
--albeit tragically—expressed what pricnes do, must do,
and should not do. The author of "Der Antimachiavell
"
wants to represent the interests of the true princely
rulers against their own denouncers and to save them from
the most incisive objections. It is, after all, the
single task of rulers to work for the well-being of
humanity. In its name he undertakes this critique. 7
A cursory reading of this early work by the future
Prussian King reveals an enlightened view of the purposes
of politics. The book is literally peppered with moral-
izing passages attesting to the noble and humanist values
which inform the actions of contemporary kings. No one
who reads this book can come away unaware of how hard the
Crown Prince strives to articulate in contrast to
Machiavelli an explicityly moral conception of royal
power in the service of public welfare. Yet anyone who
knows the political history of Prussia under Frederick
the Great will look back in amazement at how contradictory
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his writings appear when compared with his subsequent
actions. Gerhard Ritter, in his biography of Frederick
the Great, has noted the peculiar place this early work
assumes. "it is of significant biographical interest,"
wrote Ritter,
as an expression of the unlimitedly hopeful andoptimistic frame of mind in which the young manawaited the hour of his coming to power in or-
ness 8
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"Der Antimachiavell" is also a work filled with the
favorite ideas of enlightenment Europe. But as we shall
see, the work as a whole belies the claim it makes at
the outset to provide a clear alternative to Machia-
vellism.
Ritter sees the work as that of a young, overly
intellectually ambitious prince who articulated in varied
form the kind of enlightened sense of public responsi-
bility that proved impossible to adhere to under the
Q
stress of statesmanship. But where Ritter sees a ten-
sion between Frederick's "Antimachiavell" and his later
works, others detect the tension within this one work.
Friedrich Meinecke's account of the doctrine of "raison
d'etat" analyses Frederick's essay as embodying the same
political-intellectual dilemma that marked his whole
career. Frederick stood poised before two models of the
state: the humanitarian state and the power state. The
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conceptions resided side by side, and though the latter
predominated the former never disappeared entirely.
"Der Antimachiavell" was Frederick's most explicit at-
tempt to articulate the enlightened basis of humanitarian
absolutism. Shorn of divine right, repudiating the in-
herent virtues of dynasticism, Frederick sought here to
"demonstrate the possibility of meeting moral demands
for the entire realm of state life." 10
Yet a careful assessment of Frederick's appeals to
conscience and to the moral strivings of princes reveals
them to be the product of varied theoretical standpoints:
a touch of liberal social contract doctrine, a smattering
of natural law theory, here some remnants of idealist
philosophy, there a pastiche of enlightenment thinking.
The result is a grab-bag critique of a caricature of
Machiavellism from the standpoint of an embarassed abso-
lutism.
Meinecke quite correctly notes that Frederick's
concepts of diplomacy largely abandoned the moral stand-
point he adopted to criticize Machiavelli. But as
Meinecke is less willing to acknowledge, Frederick's work
on the internal affairs of state also abandoned the hu-
manitarian ideals he set forth in "Der Antimachiavell"
as worthy of a modern ruler seeking justice and prosper-
ity for all his people.
Throughout "Oer Antimachiavell
" Frederick reiterates
that the real purpose of the king or prince is that of
Ultimate arbiter for disputes within the state. Machi-
avelli, he argues, proceeds from an unduly narrow per-
spective: that of classifying extant regimes into various
forms of monarchies and republics, and of inquiring into
how princes achieve or maintain their power. it would
be more instructive to examine the reason why people
have felt compelled to call upon princes to rule them.
The inhabitants would never willfully impose a tyranny
upon themselves. On the contrary, they have opted col-
lectively-if tacitly-for governance by which they may
flourish, not by which their ruler might enhance his
power at their expense.
Frederick reminds the reader that public power in his
day, as distinguished from the private factionalism of
medieval and early Renaissance Europe, stands over and
above the disputes that wrack a people. It becomes a king
or prince to administer the law, enforce the peace, and
punish transgressors with celerity. As a neutral party,
then, the king is obliged to hold his subjects to the law.
Frederick, however, never connects this conception of
responsibility to either Hobbesian or Lockian arguments
for a social contract. His critique of Machiavelli
'
s
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comparative method, and his own preference-at least in
the first chapter-for a developmental account of the
sources of government, fall short of grounding his con-
ception of political authority in a social contract
binding upon the ruler. Yet elements of such a theory
can be found scattered throughout his work. what Hobbes
and Locke each described, in varying terms, as an anarchi-
cal state of nature in which life (Hobbes) and property
(Locke) were perpetually subject to violation by greedy
or criminal men, Frederick refers to vaguely in terms of
the barbarian conditions of central Europe as it was
overrun by peoples from the east and north. But this
suggestive reference to a European state of nature re-
mains unconnected to any subsequent social contract. In
the absence of such a social contract in history, how-
ever, one could develop a theoretical argument about what
a compact might look like to those in a state of nature.
Yet both models of social contract, the historical
and the phenomenological
, were anathema to Frederick.
The radical implications of investing popular sovereignty
in those who voluntarily agreed to contract for govern-
ment were intolerable to the Crown Prince. For contrary
reasons, Hobbes' argument must have seemed equally unac-
ceptable. The inviolability of absolutist rule resulting
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from a primitive people who permanently placed all public
power in the hands of a sovereign, lest their own lives
continue to be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short:" this, too, contradicted the Frederician spirit.
For this critic of Machiavelli strove throughout his life
to inspire in himself and within his concept of states-
manship a profound sense of caring for his people, for
the fair administration of justice, and for the fallibil-
ity of princely rule. His constant reference to the king
as "Schiedsrichter," as referee or arbiter, reflects a
concern for the impartiality of the state as a political
institution. if Prussia under Frederick the Great did not
exactly conform to this vision—and it did not— it came
closer than any other Continental absolutism. But how-
ever impartial was its administration of justice, Prussia
was not a polity founded upon the liberal conventions of
contract
.
Most conspicuous in Frederick's self-effacing view of
his own power is the profound regard he had for the
state's sovereignty—a sovereignty which he did not per-
sonally embody but to which, instead, he devoted him-
self slavishly throughout his forty-six year reign. Un-
like the courtiers and dynastic flatterers who over-
whelmed the Bourbons at Versailles, Frederick disdained
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in court life the opulence and decadence reserved for
kings convinced of their divine right to rule. His own
coronation was a simple and inexpensive affair. His
mistrust of dynasticism is also reflected in the fact that
he fathered no heir to inherit Prussia's kingship and
expressed no concern for being unable to do so. Nor did
Frederick hold any peculiar regard for the virtues of
princely stock. He treated his own brothers with harsh-
ness, for instance, when they failed him in the course
of battle.
His own writings place overwhelming emphasis upon
the need to work for the welfare of the state. As he
wrote in his "Political Testament of 1752," "the ruler
is the first servant of the state." 11 In a letter
written at the outset of the Seven Years War, when
Frederick's army faced the combined forces of Austria,
France, and Russia, the King wrote a memorandum to his
minister expressing the priority he placed upon the
state's well-being, if necessary beyond that of his own.
If it should be my fate to be taken prisoner,
then I forbid anyone to have the smallest con-
cern for my person, or to pay the slightest
attention to anything I might write from my
place of confinement. If such a misfortune
should befall me, then I shall sacrifice my-
self for the state, and everyone must then
obey my brother; I shall hold him, and all my
ministers and generals, responsible with their
heads for seeing that neither a province nor a
ransom is of fprpH -f^v ™. t
Also characteristic of Frederick's work is his con-
stant reference to the basic equality of those who in-
habit each country. while acknowledging, as did Monte-
squieu, the varied national characteristics and skills o1
people based upon differences of climate, terrain, the
arability of land, and access to riparian and oceanic
trade, Frederick calls upon princes and kings to respect
the inherent equality of all those people whom one
governs. Rejecting the view that any one class, by vir-
tue of its aristocratic bearing or religion, is superior
to any other, he insists that the inhabitants of Europe
are all to be regarded as worthy of equal treatment.
But as with social contract theory, Frederick does not
examine the deeper consequences of his rhetorical com-
mitment. Natural rights theory informs his view of
natural equality and poses restraints on public author-
ity. But nowhere does Frederick acknowledge a citizen's
claim to rights based upon this natural equality. The
constraints on state power are entirely self-imposed.
The varieties of Frederick's moralism include a
healthy measure of enlightenment optimism. At any
moment one expects him in "Der Antimachiavell " to embrace
wholeheartedly Abbe C.I. Castel de Saint-Pierre's plan
147
ess
er
ou;
a series
rma-
of 1712 for perpetual peace in Europe. Though Fred-
erick's optimism does not lead him to endorse such an
early idealist conception of world peace, he nonethel
manifests great faith in the just and ethical charact
of rule in what he saw as an era of increasing religi s
and political tolerance. He had great faith in
of developments that emerged from the Counter Refo
tion and its bellicose aftermath: the growth of the
experimental sciences; the impact of voyages in teaching
Christian states the value of comparing other moral
values; a willingness to put aside the religious con-
flicts between the Church and the ecumenical congrega-
tions—and between Lutherans and Calvinists—that had
torn Europe apart for a century and a half; and revulsion
at the habitual barbarism that had afflicted northern
Italy during the Renaissance and Germany during the
Thirty Years War. These have now triumphed, notes
Frederick, in sharp distinction with preceeding centu-
ries, in the form of a contemporary statesmanship that
rules by virtue of reason. 13
But this reason is still exercised by princes and
servants of the several sovereign states, not by inter-
national jurists. The culmination of natural law theory
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in the form of Hugo Grotius • I^w_of_Wa^and_P^ pub _
lished in 1625, finds no place in the Frederician stat
system. Much more was he indebted to theorists of
"state of war," to a theory based upon the need for
competing sovereign states to reserve for themselves all
measures in defense-or pursuit-of their interests. And
though Frederick concedes throughout "Der Antimachiavell
»
the need to conduct wars more justly, he reserves for the
state the right to conduct preemptive wars and to under-
take conquests of adjoining lands to which the prince has
claim or prior title. In the era of dynastic politics,
however, this is tantamount ot ignoring just-war theory
altogether. It was a common strategy to dredge up docu-
ments or past claims to lands prior to undertaking their
conquest. This is exactly what Frederick did in 1740 to
justify his seizure of Silesia.
Continental diplomacy in seventeenth and eighteenth
century Europe was characterized by these competing
claims. Indeed, an essential part of balance-of
-power
politics involved competition over lands of the Holy
Roman Empire and central Europe. In the wake of the
Treaty of Westphalia, the agreement among the European
powers that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, the Holy
Roman Empire was shorn of the fragile unity to which it
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had clung since the Golden Bull of 1356. The Emperor
relinquished to the imperial diet the right to declare
war, a move that enhanced the power of the electoral
princes. Switzerland and northern Italy were excluded
from the Empire. Prussia and Sweden were granted lands
along the Baltic coast-lands that had previously been
Danish and Polish domains. France gained control of
Alsace-Lorraine, and Spain's domination of the Nether-
lands virtually disappeared after the course of the
Eighty Years War with the Dutch, 1568-1648. The overall
effect of the Peace of Westphalia was to usher in an era
of recognizably modern struggles in European diplomacy:
French preeminence on the Continent, consolidation of the
scattered lands under Hohenzollern control in Brandenburg-
Prussia, Russian struggles along its western border with
a crumbling Polish state, Austro-French rivalry over
northern Italy, the decline of Spain as a European power,
and the decline of religious strife as a basis of conflict
between principalities. By repudiating the principle of
"cuius regio, eius religio" ("he who rules a territory
determines its religion"), a principle embodied in the
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the religious map of Europe
was renedered fixed
, or at least immune to changes in the
political control of territories. The terms of European
diplomacy shifted onto a secular plane. Naval powers now
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began to clash with one another Qver access ^
Land powers began to struggle for control of those prin-
cipalities within the Holy Roman Empire. Sovereign
states comprised for the first time a system of European
-a • i 14diplomacy.
This secular diplomatic network ushered in at
Westphalia provides the backdrop for Frederick's thinking
about statesmanship. it provides, too, a context in
which to appraise his refined "raison d'etat" in the era
of European enlightenment.
A good example of this refinement can be found,
curiously enough, in Frederick's discussion of the bar-
barism of hunting. 15 He fulminates for pages over the
inumanity and cruelty of this sport which so fascinated
Europe's nobility. The diatribe makes three points:
that contrary to Machiavelli
' s claim, the skills acquired
in the course of hunting have little to do with the arts
of virtuous warfare; that the aristocratic luxury and
leisure of this sport exhaust resources that would
better be expended in cultivating a state's economic
and martial strength; and that the whole activity is an
inhumane violation of nature. In spending three quarters
of its spare time chasing wild animals through the forest,
the king's court exhibits in residual form all the worst
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features of those barbarian and bloodthirsty cultures,
against whose debased conditions the modern state of
Europe rightly appraise their civilization's progress.
In that curious mixture of ethics and expedience
that marks his entire
"Antimachiavell , - Frederick here
argues that the disgusting proclivity for hunting actu-
ally undermines national security. Not only is the whole
matter morally repulsive; it also distracts from the
imperatives of economic and military development. Herein
resides the real strength of the state. The courtly
preference for the chase and hunt reflects an antiquated
understanding of what comprises the arts of warfare. in-
deed, in wartime, as Frederick concluses, nothing could
be more disastrous than for an army to idle away its time
in search of game--as officers were wont to do between
maneuvers in the field. This would only encourage idlers
and deserters to flee from the more severe tasks at hand.
Frederick's striking argument about so common an
activity relfects what is really the larger purpose of
this early and apparently idealistic work: not, as he
himself would have us think, to condemn all of Machia-
velli's teachings; nor to locate moral reflection at the
center of diplomacy. It is, rather, to update and render
suitable to the balance-of -power system the unrelenting
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realism which Machiavelli in "The Prince" had first ar-
ticulated in terms of political power personally held
within a singular state. "Der Antimachiavell " thus works
on two levels: an explicit moralism, and an underlying
"etatism." I want to suggest here that the first level,
the ethical or moral critique of Machiavellism, is at
times a kind of attractive window dressing, at other
times a casuistic rationale for breaking treaties, ini-
tiating warfare, mobilizing a citizenry, and devoting
all political and economic resources for the purposes of
territorial expansion. The window dressing makes
Frederick's absolutist militarism palatable. And the
casuistic argumentation allows realism to return through
the back door after having been dramatically escorted out
the front.
It was not misguided idealism and youthful naivete
that led the Crown Prince to write so ennobled a critique
of Machiavellian strategy, only to see him as King of
Prussia violate every one of his own (earlier) precepts.
There is, on the contrary, far more continuity between
this work and his later efforts—with both pen and sword
—at relentless state-building at the expense of allies,
neighboring lands, and his own peasantry. For beneath
the explicit if motley moralism of this early critique of
Machiavelli is a subtler, more unified, realistic ap-
praisal of what "reason of state" calls for in the diplo-
macy of eighteenth century Europe. It is a realism which
reserves for itself the right to initiate aggressive
wars, to break treaties, conclude in the midst of warfare
pacts with enemies against recent allies, and to mobilize
on a permanent wartime footing the industrial, agricul-
tural, and civic resources of the state. it is a realism
which acknowledges as supreme the concept of state sov-
ereignty in domestic affairs and which repudiates inter-
national law as an expression of Christian or secular
natural law theory. it is a realism, too, which absorbs
within the absolutist, early modern state the principles
of securing and expanding public power and terrain.
While refusing to locate political power in the hands of
a virtuous prince, it articulates a theory of military
preparedness suitable to the competition of rival land
powers--each of them with similar imperial interests, each
of them striving internally to mobilize their resources
in the inherently unstable and militarist international
system known as the balance-of
-power
.
Standing Armies and the Limits of Absolutist Warfare
The specific nature of the new international state
ewar-
he
poi
system for which Eredericx wrote only becomes ^^^^
when we examine transformations since Machiavelli
•
s day
-
the scope and intensity of ^ ^
the ruler. These transformations are evident in thre
related areas of political life: in the expansion of
fare; in the ability of the state to claim for itself t
lives of its inhabitants as in indispensible resource u n
which it expected to draw; and the efforts of the state to
manage its political-economy so as to enhance the indus-
trial and agricultural resource base of its military. The
political structure of absolutism was founded upon the
intimate connection between militarism and mercantilism. 16
Each of these two spheres was overseen by a professionally
trained corps of bureaucreats whose fiscal and managerial
acumen enabled the state to mobilize its resources and to
maintain its position in the competitive balance-of-power
state system that characterized eighteenth century Europe.
The professionalization of Continental warfare marked
off the absolutist era from the post-feudal mercenary era
which it succeeded and from the era of total national war-
fare which followed. 17 Machiavelli had written in an epoch
of mercenary warfare when the arts and artifices of battle
played a crucial tactical role. Even as he expressed the
then-progressive idea of citizen-armies, his conceptions
of the arts of war--of deploying strategems, of relying
on pikemen, of shunning firepower and artillery, of cul-
tivating superior oratorical skills as one basis of virtu-
ous leadership, and of disdaining professional soldiers-
were all deeply rooted in the contemporary technologies
of warfare and in the scale of political institutions.
The largest armies of fifteenth century Europe numbered
ten to twelve thousand soldiers. 18 Rarely were the Ital-
ian city-states able to muster armies of more than half
this size. Frederick, by contrast, came to power in an
age when national armies averaged 100,000 men and a single
battle would involve 50,000 on each side. They were pro-
fessionally trained, led into battle under the guidance of
career officers, equiped with cast- and wrought-iron field
guns and muskets manufactured in large industries, and
provisioned by well stocked fortresses strategically lo-
cated throughout the frontier.
Gunpowder, cannon, and arquebuses had only gradually
been integrated into the armies of Europe. Their advent
had not revolutionized mercenary warfare. The Italian
condottieri concerned themselves primarily with recruit-
ing soldiers, not armaments. The new weapontry was con-
strued as but a supplement to pikemen, infantry, and
cavalry. Machiavelli
* s mistrust of firepower was moti-
vated, as we have seen, bu both tactical and political
concerns. Tactically, the cumbersomeness of artillery and
the early muskets impaired the Qf
tically, they tempted princes and states to neglect cul-
tivating loyalty among their men. The arts of mercenary
warfare involved training men for close combat, encamping
them safely, and feeding them from the land or from nearby
markets. Their weaponry did not vary markedly from the
everyday tools of farm life. The limited size of their
armies and the proximity of their battles to towns and
cities meant that extended supply lines were not neces-
sary. And the close range of their direct combat could be
overseen directly by a single commander who saw the entire
battlefield.
Two hundred years of developments in technology and
in the resources available to states brought about enor-
mous transformations in the arts of war. The war system
of early eighteenth century Europe called for the combined
efforts of matallurgists, geometrists, clothiers, re-
cruiters, military police, architects, navigators, and
farmers. Their salaries and the goods they provided were
all paid for from public revenues extracted from the
state's inhabitants. All of these were overseen by a
military career-staff whose job it was to discipline
troops to endure the rigors of extended maneuver and to
stand up in the face of enemy firepower while delivering
with regularity its own volleys and cannonade.
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Frederic, criticized in "Der Antimachiavell " the relevance
of Machiavelli-s ccncepticn of Machiavelli
'
s conception
of the arts of war. The prince's skills are not those to
be cultivated by carefully observing the terrain while
hunting or through the zeal for virtuous warfare. Machi-
avelli. s pedantic evocation of steeling oneself for the
hardships of warfare hardly meets Frederick's need to
organize, train, and lead mass armies entirely dependent
upon the combined resources of their country.
Much of this criticism is unfair, however. Fred-
erick's own military writings composed after he became
King of Prussia come very close to emulating many of
Machiavelli's principles. Knowledge of the land, for
instance, is still a key element of generalship. m the
"General Principles of War" of 1748, Frederick admonishes
the statesman/commander-in-chief to study maps, to survey
personally—with the air of local guides—mountains
,
streams, and fields, and to familiarize himself with rock
formations, readily defensible positions, swamps, and
forests. He recommends, too, that one know in advance of
a campaign which cities are particularly suited for forti-
fication and which, by contrast, are indefensible. This
ability to perceive and utilize terrain for purposes of
battle was referred to by Frederick as "coup d'oeil," the
"talent to recognize in one look at the land the advan-
tages which it can offer to an army." 19
Frederick, however, finds "The Prince" exlusively
concerned with aspects of military leadership and not at
all attentive to building up the kinds of military infra-
structures necessary for modern warfare. War cannot be
mastered by preparing oneself mentally for the rigors
ahead and by training a band of farmers and day-laborers
for a few weeks on a rotating basis. Frederick derides
the Machiavellian prince's fascination with the glory and
spirit of warfare, as if it were something for which one
could prepare by establishing a martial atmosphere in
court life.
It is a wonder that the writer does not feed theprince soups served in trench-like tureens piesin the shape of bombs, and tarts in the form ofbastions; and that he does not have him attack
windmills, flocks of sheep, and ostriches ... 20
It is not only Frederick's ignorance of Machiavelli ' s
"The Art of War" that enables him to make such an observa-
tion. As we have seen, Machiavelli was well aware of how
a reliable army of politically enthusiastic citizens was
necessary to replace the derelict mercenary warriors who
had become the scourge of Renaissance Italy. But the
concern for cultivating civic virtue placed, according to
Frederick, undue emphasis upon motivation and not enough
emphasis upon institutions. Discipline, believed Fred-
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erick, could be instilled in an army, but only through
means of rigorous training and enforcement. A disciplined
army, however, would do a country no good in the absence
of adequate supplies of food, clothing, gun powder, and
armaments. An exclusive focus upon princely power and
patriotic zeal would not enable a country to compete in
the early era of standing national armies and mobile
firepower. The armies of Louis XII with which France had
sought in 1498 to overrun Italy would scarcely suffice to
compete effectively in Europe under the Bourbons, Habs-
burgs, and Hohenzollerns
.
If a skillful army commander like Louis XII wereto appear today, he would recognize nothing He
would see that one conducts war with countlesstroops whom, because of their multitude, theland would not supply with sufficient provisions
Moreover, they would be maintained by their
princes in war and in peacetime. In his day
one waged decisive battles, one dared stunning
operations with a handful of men—whom one sent
home when the war was over. Instead of iron
armaments, lances, and matchlock musckets—whose
deployment was familiat to him—he would find
uniforms, flintlocks, and bayonets: a new art of
war, with innumerable new means for the attack
and defense of fortresses. He would experience
that these days it is just as difficult and
necessary an art to supply troops as it was in
an earlier day to defeat the enemy. 21
The enormous expense and effort required to supply
and train a regular corps of soldiers became, as we shall
see, a central object of Prussian political activity.
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But already we can appreciate the difficulties imposed
upon a state by the need to maintain a regular army and to
provide in peacetime a professionally staffed standing
force. The extraordinary financial burden placed upon
states already constrained fiscally by the restraints of a
mercantile political-economy was exacerbated by the sheer
manpower requirements of modern warfare.
The advent of gunpowder had greatly reduced the
feudal and medieval reliance upon cavalry. English armies
during the Hundred Years War had already shown, as at
Agincourt in 1415, that reliance upon the long-bow instead
of the heavier, unwieldy crossbow enhanced the value of
infantry over cavalry. The widespread integration of the
matchlock musket and then the flintlock into European
armies helped further undermine the massed cavalry charge
as the leading edge of attack. The chief instrument of
war was now armed infantry. Gunpowder had revealed the
vulnerability of mounted knights in armor. The gradual
development of light field guns had also left the feudal
castle vulnerable to attacking forces. These transfor-
mations in the technology of warfare had exposed these
medieval institutions as inadequate. The face of battle
was increasingly forged by industrial manufacturing, and
the same growth of population that provided the labor
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power for industry led to increases in the size of
armies. The development of manufacturing and trade cen-
ters attracted peasants from the land, and the dynastic
houses were becoming more capable each year of establish-
ing administrative control of their lands. Continent-
wide agreement in the Peace of Westphalia regarding the
borders of competing countries provided a framework within
which each state could mobilize its people on a secular
basis
.
The social composition of European armies changed
accordingly. it was no longer the right of lords to round
up their vassals for a forty day levy as provided for in
the feudal oath. Nor did it suffice to pay condottieri
for the adventurers and roaming warriors comprising the
mercenary ranks. It became incumbent upon the royal
houses of Europe to introduce professionally trained
staffmen as the core of an army whose basic manpower was
provided by conscripts and paid national volunteers.
The Thirty Years War was the last European conflict in
which condottieri and mercenaries played a major role.
The Swedish forces under command of King Gustavus
Adolphus, for instance, were comprised almost entirely of
mercenaries recruited from the very lands of central
Europe they conquered. Albrech Wallenstein, commander
of the Imperial-Catholic League forces, was the last great
-OUS
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European condottiere; after recovering the rebelli,
Bohemian territories for the Habsburgs he offered hi,
servioes to the anti-imperial ooalition of Franoe and the
Protestants. He was soon assassinated by factions loyal
to the Emperor. 22
In the aftermath of the Thirty Years War, countries
began to build up their own regular forces and then called
upon mercenaries only to supplement their ranks. State
efforts were concentrated upon the scientific education
of a regular officer staff and upon the recruiting and
disciplining of national forces.
A range of strategic considerations dictated the move
towards standing armies. Technological advances in pro-
ducing mobile field artillery on a mass scale required
that a state plan investments in a web of mining and
metallurgical industries. Required, too, were enormous
amounts of wood with which to feed the furnaces used in
smelting ferrous ore and in casting bronze or forging
wrought iron.
Gradual improvements in lighter armaments yielded a
flintlock musket far easier to load than the arquebus or
matchlock musket fired by means of an exposed cord fuse.
The flintlock proved far more adaptable to battlefield
conditions that its predecessors because it did not have
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to be lit to fire. But the widespread incoroporat ion of
the flintlock required of an army an intimate familiarity
with its weapon so as to maximize accurate firepower. By
coordinating the loading, aiming, and firing of its guns
among two or three lines of armed infantry, an army could
achieve a considerable advantage over less disciplined
forces whose volleys maintained neither continual pres-
sure through successive waves of bullets nor complete
coverage of the battlefield.
Coordinating artillery barrages so that they cleared
the land before an advance of infantry of cavalry re-
quired carefully cultivated skills in geometry. A whole
science of ballistics developed standardized tables ac-
countin for variations in the angle of fire, the diameter
of the barrel, the weight of the cannon ball, and the
size of the gun powder charge. At the very least the
science demanded of gunners that they be able to read
charts—not a widely shared skill in an age without pub-
lic schools. Long before Europe adopted a public school
system, in fact, it spawned special academies devoted to
artillery and naval sciences, the forerunners of the
early nineteenth century war colleges.
Artillery and flintlocks also demanded of armies
extensive supplies of munitions. Frederick reports, for
instance, that during the Seven Years War a single cam-
164
iree
a
paign-usually lasting about two months-consumed th,
times as much gunpowder as Prussia could produce in
Year. 23 indeed, it was the complete dependence upon gun-
powder, shot, cannon balls, and land mines that forced
European armies to rely so heavily upon well-stocked
magazines and fortresses strategically placed along the
frontier. in addition to the magazines, the provisioning
of armies required extended supply-trains that slowed
down the progress of the very forces they kept supplied.
When Frederick was forced to abandon the siege of Olmutz
in Moravia in 1758, he retreated with a convoy of 4,000
wagons; fully half of his army had to escort the supply
24train. in 1708, during the War of the Spanish Succes-
sion, the Anglo-Dutch army under command of the Duke of
Marlborough had 3,000 wagons and 16,000 horses for 38
guns and mortars. The supply-train stretched out for 30
• , 25
miles
.
The coordination of supplies to sustain an army of
50,000 required efforts in such diverse fields as road-
building, carpentry for carriages and bridges, weaving,
medicine, and cooking. All had to be overseen by a
small army of accountants, administrators, and police.
The military strategies and tactics characteristic
of warfare in absolutist Europe led to an elaborate if
peculiar system of engaging the enemy and then withdrawing
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in such a manner as to minimize one's ri sks and losses
,
to try starving out an enemy in the field: not so much to
defeat him militarily as to occupy the land he currently
patroled. A ritualistic, chess-board pattern of war
emerged because of concerns by mercantilists and fiscal
agents to reduce where possible the costs of war in terms
of men and materiel; the limits placed on the intensity
and scope of warfare in Frederick's day were those im-
posed by the instruments of war and by the political-
economy that sustained it.
The intensity of firepower had markedly increased
since the Renaissance, but the limitations of new arma-
ments were still conspicuous. Muskets could fire a shell
no farther than 200 yards, and even within that distance
it was notoriously inaccurate. Artillery fire, though
the object of scientific inquiry, was still rendered un-
certain by a number of factors which no army could have
claimed to master: variations in humidity affected the
explosiveness of powder charges; wooden gun carriages
would collapse as the gun recoiled; cannon shot fre-
quently fragmented in the barrel; fine adjustments in the
angle and line of fire still required the efforts of
several men; the loading of cannon through the barrel
—
breech loaded field guns were not deployed until the
early nineteenth century—still consumed precious time;
and the sm0oth bore of the gun barrel-rifleiS ordnance
was unknown until the ^-nineteenth century-made ac _
curate fire difficult because ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
flew.
The proliferation of defensive measures, particularly
xn the arts of fortification and road obstruction, gener-
ally limited offensive measures and induced armies to
emphasize prolonged sieges, caution on the battlefield,
and penetrations into enemy lands no further than allied
fortresses and magazines could supply through internal
lines. 27 Moreover, the unreliability of troops recruited
for the most part under compulsion meant that vanguard
forces, wide flanking operations, and maneuvers designed
to harass the communication and supply lines of enemy
armies could only be undertaken at the risk of losing
one's men through desertion.
"The land means the same to the soldier as the
chessboard means to the chess player who wants to move his
pawns, bishops, and castles." 28 Throughout his military
writings Frederick emphasizes caution in militiary en-
deavors. The primary need is not to confront the enemy's
forces directly but to wear them down and attack them only
under the most favorable circumstances. Otherwise one
should avoid confrontations, especially when operating,
as was Prussia in the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years
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War, in enemy lands under the burden of manpower short-
ages. Frederick was in agreement on this point with the
famous military tract of France's Marshall Maurice de
Saxe, "My Reveries Upon the Art of War." Saxe's work,
written in 1732, focuses upon the need for good forti-
fications, the wisdom of delaying one's campaing until
the fall months-in order to force the enemy to exhaust
his resources while on maneuvers
-and of cutting off his
supply lines rather than attacking directly. Saxe goes
so far as to deny generals any leading role in battle;
tactical maneuvering of one's forces in the midst of
fighting leads to confusion and complicated arrangements.
Above all, Saxe stresses the simplicity with which land
wars can be fought. He even mocks those strict dis-
ciplinarians who exhaust their troops on the parade ground
and do not trust their men to fight well without train-
29mg.
If Saxe underplays the importance of trained infantry,
it is because he mistrusted relying upon weapons as inac-
curate and of short range as the modern flintlock. He
still believed that at close quarters the force of closed
infantry formations could be decisive—as indeed it could
be, providing the infantry were able to approach. Forces
accustomed to marching in cadence would generate the mo-
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mentum necessary for cln.in. 30 , ,Y os g. Unless favorable cond ._
tions for such tactics were present e, Saxe concluded, there
was no use in going to battle On fi»* u ,ri . o lat unbroken land such
tactics were unworkable. on hillv uu n iiy land, however, in
inclement weather, or when an army could surprise its
adversary, these formations would work without having to
resort to massive bombardments and musket volleys. Saxe
recommended a war of positions; one that relied upon simple
maneuvering in the field and that did not risk or expend
men and armaments. »i do not fabor pitohed battles,
especially at the beginning of a war," wrote Saxe, "and I
am convinced that a skillful general could make war all
his life without being forced into one." 31
Frederick, though less confident about evading
Pitched battles, displayed a similar reluctance to engage
his forces. But he acknowledges, too, the need at times
to marshal one's forces for a decisive and annihilating
blow.
The greatest defensive skill of a general is to
starve out his enemy. That is a means by whichhe ^ risks
^ nothing but can win everything. Forthis it is necessary thourh cleverness and
adroit maneuvering to exclude as much as pos-
sible the element of gambling. Hunger conquers
a man more surely than does gallantry. But the
seizure of supply trains of the loss of maga-
zines does not alone end a war; only battles
lead to a decision. Thus must an army apply
both means to achieve its war aims. 32
As we shall now see, Frederick's recurrent efforts to
16 9
intensify mobile firepower in search nf *v «=x x o decisive battles
at times ana places of his own choosing too, plaC e wlthin
a larger context of absolutist war as one of positions in
whrch direct engagements were generally avoided and only
sought out infrequently. »To win a battle means fcQ^
an enemy to abandon his position."" Frederick's military
writings reflect this tension between the war of positions
and the war of decisive battles. 34
Clausewitz later observed how warfare in this era
was devoid of its most elemental feature: a tendency
towards extreme exertion.
In
G
wh^h
U
^
° f WrfarS thUS became a tru* gamem rc the cards were dealt by time and byaccident. m effect it was a stronger form ofdiplomacy, a more forceful method of negoti-
ation, in which battles and sieges were theprincipal notes exchanged. Even the most
ambitious ruler had no greater aim than to gain
a number of advantages that could be exploited
at the peace conference. 35
Siege warcraft exemplifies the most sophisticated
form of the chess-board pattern of early eighteenth
century military strategy—and of its political dimension.
Bourbon France, under the direction of its chief military
engineer, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707),
erected a series of massive stone fortifications along
the eastern frontier. 36
The walled-in cities of the Italian Renaissance had
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Proven no obstacle to the monstrous field cannon brought
in by the French which shot away for days at their fa-
cades. The medieval castle, l ike the walled-in city-
state of northern Italy, could not hold up to cannonades.
But warfare in absolutist Europe did not consist of be-
sieging cities; it consisted of besieging fortresses.
Vauban personally oversaw construction of entirely dif-
ferent enclosures. Fortified buildings were erected at
the center of serrated, irregularly shaped walls, several
feet thick, some 20 feet high, forming a polygon in the
interior yard. At each exterior angle of the polygon
special bastions extended out. Heavy cannons mounted
atop these bastions gave defenders a commanding strategic
position. These bastions, in projecting out, also af-
forded defenders control of the land and of the various
defensive earthworks they had constructed around the
fortress. About 100 yards away from the main fortress
the defenders would build a series of earthern outworks.
They would dig a trench around the whole fortress. In
this trench, some five feet deep and ten acrosss, they
would implant wooden palisades: stakes of wood nine feet
long set three feet deep in a row along the trench floor.
Meanwhile, the dirt dug out of these ditches had been
piled up above the inside wall and would form a rampart,
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an extended mound, running the entire length q± ^
trench along the side facing the fortress. The effect
of these concentric outworks was effectively to double
the steepness of the trench wall nearest the fortress,
inside the rampart, leading up to the base of the fortress
walls, a sloping "glacis: of earth and stone provided
yet another hindrance to attacking armies. Land mines,
"fougasse," were occasionally used in the trenches and
along the sloping glacis, but they proved unreliable in
wet weather. The outworks, however, and the new design
of angular, relatively low fortress walls that could not
easily be battered by distant cannon, worked well. They
worked not because they made fortresses invulnerable;
they worked because they raised the costs of besieging
a fortress and forced commanders to evaluate whether the
protracted battle over a well-fortified position was
worth the cost of his men and armaments.
These fortresses were frequently located along
rivers or streams deep enough to bear traffic and sup-
plies. This facilitated access to provisions and re-
lieving forces during a siege. It gave a commander lines
of supply and communication while on campaign. And from
the standpoint of defense, it enabled the besieged, via a
system of dikes and moats, to flood the entrenchments
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when advancing armies closed in.
These fortresses, then
, were impressed ^
what has come to he known as the inherent strength c £
the defensive. But these fortresses were not invul-
neralbe to attack. The diaiectics of offense and defense
always sees to it that each new offensive weapon gives
rise to a defensive countermeasure and that apparently
secure formations and armaments can be overtaken in
time
.
Vauban himself proved this with his extensive work
on the art of siegecraft. A system of trenches would
enable an advancing army to creep up on a fortified posi-
tion. Light, mobile field guns had to be brought within
range of the fortress walls without themselves being
vulnerable to counter-battery attacks from artillery
mounted upon the bastions of the fortress. These for-
tress guns could carry further than those available to an
army on the march. It was no small achievement for an
attacking force to place its field guns behind mounts and
man-made parapets, behind which artillery was stationed
in such a manner that the cannonade from the fortress
either slammed into the parapets or flew over completely.
Mortars, with their high angle of fire, were more suited
for siege warfare than long-barreled howitzers which
fired at a lower angle. To lob mortar into a besieged
fortress reguired that these guns be brought within five
hundred yards-a distance easily covered by enemy guns of
the fortress. Moreover, one had to establish supply lines
for those mortars and for those who tended them. Thus the
system of trenches. Concentric circles closing in on the
fortress enabled the army to creep up. Corss-trenches
connected these concentric ditches with one another and
provided a path for supplies and reinforcements. An at-
tacking army would also bring up the planks needed to
carry the defensive outworks.
If the besieging army was better supplied than the
forces within the fortress, the defenders always had the
opportunity to surrender peacefully—in effect, handing
over their position. But if the besieged forces had
good reason to believe that a relieving army was on the
way, they would be willing to persist in defending their
position. In siege warfare, then, lines of supply and
communication were essential: lines of supply to maintain
the firepower of guns; lines of communication to find out
the positions of allies and adversary armies. The pro-
visioning of men and armies has always been a feature of
warfare, though by no means on the scale of eighteenth
century armies. But a fundamentally new feature of war-
fare was the need to maintain secure lines for maintaining
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one's guns and for communicating with allied forces. The
new war of positions, m0reover, placed an entasis on
avoiding battles until the most favorable conditions ob-
tained. Military tactics were part of a political-xnili-
tary strategy in which outmaneuvering an army or inducing
it to surrender through attrition were worthy goals. Set-
piece battles were infrequent, and while they remain for
us the most dramatic of encounters, indeed, while armies
trained themselves to win them, a good part of an army's
time on campaign was spent in more mundane fashion. The
military heroism immortalized in books about decisive
battles overlooks much of what men in arms really did. 37
One could call these "labor-intensive" wars. Con-
sider the effort of building the circumvallating trenches
for siege warfare. Soldiers whose muskets were unusable
at distances beyond 200 yards had to spend much of their
time digging earthworks and reinforcing their position.
A very common tactic, for instance, to block off roads or
hinder infantry was to build "abatis." A battalion would
cut down several hundred trees and scatter about one-third
of them on the path. They placed the remaining trees be-
tween their own position and trees already scattered. By
arranging this larger group of trees so that all the
leaves and branches faced an oncoming enemy and all the
trunks faced their position, they could create a five foot
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high wooden parapet, behind which they could hide and
still fire mortar or musket
_ MOreover; they wQuid ci . p
off the lightest branches and file down the remaining
ones until they became sharp, a well-made abati could
close off a defile completely; it could also protect the
rear of a retreating army.
In the face of fortified positions, offensive oper-
ations tended to proceed methodically. The immediate goal
was to accumulate the materiel needed for a campaign along
the frontier, then to move out with extended supply lines.
The heavy dependence of all Continental armies upon for-
tresses and magazines both limited mobility and provided
easily identifiable targets of operation for offensive
actions
.
Warfare not only occurred on a chess-board pattern of
capturing fortresses, occupying land, and defending posi-
tions and supply lines. It was also a seasonal affair.
Winter weather presented insuperable obstacles to an
army on the march. Forage for horses was usually unavail-
able in the field and had to be carried in supply trains.
Rivers otherwise used for transport would freeze or clog
up with ice. Supply trains had great difficulty nego-
tiating icy roads and mountain passes. The troops became
far more vulnerable to illness. Unless they were close
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to their cities, armies on campaign made wintercamp in
the field or in their fortresses.
Beyond the limitations on war imposed by the climate
domestic labor shortages hindered the ability of states to
strengthen standing armies. Particularly in Prussia,
with its sparsely settled and newly reclaimed lands in
East Prussia, Junker landholders were reluctant to re-
lease for military service the servants, peasants, and
farmers needed to work the land.
Restraints on the availability of manpower and equip-
ment constrained Europe's armies. Limitations imposed by
climate and population were exacerbated by economic con-
siderations. Indeed, the economic autarchy of mercantile
doctrine placed severe fiscal restrictions on the ability
of European states to wage extended warfare. The inherent
limitations on public expenditures imposed by mercantile
doctrine conspired (so to speak) with the need to preserve
national labor power for agriculture. The result, re-
flected in the military strategy of the day, was to place
the emphasis in wartime upon preserving one's forces and
not taking bold, risky initiatives. Instead of decisive
strikes upon the enemy's forces, strategy preached seizing
land and thereby expanding one's resource base for con-
ducting future wars.
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It is within this larger context of limited warfare
that Frederick the Creafs tactical innovations can prop-
erly be understood as attempts to maximize mobility and
firepower while simultaneously restricting deployments of
manpower and equipment. His contributions to the develop-
ment of military strategy were not those of a revoltuion-
ist. His work, for instance, on artillery was but a
continuation of methods introduced a century earlier by
King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden during the Thirty Years
War were not integrated at even the divisional level; nor
were they part of an army with light infantry and well-
organized cavalry able to move quickly after the field
guns had prepared the ground with cannonades.
Briefly stated, Frederick broke up the traditional
column march formations into several discrete divisions
advancing on parallel or adjacent lines. 38 Each division
was assigned light cavalry and artillery batteries to form
up at the front of the lines. By lightening the carriages
and by relying solely upon lighter cast iron guns rather
than the heavier—but less costly--wrought iron guns,
Frederick was able to develop horse-drawn artillery that
could easily be moved and re-aimed in battle. He favored
the howitzer with its shorter barrel over the traditional
long-barreled field gun; despite its shorter range, the
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howitzer's lighter weight afforded a degree of mobility
unattainable with the heavier guns. Frederick's artil-
lerists had also devised carriages with their own racks
for powder and ammunition, decreasing somewhat their de-
pendence upon fixed supply lines. The increased mobility
enabled the Prussian howitzers to be placed at the leading
edge of battle and then repositioned. it also enabled
Frederick's army to withdraw quickly from a position
without running so great a risk that its guns would be
captured by the enemy.
Frederick's greatest tactical maneuver was the
oblique order—the "refused" wing. Here he would arrange
his battle lines so that one side was favored, so that
one side would fill up its forward line with infantry and
light cavalry from the other side of the line. At the
Battle of Leuthen, for instance, in Austria in 1757, the
Prussian army used a hill in the middle of the battlefield
to deceive the Austrian forces into believing that
Frederick would attack from his left. By sending a small
force behind the hill into an area only partially visible
to the Austrians, Frederick lured Marshal Daun to order
his forces to the right in anticipation of a full attack.
But the main part of Frederick's army was really prepar-
ing to advance on its right. Daun, though knowing of
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Frederick's oblique order, had let himself be outmaneu-
vered. with 33,000 troops, the Prussian army outflanked
the Austrian forces of 63,000 and took a third of them
prisoner
.
This "refusal" of a whole wing of an army, of march-
ing divisions lining up to favor one side of the line of
battle while refusing to offer battle with the other side
of the line, required that the oncoming columns "peel off"
when commanded into formations of artillery, infantry, and
cavalry. The formation of such battle lines required
exceptional degrees of artillery mobility. It also called
for well-disciplined troops marching steadily in even pace,
in "Gleichschritt
,
" and ready to respond to field com-
manders. Often, as at Rossbach in 1757, the commanders
were unable to decide until the very last minute which
side was to be favored. The whole point of the oblique
order was to concentrate your forces on one side of the
line against half of the enemy's forces. With the adver-
sary spread evenly across the whole front, his strength
would be diluted at the point which your leading edge at-
tacked, and half of its forces would seek to engage the
side of your line which you chose instead to "refuse" in
battle. Until the Seven Years War it was customary to
conduct battle with an extended front line. But Prussia,
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only aided by „anoverian regimentSj ^^ ^
three of Europe . s most
and Austria. The oblique order partiauy compensated
the small size of Prussia , s army by only offering^
on one side in the hope of outflanking the enemy .
For Frederick, the key consideration in deciding
whether to offer battle was if his army could attack the
enemy's weakest point. if he could not attack the most
vulnerable position, if instead there were enemy guns
commandinq the hillc nr ty n n ± s o flat terrain providing no cover
for feints and maneuvering, it was better not to attack
at all.
In one paragraph, Frederick summarized his tactics:
Doubtless you will have noticed that the
constant principle I follow in all my attacksis to refuse one wing or to engage only adetachment of the army with the enemy... Thisdisposition gives me the advantage of risking
only as many troops as may seem appropriate,
and if I notice some physical or moral ob-
stacle in my way I am free to abandon my
plan, pull back the columns of my attack into
my lines, and withdraw my army, placing it
under the protection of my artillery untilbeyond range of enemy fire. The wing that
has been nearest to the enemy then falls backbehind my refused wing, enabling the latter
to support and cover me when I am defeated.
If I then defeat the enemy, this method
enables me to achieve a more brilliant vic-
tory; if i am defeated, it reduces my losses
considerably. 39
Nor was Frederick any less straightforward regarding
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the political and economic motives underlying such a
cautious approach to decisive battles.
Our wars must be short and intense. We must
anv
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drawn-out war eventu-lly dermines our excellent discipline de-populates the land, and exhausts our resources. 40
The morale of national recruits proved far less in-
clined for war than Frederick had hoped. The armies of
his day were beset by deserters and those intolerant of
military discipline. Between 1717 and 1728, for instance,
the Saxon infantry lost forty two percent of its men
annually to desertion. During the Seven Years War the
armies of Austria, France, and Russia suffered 212,000
desertions; 41 in the course of the war, in other words,
they lost to desertion a body of troops equal to their
average number of national volunteers and conscripts in
service at any given time during the war.
One look at an average infantryman's life in wartime
would reveal the good reasons for desertion. He was
expected to march while loaded down with a five foot
musket, a 55 pound knapsack, sixty shot and several pounds
of gunpowder, and he had either to carry tent stakes or
part of the tent itself. He was also obliged to do double
duty as general laborer whenever wagon trains and artil-
lery bogged down in mud or when abatis, entrenchments, or
camps had to be built. It is small wonder that unitl
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World War one, accidents, illness and starvation killed
more European soldiers in wartime than did direct ex-
posure to enemy fire. But if the daily toil of the
Prussian "Landsknecht" was oppressive and exhausting, his
duties in the throes of battle were of another order of
magnitude
.
The ingenious idea in 1701 of converting bayonets
that plugged up the mouth of the musket into ring bayonets
that fitted around the musket mourth revolutionized in-
fantry tactics. The advent of the ring bayonet, replete
with its two and a half foot blade, enabled infantrymen
to combine functions that had previously been carried out
by separate units of pikemen—who fought close-in—and of
musketeers, who fired in battle line and who had to con-
vert their guns into bayonets before engaging in close
fight. With the ring bayonet, however, infantry could
both fire and advance. In effect, a commander did not
have to choose now between pikemen and musketeers. Armed
infantry now combined both firepower and mobile shock.
The tactical formations of the oblique wing, the
need to coordinate all three weapons groups—artillery,
infantry, and cavalry--and especially to get infantry to
master their weapons and charge head-on with their bayo-
nets all put a premium on discipline. But inculcating
discipline would often lead inadvertently to discontent
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and desertion. Indeed =4- *.i , at times the Prussian officer
expended more effnrt «=»4- i
.
o patroll lng his own men than in
patrolling the frontier.
"One of the most essential duties," writes Frederick
"of generals commanding armies is to prevent desertion."
He suggests the following measures:
1. By not encamping too near a wood or forest
2
^^/^tary considerations require it
3* Bv tll^ rGl1 S6Veral times^aUy
scour the
9 °Ut
.
fre^t hussar patrolsto
4 Rvn country around the camp.4. By placing chasseurs in the wheat fields
PostTatl
n
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^
d°Ubli^ the y
5 Bv not
t0
t
treU(3then the cha in.
and
Wing thG soldie^ to wander about
Iheirtn' °T that thS officers conductt troops to water and forage in formation6. By punishing marauding severly? sine S 'the source of all disorders
wTi?
0t drawin<? in the guards placed in the
underarms?
marChing da
^ s until the troops are
8
'
sold
f
?P^o7' ri^orous P^ishment, the
of march ^ °r division on days
9. By avoiding night marches unless there is ab-solute necessity for them.
10. By sending hussar patrols forward on bothflanks while the infantry pass through woods.By placing officers at both ends of a defileto force the soldiers to return to the ranksBy concealing from the soldier any retrograde
marches you are forced to make, or by making
use of some specious pretest that would flatterhim.
By always seeing to it that the necessary sub-
sistence is not lacking, and taking care that
the troops are supplied with bread, meat, beer
and the like.
14. By examing desertion as soon as it creeps into
a regiment or company. Inquire whether the
soldier has had his bounty, if he has been given
11
12
13
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Discipline was to be strictly enforced on campaign,
in his "Military Testament of 1768" Frederick argued that
a commander must punish all thievery, desertion, acts of
insubordination, any nealerf n f *„4-i~u gi ct o duties or abandonment of
posts, the discarding of ammuniation, refusal to shoot
during exercises, and not shooting on the battle lines
when ordered. 43 Yet it does not seem to have occurred to
Frederick that severe disciplinary procedures required to
train an army and keep it disciplined contributed to the
desertion which he hoped-with severe measures-to prevent.
Patriotic ties had little to do in the Frederician
view of warfare. in lieu of widely shared civic and
military commitments to the politics of the Prussian
state, Frederick, like all commanders of land armies in
Europe at that time, believed motivation had to be
drilled in, created by constand exercise. The driving
force was less the love of one's country than the fear of
failing to carry out orders. Because there are far more
soldiers than officers, observes Frederick, men of the
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"can o„ly be kept in order by^ „
ave a greater fear of their officgrs than of ^^dangers to which they are exposed." 44
Frederick never resolved the problems of desertion
and lac, of discipline. Much of the dilemma, he pointed
out, was inherent in the kinds people who join armies or
were involuntarily recruited from the provinces to fight.
Such people constituted the dregs of the land, good for
nothings who did not want to work at home and who do not
want to work on the battlefield. They are vulgar folk who
simply want to indulge their base inclinations with im-
punity under the protection of an army standard. They
are the disobedient offstrping of peasants and urban
laborers: wild fellows, loose with whatever little money
passes through their hands, and disrespectful of all
civil norms. Perforce they were contemptuous of their
officers, a class recruited exclusively from noble fami-
lies. With such crews to work with, concludes Frederick,
it is no wonder that desertion afflicts his forces;
luckilly, all the European armies had to face the same
45problem.
Frederick, in agreement with Machiavelli, had argued
that "the best forces a state can have are comprised of
46native forces." But this, he concedes, reguires an
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extensive population if the country's agriculture and
nascent industrial economy are not to be hindered through
loss of labor power. In the absence of a sufficiently
large population to supply recruits for the army, Prussia
would call upon mercenaries. But they should never com-
prise a main fighting force; rather, they should provide
support to divisions by forming their own regiments. But
they should accustom themselves to the same order, dis-
cipline, and trust demanded of conscripts. Most impor-
tantly, a state should never so neglect conscription as to
rely upon mercenaries for more than half the army's
fighting strength. Yet during the Seven Years War,
Frederick has to call upon mercenaries to the extent that
by 1762 they comprised two-thirds of his fighting regulars.
However, it was far more than the reliance upon mer-
cenaries that enabled Prussia, with English and Hanover-
ian aid, to endure seven years of warfare against the
three most populous European countries.
In his own discussions of political-economy and in
his writings--so characteristic of all the Hohenzollerns
—
on the need to build strong, well-financed standing for-
ces, Frederick reveals a structure of political concerns
far more incisive and better developed than that found in
"Der Antimachiavell . " His work reveals an enlightened
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absolute shorn of personal poiUicai glorification ^
which the state as an objective and autonomous unit of
international relations fully mobi li ze s the society over
whxch it presides in the name of competing with other
states. m this respect Frederick's work builds upon
elements of political life which Machiavelli had sketched
out in narrower terms of the civic ties and the psychology
of virtue that underlay the state and princely power. The
institutions of the state itself become in Frederician
Prussia more important to the ruler than the political
psychology of its leaders and citizens. What need of
patriotism in a well-disciplined army? The truly virtuous
modern ruler achieves, power not by cultivating a support-
ive political atmosphere but by creating institutions
designed to enhance the economy and, in turn, the profes-
sionally trained army.
The Prussian State Between Mercantalism and Militarism
The Hohenzollern principality of Brandenburg, one of
nearly three hundred in the Holy Roman Empire, emerged
after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to become the basis
of modern Germany. Though neither the largest nor by any
means among the more prosperous of the German principal-
ities, Brandenbrug, or Brandenburg-Prussia, under the
guidance of several perspicacious rulers and kings— from
188
the Great Elector
, Frederick wiUiam (ruled i64o _ i688) ^Kmg Frederick the Great (ruled 1740 .1786) ..was able tQ
develop into a competitive Conti^f ic ntinental power. By the
year of Freder i r-v 1 cenck s accession, the Hohenzollern lands of
Cleve-Brandenburg-Prussia ,n ky Prussia had all been united politically
into the Kingdom of Prussia. Although ^^
pean countries were more populous, Prussia fielded the
third largest standing army. 47 The iargely agrarian
,
semi-feudal economy was overlaid in some towns and in the
more populated western lands with a rising market-based
commercial class. Prussia also enjoyed the beginnings of
industrial development through ferrous-ore and coal
mining. Under the aegis of a landed, military-minded
class comprised exclusively of landed nobility, Prussia
overcame its geographical scattering across the North
German Plain from the Rhineland to the east Baltic lit-
toral. Prussia was able to forge its consolidation
through imperial conquests and diplomatic maneuvering and
was able to expand into neighboring principalities and the
lands of other kingdoms because of its army and the artic-
ulation of its social structure and economic strength in
terms of military power. Popular wisdom in the late
eighteenth century coined a phrase for this phenomenon"
"Most states have an army. The Prussian Army has a state."
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" POUtiCal
of the Hohenzollern
-lers, the in -house memoranda political .miuta
-station, each Hohenzollern left to his successQr
to posterity, reveal for us the^ ^
Of office as the princely house^ ^ ^
kilities of p-m c o -; „v_>j_ Prussian power.
The rules for court life written between ^ ^
1546 by the Blector Joachim „ of Brandenburg
mealtimes and the organization of kitchen work. Fully
two-thirds of this "Hofordnung" reveals a fastidious
ooncern for recording and controlling food consumption in
the roayl court. Joachim I! discusses preparation of
each meal in the most 'detailed terms. Table arrangements,
how to purchase fish, the distribution and preservation
of spioes, management of the house key, the precise num-
ber of people allowed into the kitchen, the evening
distribution of "sleep-drinks"-each of these issues is
accorded the same kind of attention as is devoted in the
last third of the "Hofordnung" to accurate bookkeeping
and the prompt repayment of household debts. 48
That Joachim II overlooks in this one document any
questions of securing defenses or raising an army betrays
a problem pointed out nearly two hundred years later by
Frederick the Great in his own "Denkwiirdigkeiten zur
190
Geschichte des Hauses n ran^ u63 B ndenburg." Until the reign of
the Great Elector, Frederick wina William, the Hohenzollerns
were simply unable to defend fh^ ru r t ei crown lands with any-
thing but hastily recrnif^ m ^Y ruited mercenaries. Johann Sigismund
(ruled 1608-1619), for instance
, was only ^ ^ ^ ^
salaries of 400 cavalrymen, 1,000 infantrymen, and 2,600
footsoldiers-and then only for three months annually.
During the entire Thirty Years War the 7,000-11,000 men
fighting behind Brandenburg standards were paid out of
Spanish and Imperial treasuries. Georg Wilhelm, Elector
of Brandenburg (ruled 1619-1640), was only able to raise
6,000 men of the 20
,
000 he called for in 1638 . 49 Lacking
a competitive standing army, Brandenburg had to suffer,
suring the Thirty Years War, the indignity of seeing
Swedish troops enter Berlin. In the Peace of Westphalia
Sweden was able to secure lands coveted by Brandenburg:
lands at the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser.
In marked contrast to the "Hofordnung Kurfiirst
Joachims II von Brandenburg 1542/46," the "Political
Testament" of the Great Elector, written in 1667, details
"how the entire state must be led." 50 The shift in ter-
rain from Joachim II * s recounting of court life to the
stately survey of military, fiscal, and diplomatic af-
fairs conducted by the Great Elector is reflected in
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Frederick the Grpaf «ce t s d1Sm1S sal of the petty Machi-
avellian
"principini." The GrM * Pn ^m eat Elector writes his son
about political deliberation aiterati , administrative acumen,
Protestant pietv anHP y, d the need to construct impregnable
fortresses throughout the lands to which the Hohenzol-
lerns had gained title after Westphalia: Cleve, Halber-
stadt, Magdeburg,
„inden
, and Wgstern pomerania
_ ^ ^
calls for establishing full administrative rule over
Prussia, a land to which the Hohenzollerns had gained
title in 1618, but which they would not politically com-
mand until the aftermath of the Swedish-Polish War of
1660, when Poland finally relinquished its claim to
Prussia.
In 1653, by arrangement with the Brandenburg Estates
holding crown lands, the Great Elector extracted a con-
tribution of 530 Taler every six years, to be paid by the
Junker landholders of estates. They were now granted
complete administrative rights on the land they held—in
exchange for the land tax. Over the next century and a
half, in fact, the rights accorded the Junker lords came
to be embodied in the "Landrate," the local councils.
These "Landrate" remained distinct from the state-ap-
pointed administrative hierarchy of the local commissaries,
provincial chambers, and the central agency, the General
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coun-
-S
Directory. the "Landrate" represented the local nobility;
in fact, the nobility alone served on these local
cils. These "landrate" assumed responsibilities foi
policing their own districts, and the full control thi,
allowed them over peasants' lives ensured the semi-feudal
class status of the Junker nobility. The rigid legal and
political separation of nobility from serf was duplicated
in the army developed by the Prussian state. Nobility
were recruited directly into the officer corps while the
serfs, peasants, and common laborers filled the ranks of
the "Landsknechte." The army thus embodies the economic
and political divisions of feudal labor. 51
The Hohenzollern
-rulers made impressive gains in
expanding their fiscal resources. In 1667 the Great
Elector introduced the first excise taxes on luxury goods
purchased in the ciries. Foodstuffs and homemade clothing
were excluded, but imported spice, silk,, and tobacco were
all subject to the tax. At the same time the state began
to create an infrastructure fcr trade in the towns and
for the settlement of underpopulated lands. A major
canal running from the Oder to the Spree allowed for
riparian trade between Stettin and Berlin. Inhabitants
of towns were encouraged--at times, subsidized—to settle
on land eastward. The creation of a regular postal system
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enabled eulturl and«rcial ties to develQp within
Brandenburg-Prussia
.
The state treasury flourished. From 1640 to 1652,
the state disposed of an annual average of 192,000 Taler;
over the next ten years this figure nearly doubled. m
'
1673, three years after a broader excise tax was intro-
duced, the state treasury, the "Staatskasse , » collected
402,000 Taler. Fifteen years later, when the Great Elec-
tor's successor, Frederick III (ruled 1688-1713), reached
the throne, the "Staatskasse" collected 2,257,000 Taler.
Thirteen years later, when the Elector Frederick III was
recognized by all of Europe as Frederick I, King of
Prussia, the state treasury collected 3,800,000 Taler.
By the time the Crown Prince Frederick became King
Frederick II in 1740, the Prussian "Staatskasse" could
count on an annual income of 7,000,000 Taler. 52
An overwhelming proportion of the Prussian budget was
earmarked for military preparedness. The political-econo
my of the Frederician state was a paradigm piece of the
absolutist era in terms of its ability both to supply an
army out of public revenues and to use the army to create
new markets. Not only were armies used to conquer ad-
jacent territories and navies used to settle overseas
colonies; the armed forces themselves became an internal
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market. They beca.e not only the most conspicuous bene-
ficiary of public revenues, but also served as an engine
of national development and industrialization.
The Great Elector left to his successor, Frederick
HI/I, an army of irregularly raised recruits numbering
28,500 men. 53 Three-quarters of these troops were in-
fantry, fifteen percent of them comprised the cavalry, and
the remaining ten percent were responsible for garrisons
and fortresses. Unlike the "Landsknechte , »' whose pikes,
bayonets, and muskets were supplied by the state, cavalry
had to provide their own horses and equipment.
Until the death of the first Prussian King, Frederick
I, in 1713, the structure of the Prussian Army remained
little changed from the later days of the Great Elector.
Indeed, as Frederick the Great regretfully notes in his
own assessment of the House of Brandenburg, the proclivity
of Frederick III/I to spend a good part of the dynastic
income on court life, ostentatious public spectacles, and
fancy uniforms for his bodyguards contributed little to
the Prussian state. 54 But it did dazzle the other courts
of Europe enough to convince them of Frederick's claim to
Prussian lands that Sweden, Poland, and Russia had also
coveted. But when the Brandenburg Elector became King of
Prussia, his state was in a precarious position. Fiscal
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irresponsibility and a general neglect of the army had
allowed Prussia to fall far behind its rivals Austria,
France, Russia, and England. English titular claims to
Hanover, Saxony's royal claim to Poland, the Habsburg
hold over Silesia, Lorraine, and the lower Netherlands,
and the French presence up to the Rhineland left Prussia
in a vulnerable position. The Peace of Utrecht in 1713
ended the War of the Spanish Succession and forced Spain
to withdraw from the Netherlands. But in doing so the
peace treaty raised Austria to a position just behind
France as the second most powerful European state.
In 1667 the Great Elector, Frederick William, had
drawn up military plans for the conquest of Silesia. 55 At
the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, however,
Prussia had no army on the scale required to pursue such
a policy of linking its scattered lands and acquiring new
resources
—
particularly Silesian coal and ferrous ore.
The "Sergeant King," Frederick William I (ruled
1713-1740), took over the Great Elector's work in strength-
ening the Prussian Army. He instituted the principle of
universal male obligation. Anyone leaving Prussian ter-
ritory to avoid conscription would be treated as a mili-
tary deserter. 56 Frederick William I built up a system
of cantonal recruitment that became the basis of Prussian
conscription until the military reforms after 1807.
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Though numerous cateaorissgone of exemptions were introduced
during the Sergeant King's reign-exemptions for sxilled
laborers, the educated, professionals in law and medicine
clergymen, and the nobility-the principle of the Prus-
sian state arrogating the right to call upon its inhabi-
tants for military service had nevertheless been estab-
lished.
Under Frederick William the standing army increased
from 30,400 to 63,200. 58 with the tenth largest terri-
tory in Europe and only the thirteenth largest population,
Prussia's peacetime standing army now stood as the fourth
largest. Munitions plants were constructed in Potsdam,
and to obtain the saltpetre required for gunpowder, spe-
cial "Saltpetre Men" were sent throughout the country to
search cellars, barns, and birdhouses. While France had
enormous caves filled with saltpetre, and England imported
it from India, Prussia, like many European landpowers,
was forced to rely upon the yields of its agents in the
field. 59
The resource-base of Prussia under Frederick William
did not favor an armaments industry. A shortage of tim-
ber wood and coal left Prussia at a serious disadvantage.
Heavily forested countries like Sweden and Russia could
develop first-rate cannon industries; light, mobile can-
non had to be cast at temperatures far above those needed
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- soften the heavier wrought _ iron into
ana England
, because of fcheir _ coiUerieS; ^
able to cast light guns on a scale impossibie ^
™e Prussian lands in 1713 were not rich in ferrous ore
The basic strength of the Prussian Army had to be
supplied through tactical ingenuity and by exploiting its
own population to the most strenuous degree. Frederick
WUliam I, in his "Political Testament" of 1722
, had
admonished his successors not to permit Prussian troops
to serve as supplements for neighboring-or allied-
states. The subsidies paid by other states for this
military assistance may be tempting, but it is far more
important to maintain the population and not to waste
one's soldiers in foreign wars: "when your land is depop-
ulated you have great difficulty in conducting war again.
The well-being of a sovereign requires that his land be
well-populated." 60 Frederick the Great shared this con-
cern that Prussia have a population large enough from
which to recruit a competitive army without having to un-
dermine the resources and labor-power required for public
wealth. "The strength of a state is its population
count and not the extent of its borders." 61 Indeed, in
his "Political Testament of 1752" Frederick reveals that
he kept lists of births and deaths throughout the country
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so that precise calculations of Prussia's population lay
readxly within reach on the eve of war. 62 The census
proved essential to the cantonical recruitment system-
the more so because despite the universal character of
obligation only a small percentage actually served.
As Frederick calculated in his own "Military Testa-
ment of 1768," only one-ninth of the population was even
eligible for conscription. Of 4.5 million Prussians, half
were immediately ruled out because they were women. 63 of
the remaining 2,250,000 men-Frederick having presumed,
probably incorrectly, that war did not disproportionately
affect the male population—over half were ineligible
because of old age, youth, and physical handicaps.
Frederick calculated that in the whole country one would
find one million "weapon-capable" ( "waf fenfahige
" ) men.
An average mid-eighteenth century wartime Prussian
army of 160,000, if fully drawn from the ranks of the
native population ( "Landeskinder
" ) , would involve sixteen
percent of the eligible males, a percentage of the popu-
lation sufficient to cripple the Prussian economy by
denying it agricultural labor power and skilled workers.
Frederick decided that the cantons can provide up to
70,000, enough for a peacetime standing army, and that in
wartime he could recruit another 25,000 from the cantons,
the rest supplied by foreign armies or mercenaries.
These figures reveal the population pressures of
Prussia, pressures felt in varying degrees by all of the
Continental labor-intensive land armies. Of 4.5 million
inhabitants, only 95, 000-2. 25 percent-could be spared
for service as fighting regulars. 64 Prussia, like the
other Continental powers, recruited upwards of half its
infantry from the mercenary underworld of Europe—
a
class of criminals, the slow-witted, adventurers, and
the homeless.
The Prussian Army was organized around its trained
officer corps and around the men culled through the can-
tonal system of recruitment. The ability to conscript
peasants and day laborers and to pay for their equipage
from state treasuries reveals in full form the alliance
between mercantilism and militarism which enabled
Prussia successfully to compete in the Continental
balance-of
-power
.
At the outset of Frederick the Great's reight the
Prussian Army consisted of 83,000 men, of whom one-third
were mercenaries. Eighty-six percent of the state budget
was devoted to the army, and a thorough network of tax
officers combined with the frugality of the Hohenzollern
House to create a military reserve—a "Kriegskasse "—of
200,000 Taler. By the end of Frederick's reign in 1786,
the standing army numbered 100,000 Prussian natives, a
70 million Taller reserve filled the "Kriegskasse," and
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the Prussian state had almost doubled in size by ac-
quiring 30,000 square miles of land in Silesia, West
Prussia, East Friesland, and Linden. 65
Frederick's state-building, both domestically and
territorially, was based upon his use of the the "Kriegs-
kasse," the war treasury. "Never spend all one's in-
come," he wrote in 1752 "=;n fhaf 4-u« *.J./3Z, so t t the treasuries may be
built up to sustain a war of four years' duration." 66
The war treasury was funded through the excise tax and
through the "Kataster:" the assessments due from peasants
on the land. The tax commission oversaw the excise; the
provincial treasury collected the "Kataster." Additional
revenues were generated by the postal system, the occa-
sional debasing of coinage, through fees paid for the use
of crown lands, and by tarrifs on imported goods. About
one-tenth of all revenues were set aside for the "Kriegs-
kasse" and the rest of the funds paid for general public
programs including maintenance of the standing army.
The economic policies of Frederick the Great em-
bodied a classic form of mercantilism. The whole object
of fiscal policy was to generate a budget surplus while
enhancing economic autarchy. The "Political Testament of
1752" clearly expresses these concerns. Prussia pos-
sessed no riches like those of Peru. Nor did it
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en 3 oy the prosperous trade of Creat Britain or the United
Netherlands. Onl y through strenuous work could one hope
to keep up with the,. Only by protecting markets fro,
-ports could internal trade be encouraged. When Prussia
Produced domestically what otherwise would be ported,
gold remained in the land and the balance of trade gener-
ated a surplus. Excise taxes on luxury goods could also
help discourage unnecessary expenditure and provide in-
centives for developing more useful industries. En-
couraging migration to newly settled, undeveloped land
could stimulate agriculture. The population could be in-
creased by attracting skilled laborers from foreign
countries. sixty thousand wool spinners were needed,
Frederick observed, and by offering them a "gift of cot-
tage, a garden, and enough pasture for two cows," they
could be drawn in from Saxony, Poland, and Mecklenburg. 67
Tax exemptions should be encouraged for needed
industry and manufacturing. Frederick William I had
already written that no foreign wool should be purchased
or consumed in Prussia. 68 He had also made great strides
in creating the infrastructure of economic development.
He had, for instance, overseen construction of Prussia's
first weapons plant— in Potsdam—and had organized
regular surveying of state lands.
Frederick the Great continued this development, and
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he used the standing army as the basis of new markets,
all subsidized by taxes that fell primarily upon the
shoulders of the peasant class. Soldiers were quartered
in cities rather than in fortresses so that they could
spend their meager income—1.5 to 2 Taler per month-
on goods rather than waste it on gambling. The uniforms
they required stimulated the wool industry, and pro-
viding the army with stocks of corn and wheat gave the
government new means of controlling prices. If a poor
harvest led to rising prices, the grain would be put on
the market. If Poland tried to undersell Prussian
farmers, the state would buy up quickly and thus stabil-
ize the price.
An excise tax imposed upon luxury goods was used to
stimulate domestic industry and to shift somewhat the
tax burden to the more privileged classes. Bread, beer,
and meat were not taxed, but Prussia imposed an excise
on all foreign luxuries which could be domestically pro-
duced: "fabric, scarves, stockings, hats, glass, mirrors,
6 9lace, and jewelry." To establish domestic production
of some of these goods, Frederick had porcelain manufac-
turers brought to Berlin, where they built up a thriving
trade. To reduce Prussia's import of silk, he had
thousands of mulberry trees planted in church yards and
public gardens, whence a native industry emerged.
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The revenues generated from taxes helped build up
the aoy, and this in turn enabled Prussia to sei 2e and
hold new territories: Silesia, for instance, which
Purssia gained in the First Silesian War, and which it
successfully defended in the Seven Years War. Rich
ferrous ore and coal supplies there provided an early
stimulus to Prussian industrialization.
Unlike Brandenburg during the Thirty Years War, the
Prussia of Frederick the Great was able to compete with
the Continental armies. During the later stages of the
Seven Years War, for example, Prussia was able to sustain
the rigors of a protracted war of attrition and to
emerge from it geographically intact. The mercantile
policies of Hohenzollern absolutism had yielded a mili-
tary force fully capable of playing a major role in the
balance-of-power machinations that characterized European
statesmanship. On no occasion was this more evident
than during the three partitions of Poland. Austria,
Prussia, and Russia agreed by treaties to carve up this
land for themselves. The partitions of 1772, 1793, and
1795 left the Kingdom of Prussia united from just east
of the Weser River to the west bank of the Nieman in
Lithuania. With its eastern territories consolidated,
Prussia could now turn to the west: to the Rhineland.
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The Politics of th^^^r^IIl^
in his "Political Testament of 1752," Frederick
takes note of two political realms with which the states-
man most continually occupy himself. The internal ad-
ministration of a country involves maintaining its go-
vernmental forms; the administration of justice, wise and
frugal financial management, maintaining a disciplined
army, and overseeing civil peace are all components of
domestic politics that occupy a statesman's time. By
contrast, "the whole political system of Europe" commands
his attention in foreign policy; here the statesman
seeks "to secure the state, expand its possessions in
accepted, customary ways, and to increase his own power
and reputation." 70
Some of these foreign policy goals are inconsistent
with one another. As Frederick found out during the
First Silesian War, the pursuit of territorial gain by
means of war could endanger the security of the (Prus-
sian) state. And it is far from clear—after reading
"Der Antimachiavell"—that the pursuit of princely power
constitutes the kind of strength that enabled a power to
compete in Continental diplomacy. Frederick's work as a
whole indicates a kind of institutional politics that he
did not see in Machiavelli 1 s prince and that emerged only
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with the absolutist state. "a prince should be the first
servant and the first official of his state." 71 More-
over, the prince (or king) had this responsibility within
a state system of other sever iegn states, each of which
recognized and accepted its competitive nature. The
limits placed upon their own power by mercantile policy
and considerations of population were furthered by a set
of tacit agreements regarding the scope of warfare they
would rely upon.
The era of limited warfare was perfectly suited to
balance-of-power diplomacy. The persistence of such a
state system required a relative homogeneity of cultural
and intellectual ties, as well as agreement on the terms
of estimating power. The relative homogeneity was pro-
vided by a Christian framework that recognized and
tolerated a degree of religious freedom that the Counter
Reformation had not known; and the accounting of public
power facilitated estimates of a country's ability to
wage war.
Other indices were subordinated to or subsumed
within this criterion. Population, the extent of terri-
tory, finance, and the balance-of -trade were construed
in terms of their potential expression in terms of mili-
tary power. Other indices were available, and it was
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not as if they were iqnored qf3f „ nxg a. States competed economic-
ally for access to the Near East and colonies, like
America and India, rich in resources and unfinished
goods. Princely houses also competed for reputation and
dignity. Saxon princes seeking the kingship of Poland,
like Frederick III assuming the kingship of Prussia in
1701, constituted efforts at enhancing royal prestige
through means of bloodless competition. But frequently
such competitin became the object of warfare. The wars
of the Spanish, Austrian, and Bavarian successions all
developed from such a politics of prestige to absorb the
military energies of Europe. So, too, did the colonial
wars, of which the most significant was the Seven Years
War, during which Britain defeated France for control of
North American colonies.
War became the decisive means for arbitrating the
political differences of states when treaties collapsed
or alliances reversed. As the Treaty of Westphalia or
the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt (1713-1714) had
shown, war was by no means the only manner of settling
accounts. But the threat of military intervention, the
shadow of warfare, loomed ominously over the terrain on
which diplomacy proceeded.
The possibility of war as an ultimate arbiter under-
207
Pinned the whole era of the European balance-of
-power
,
even if war was not always resorted to, and even as wars
were essentially limited insofar as they did not seek
unconditional surrender and total destruction of the
enemy's country. As Frederick once wrote, "the peaceful
citizen should not even notice when the country takes up
arms." Indeed, it was the very limits of absolutist
warfare that allowed states to go to war so frequently.
The state system of the balance-of
-power was not
quite Hobbesian. The framework for diplomacy was by no
means a natural condition of unmitigated competition
among anonymous, sovereign states struggling for access
to goods and resources. Certain rules prevailed and
provided a regulative network within which states con-
ducted their foreign policy. The basic aim of such a
system, observed Frederick, is to ensure that "the superi-
ority of some rulers is compensated for by the combined
strength of several other powers." 72 The international
system was guided by the view that "no one state shall
73predominate." To this end a statesman resorted to
alliances, intervention, the breaking of treaties, nego-
74tiations, and when necessary, war. To this extent the
balance-of-power resembled the competitive state of
nature which both Hobbes and Locke saw as characteristic
of unpolitical society. But diplomatic custom and the
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limits of war assured that the international system did
not degenerate into the brute struggle of untamed "compe-
tition," "diffidence," and "glory" that Hobbes has seen
in the state of nature. Despite the absence of any arbi-
trator or international police force the rules of conduct
were self-imposed, by the participants themselves.
It was not a system that could properly be termed
lawless. To be sure, it was anarchic in the sense that
no sovereign presided. But the politics that did emerge
respected— for instance—rules for prisoners of war and
for cease fires so that diplomats might be accorded safe
passage to the negotiating table. Besieging a city did
not take place without first asking the urban populace
to surrender.
The calculus of political power, however, became one
of military force. Intentions about what to do with such
power were construed in terms of the ability to enforce
an equilibrium through alliance and through resort to
limited warfare.
The decisive measure of this power was the popula-
tion of a country. Frederick's recurring concern over
the population of Prussia reveals how the warfare of his
day was dependent on available manpower.
The early era of standing armies was still very much
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an era in which battle assumed a human form. The gene-
ral's ability to assess the battlefield personally consti-
tuted one of the arts of war. Artillery could not fire
cannon balls from distances beyond the horizon, and men
confronted within immediate range the forces that threat-
ened to destroy them. The speed at which an army de-
livered annihilating firepower allowed opposing forces
time to think: to regroup and fight on or to retreat in
fear. The innacuracy of musket and cannon and the limited
ground their firepower covered meant that battles never
achieved total form; that they remained instead within
the scope of human reason, within a battlefield bounded
by space and time. Though men killed one another with
weapons, they had to wield those weapons within the sight
and hearing of each other.
This human scale of eighteenth century warfare was
not simply in terms of how one experienced it. The
statesmen of Europe construed their military power in
terms of fighting regulars. The significant exception
was provided by naval warfare. Here the number of ships
of the line comprised the decisive index. But the land
powers of the Continent, the countries competing with
armies, invariably construed their power in terms of the
number of soldiers.
"It is one's first duty as a citizen to serve his
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country." 5 ^ these^ ^^
his "Political Testament of 1752." He is writing about
his own obligation to serve his country, but these words
could just as well have been used to denote the role
Played by citizens-or inhabitants
-of any state. if
the concept of citizenship is understood in terms of the
rights held by a people within a polity, however, then
the great majority of the Prussian population in the
eighteenth century could hardly claim to enjoy the status
of citizenship. Elections for public office were unheard
of—except for the electoral princes and bishops of the
Holyo Roman Empire choosing an Emperor. The officials
and administrators of the Prussian state were appointed;
retired officers, the nobility, and those privileged
enough to have received training in law or accounting
comprised the hierarchy of government. The local nobil-
ity selected members of the "Landrate" from its own ranks.
In military matters we find a legal obligation to
serve in the army—with certain exemptions for the edu-
cated, the clergy, the nobility, and those whose skills
or entrepreneurial status rendered them indispensable to
the economy. Peasants and unskilled laborers, in other
words, bore the brunt of Prussian conscription.
The constraints of population and the mercantile
economy combined with the limits of military technology
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to keep wars from achieving a level of total exertion.
Thousands nonetheless died in these limited wars. The
disciplinary procedures introduced into the Prussian Army
had as their goal to enable soldiers to stand firm in the
face of battle and shoot back. Frederick bemoaned the
losses of his men but could not succumb to his fleeting
emotions. He persisted along with his European col-
leagues in adhering to the norms of balance-of
-power
politics in relying heavily upon the army. He thus
acquiesced in the demands of a state system which claimed
on its behalf the duty of peoples to risk their lives—
indeed to lose their lives—in the name of securing their
homelands
.
But armies were not used merely for defensive pur-
poses, to thwart aggression. Armies were more frequently
used to seize neighboring territories, to lay claim to
colonies and foreign crowns, and to join with partners in
wars designed to restore to Europe a modicum of balance.
Politics in the balance-of-power was not that of
discourse, debate, or domestic interests competing in the
public sphere. It was not the politics of mass movements
and people mobilized with and against one another. Nor
was it representative government in a state reflecting
the diversity of opinions of its citizens. In an era
devoid of mass media, in an age when most men and women
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were illiterate and without the franchise, there existed
few opportunities to find out for oneself what was going
on politically in the capital. in the absence of liberal
institutions there existed no opportunity for the over-
whelming majority of peasants and day laborers to express
their will—much less develop one—on public affairs.
The public sphere was a narrowly delimited realm of the
king's advisors—invariable drawn from courtiers and a
small group of nobility. There developed in these courts
and dynastic circles a household politics. For the ma-
jority of the populace, however, the politics of the
balance-of-power was that of the state conducting its
own policy. It is no accident that in German the same
word covers both politics and public policy. In the
German view these two activities of "Politik," so
separable in the liberal and democratic traditions, are
one and the same, ordered by a centralized state, carried
out by professionally trained bureaucrats. There remains
for most of the inhabitants little to do by serve on be-
half of those instruments of policy and implement deci-
sions already made. Those who served in the conscript
armies of Europe participated in the balance-of-power,
but only by offering—on demand of the king—their lives
in the name of the state.
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The balance-of-power arose because of inability of
any one state to prevail-and because collectively the
other states would not allow any one state to prevail.
The limited nature of early modern European warfare
perfectly served this conception of diplomacy. Re-
straints imposed by population, resources, and the poli-
tical-economy of mercantilism guaranteed that no one
power could marshal sufficient manpower and materiel to
mount an overwhelming assault and create an imperium.
The art of war, as Clausewitz later noted, was indis-
tinguishable from diplomatic prudence. War and peace
admitted of no gradation insofar as the constant threat
of limited war helped maintain a delicate political-
military balance. The balance simultaneously deterred
aggression and enabled a state or alliance to go to war
without endangering the existence of any state. It pro-
vided a convenient framework for mutual expansion
, as
when Russia, Prussia, and Austria dismantled Poland.
And it provided a rationale for the mobilization of a
country—to harness its resources in defense of its
foreign policy interests.
But this reliance upon warfare as an instrument of
arbitration proved inherently destabilizing for the very
same balance-of-power in whose name it was restored to.
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As Frederick's own efforts in Prussia show, the struggle
to enhance one's military power in the name of sustaining
competitiveness in diplomacy established what can only
be called a "ratchet of escalation;" each country strives,
step by step, in response, to catch up with its rivals
and to form ever more powerful coaltions at new levels of
potential violence.
Postscript: Napoleonic Warfare
In 1772, a French nobleman and poet, Comte de
Guibert, criticized the limitations with which contem-
porary wars were fought. "But let us suppose," he
speculated,
that a people should arise in Europe vigorous
in spirit, in government, in the means at its
disposal, a people who with hardy qualities
should combine a national army and a settled
plan of aggrandizement. such a people would
not be compelled to limit fighting by finan-
cial calculations. We should see such a
people subjugate its neighbors and overwhelm
our weak constitutions like the north wind
bending reeds. 76
Guibert dismissed the likelihood of such a military
power emerging. But within twenty-five years there de-
veloped in France a military force with far more intensity
and ambition than anyone could have imagined. The style
and politics of Napoleonic warfare transformed Europe's
armies, and with them, European politics.
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The levee en masse, the nation at arms, expanded
the scope and intensity of warfare, setting the stage for
that total warfare which Clausewitz analyzed in On War
.
Lazare Nicolas Carnot
,
a French military engineer during
the first two French wars against the Coalition of Euro-
pean Armies, described the spirit and tactics of the
Revolutionary Grand Armee
. "No more manoeuvres, no more
military art but fire, steel, and patriotism." 77
On 23 August 1793, the National Convention published
a law which effectively announced the advent of total
mobilization
.
The young men shall fight, the married men
shall forge weapons and transport supplies;
the women will make up old linen into lint;
the old men will have themselves carried in
to the public squares and rouse the courage
of the fighting men, to preach hatred against
kings and the unity of the Republic.
The public buildings shall be turned into
barracks, the public squares into munitions
factories .. .All fire-arms of suitable calibre
shall be turned over to the troops: the in-
terior shall be policed with shot guns and
cold steel. All saddle horses shall be
seized for the cavalry; all draft horses
not employed in cultivation will draw the
artillery and supply wagons. 78
As Clausewitz later acknowledged, France's new style
of warfare constituted more of a political revolution
than a revolution in military tactics. The amassing of
artillery, the relentlessness of pursuit, the willingness
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to confront head-on the Coalition armies rather thi
harass their supply lines were only made possible by a
degree of mobilization unknown to European armies. The
half a million Frenchmen who volunteered for the first
defensive war found themselves within a few years involved
in wars of conquest. in part motivated by their new-
found freedom, in part driven on by the entirely new
officer corps which had replaced the aristocratic career
officers of Bourbon France, the Grande Armee swept
readily through northern Italy, the Netherlands, the
Rhineland, Hesse, Saxony, and Bavaria, and then on to
Berlin and Vienna. A planned invasion of England was
called off, but the French Empire undertook a blockade of
the European Continent to close off British trade. In
1812, with 300,000 troops already in Spain, Napoleon be-
gan an invasion of Russia which was supposed to culminate
in the Czar's surrender. With 375,000 men, 100,000
horses, and a supply line 250 miles long, the French
forces sought to complete their Continental Empire by
annihilating the main Russian Army.
The political restraints of balance-of-power diplo-
macy were shattered by France's aims. Napoleonic war-
fare exposed the limits of absolutist armies. It com-
pressed into a few years time far more changes in the
217
intensity of warfare than had been achieved over the
preceding century and a half. The professional standing
army, the
..state within a state," now became a nation at
arms. What Frederick the Great could only strive for.
Napoleon had achieved.
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CHAPTER V
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE POLITICS OF TOTAL WARFARE
The principles of warfare on a national scale that
Bonaparte brought to Europe after the French Revolution
transformed military thinking. The rigorous methodicism
of earlier military strategists, of Vauban
' s detailed
plans for siege warcraft, of Guibert's chessboard pat-
tern of war, was swept aside by the need to plan strategy
for armies far larger than any absolutist general staff
had ever been prepared to handle. Dynastic politics and
bureaucratically controlled armies became transformed
by the wars of whole nations.
The mobilization of the French citizenry by the
likes of Carnot posed an immediate threat, both poli-
tical and military, to the Continental governments.
The size of the French revolutionary army and the reck-
less abandon and strategic brilliance of its commander-
in-chief, Napoleon Bonaparte, brought to the Lowlands,
to Prussia, Spain, Austria, and even Russia the possi-
bility of a European French Imperium. Only by under-
standing the nature of this new, total warfare in Europe
could the states beyond the Rhine hope to forestall the
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French military revolution from overtaking them.
Clausewitz's Realism
Carl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, a Major General in
the Prussian Army, director of the War Academy in Berlin
from 1818 to 1831, articulated the principles of total
warfare embodied by Bonaparte's armies. m his lectures
at the War College, in numerous political essays, and in
his historical writings, Clausewitz examined both this
new strategy of warfare and the responses to it that
statesmen would need to make if a balance-of
-power was
to be restored. In his most famous book, On War
, a
massive, uncompleted tome that was published only post-
humously, Clausewitz formulated an understanding of
warfare which has shaped for subsequent generations their
thinking, and their politics, of the military. it is a
work that still shapes, or at least forms the starting
point, of political-military strategy today.
By developing from the concept of absolute war an
appreciation for the immanence of political relation-
ships, and by explaining how policy-makers are respon-
sible both for deciding to resort to war and for its
conduct—even under the most extreme military condi-
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tions-Clausewitz accorded realist statesmanship the
full burden of conducting national warfare. Neither
professional military men nor everyday citizens of the
state did Clausewitz deem responsible for matters of
war. Instead, he locates all responsibility in the
hands of a commander-in-chief and the state's cabinet.
Even under the most optimal of political conditions, as
we shall see, Clausewitz foresaw what he called the
"military genius" as the one man most qualified to wage
total war responsibly. Yet responsibility, for
Clausewitz, meant that political considerations always
guided the movements of a state's military machine.
But what did Clausewitz understand to be properly
political? What does it mean to say, as Clausewitz
wrote in On War
,
that warfare is "a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other
means .
"
Clausewitz located himself firmly in the tradition
of political realism. His work revolves around a view
of war's propriety as an instrument of national policy,
as an instrument for resolving fundamental differences
between states: securing territory against foreign
threats, seizing new lands, or establishing allied con-
straints on states that seek gains which might chal-
lenge the balance-of
-power
.
The dictum about warfare as the continuation of
politics, surely the most-quoted in all of military
strategy, contains within it the kind of ambiguity
that nourishes endless debate. it proclaims that poll
tical considerations underlie all warfare, but it sug-
gests, too, that the realm of war constitutes a world
quite unique, that resort to war entails a fundamental
shift in the terms of interstate relations. it is not
mere politics to disarm the enemy in a violent engage-
ment. In the shift from diplomatic notes and the bar-
gaining table to the clash of arms on the battlefield,
two nations interrupt their political relations and
dramatically alter their form of intercourse, but they
do not alter the political character of their policies
The legalistic severance of formal diplomatic rel
tions betokens a deeper shift of terrain. The shift
from parchment to gunpowder means that political dis-
course gives way to political violence. When nations
confront each other by means of their armies, the pecu
liar nature of war threatens always to override the
guiding hands of statesmen. The political conflicts
between states become the occasion for an accompanying
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political struggle within each state for ccntrcl over
military policy. It is in his ability to contain and
delimit the nature of war itself that the true statesman
displays his greatness.
The path of war's eruption is strewn with diplomatic
notes, broken bargains, and shredded documents. When war
itself breaks out it leaves far behind these remnants of
political activity. it explodes into a fireball, against
which the shapes of human figures are scarcely discern-
ible. Yet despite its drive for autonomy war always
retains a certain human quality, one that prevents it
from achieving an absolute form: a quality, too, in which
rational intent and purpose maintain, if in veiled form,
their guiding role.
Certain kinds of politics, however, Clausewitz
dismisses at the outset. The realist's universe is closed
to particular forms of political action. In the first two
pages of On War
, Clausewitz argues that those of weak
constitutions or pacifist souls should make way for the
stronger of heart.
Kind-hearted people might of course think there
was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an
enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imag-
ine this is the true goal of war. Pleasant as
it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed:
war is such a dangerous business that the mis-
takes which come from kindness are the very
worst .
2
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Later on in his study Clausewitz presents in more
vivid terms the consequences of waging war with a kindly
demeanor
.
We are not interested in generals who win vic-tories without bloodshed. The fact thatslaughter is a horrifying spectacle must makeus take war more seriously, but not provide
Se °J 9raduaHy blunting our swords in
will r£L° i
humanity. Sooner or later someonecome along with a sharp sword and hackoff our arms.
3
At the point at which war commences there exists
neither space nor opportunity for the sort of political
vocabulary which decries the use of violence or which
argues, along the lines of "jus in bello," for restraint
in warfare. Like the constraints on state action imposed
by the law of nations, such concerns are not appropri-
ate—indeed, they may actually be dangerous--if one
places much faith in them.
Attached to force are certain self-imposed
imperceptible limitations hardly worth men-
tioning, known as international law and
custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force
—
that is, physical force, for moral force has
no existence save as expressed in the state
and the law— is thus the means of war; to
impose our will on the enemy is its object.
This disregard of international law from warfare,
"jus in bello," establishes in the Clausewitzian framework
the primacy of what has come to be known as "Staatsrason ,"
reason of state. Moral force exists only insofar as the
state embodies it. The sole means for that morality to
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find expression is in the actions of the state: act
mediated by force. Morality exists and sustains itself
not by argument but through the institutions and decrees
of a central political authority. Physical force, re-
course to war, is the sole legitimate arbiter of com-
peting political moralities. But we are really speaking
here not of morality but of the power and institutional
interests of the state.
In this sense Clausewitz codifies a feature of
balance-of-power politics that marked Europe from the
Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Vienna of 1815.
The sole test of a state's power was the army it sent in
battle. The clash of warfare, a politics of physical
force, mediated state conflict. War, the capacity and
willingness to wage warfare, embodied national power.
Yet Clausewitz does acknowledge that international
law retains a certain significance, though one "hardly
worth mentioning." On no other page of On War does he
discuss international law. This is a strange oversight,
for Clausewitz himself could hardly have been unaware of
the war conventions customarily upheld by belligerents
in his day. War prisoners, for instance, were held in
camps and exchanged after a peace agreement, not arbi-
trarily slaughtered after battle. Clausewitz, for in-
stance, spent several months in 1806-07 as a war pri-
soner in France and was released only after the Peace of
Tilsit. Throughout the whole balance-of
-power era cease
fires-during which emissaries enjoyed free transit
through enemy lines-were mutually respected. Such
customary accessions to the law of nations, even under
extremes of wartime, are summarily dispatched by Clause-
witz in the opening pages of his work. The logic of his
realism allows no serious consideration of the manner
by which international laws of war were upheld-even if
merely for reasons of self-interest. No, this is rather
a terribly bloody business. Or so this "is how the mat-
ter must seem. It would be futile—even wrong—to try
and shut one's eyes to what really is from sheer dis-
tress at its brutality." 5 The temptations and dangers o
unilateral kindness, he reminds us, must be avoided in
war. The intellect discerns this, and opts for full
force. This is an act of intelligence.
Intelligence also teaches states to channel their
aggressive drives via effective means. This distin-
guishes them from barbarian tribes or primitive people
with no political institutions and therefore, with no
real wars. Clausewitz's example here is revealing. On
the page immediately following his brief dismissal of
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international war, Clausewitz refers in passing to cer-
tain rules of warfare: rules, "jus in bello," warrantin
the kinds of constraints that contradict the nature of
warfare. Man is capable, he confesses, of agreeing
bilaterally to restraints on force. Those societies, in
fact, capable of such agreements are more advanced and
civilized
.
If, then, civilized nations do not put theirprisoners to death or devastate cities and
countries, it is because intelligence plays
a larger part in their methods of warfare andhas taught them more effective ways of usingforce than the crude expression of instinct. 6
We come, then, upon a curious feature of Clausewitz's
realism. And it is a characteristic, too, of those
extreme versions of "Staatsrason" that posit an immutable
realm of conflict among states in any balance-of-power
system. Warfare demands extreme exertion, particularly
in an era of national mobilization. International law
cannot suffice to console nations at war; their full
energies, transformed by armies into force, alone can
settle such conflicts. Unilateral measures introduced by
citizens or parties within a warring state can only
weaken the state. Countries at war, in fact, have to act
as one unified body. The more advanced a political cul-
ture, the more able it is to organize its armies and
direct them for political purposes. This ability to
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give political direction to force characterizes civilized
societies, and distinguishes them from political ones.
One way in which advanced nations give political pur-
pose to their armies is by agreements or conventions of
an international character to establish rules for the
conduct of warfare. The binding force behind such rules
of war, the realist tells us, is not their moral but their
mutual character. It is simply in the interests of each
belligerent to abide by these rule, not to breach them in
search of some immediate gain lest the entire system of
rules of engagement break down. But the operative prin-
ciple here is not a moral claim, rather an expedient one.
The political arbiter of such restraints, then, is not
moral but reason of state. Not citizens but statesmen
and commanders-in-chief have the right to decide poli-
tical questions. The dictates of war place constraints
on the sphere of public action that may legitimately
intrude upon the state.
Absolute and Real War
Clausewitz 1 s
absolute and real
ing chapter in On
discussion of the
war, a discussion
War, contains the
difference between
central to his open-
key to his politics
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and to the politics of statesmanship.
He relies heavily upon a Kantian distinction between
the noumenon of absolute war and the phenomenon of its
real, actual occurence. Clausewitz likens the pure con-
cept of absolute war to a duel between two men: "an act
of force to compell an enemy to do our will." 7 The
social relationship, the attribution of intent, is cru-
cial for war, even in its absolute form. For war is not
mere violence, not something disembodied. it "is an act
of force, and there is no logical limit to the applica-
tion of that force." 8 The true path of war is to seek
disarmament of the adversary, and such an intent knows
no moderation.
But because war, like a duel, is a social act, each party
seeks disarmament of the other, and an escalating spiral
of violence comes quickly to characterize the action.
An opening thrust is parried, then returned. Each re-
sponse then carries the exchange beyond some mere stand-
off into escalation. The hostile intent of the bellig-
erents prompts each to outdo the other. The war that
unfolds then involves a numerical factor of available
forces and a qualitative factor of available forces and a
qualitative factor of strength of will. To introduce
into this understanding of absolute warfare a moderating
principle would be literally absurd, for war, as dis-
tinguished from all other activities, means a mutual
struggle aimed at disarmament of the foe by concen-
trating all violence against him.
Is such a war, in its absolute form, possible in
practice? Clausewitz does not pose this question as if
he were some philosophical naif. He recognizes, if in
convoluted form, the philosophical meaninglessness of
posing the question whether the pure concept of absolute
war could be possible in practice. Clausewitz
• s convo-
luted response denies, on practical grounds, the possi-
bility of absolute war ever realizing itself in human
action. He does not recognize the category mistake of
even posing the question, yet he comes around to a
similar position after reviewing the conditions of any
possible war. It turns out, as we shall see, that one
could not embody in corporeal activity what Clausewitz
has termed absolute war.
The three conditions under which, according to
Clausewitz, absolute war would be possible in practice
are
:
a) if war were a wholly isolated act, severed from
events in the political world;
b) if war were a single decisive act, or a set of
decisive acts, which transpired simultaneously;
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and
O if the outcome achieved were complete, perfect
unto itself, uninfluenced by the political situ-
ation it would bring about, or from which it
9arose
.
To enumerate these conditions is, as Clausewitz goes
on to show, to preclude absolute war from ever being
realized. To obtain each of these conditions would re-
quire the abstraction of war from the context out of
which, as an intelligent act between states, it neces-
sarily unfolds. Clausewitz articulates a set of prac-
tical responses to each of these postulated conditions
and he shows that whatever its conceptual purity as an
absolute noumenon, war itself is something rooted in
social, political, and historical relationships which
indelibly stamp it as a human enterprise.
First, "war is never an isolated act." 10 War,
rather, is rooted in relationships between two bellig-
erents, each of whom possesses a will to action, each of
whom understands, if only partially, what is at stake
in the war. Clausewitz calls this set of contexts
"modifications in practice." Through them, war becomes
something always short of perfect, never achieving the
absolute best. The absolute form of war would consist
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as a pure duel removed from the political or social
conflicts which led one party to challenge the other.
But even were we to confront two duellists completely
removed from the class attitudes which spawned the:
battle over honor, we would observe in the duellist!
themselves certain qualities of mind and body incon-
sistent with the absolutist conception. Duellists, too,
are embodied agents. And like the very war whose dis-
tilled essence their actions comprise, their actions are
delimited by natural features. War, in other words, as
an activity embodied in two or more forces always re-
mains constrained by the limits of human organization.
These limits, however, are not merely physical. Indeed,
their most characteristic limitation is psychological.
More troublesome in war than the limits of exertion is
the fallibility of judgement.
Clausewitz has in mind the inability of human will
to comprehend a social relationship fully. Not simply
because of a deficit of information, rather owing to the
nature of perception itself, knowledge in warfare is
terribly problematic. Understanding and mutual compre-
hension are difficult enough in a simple relationship
between two people. The complexities of warfare raise
to near incalculable levels the problems of knowledge and
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perception. m war, intention plays a central role.
Each side's actions depend upon both self-understanding
and an interpretation of the adversary. m war, amidst
warfare, action is not something objective; it does not
exist as mere physical behavior that could be fully
apprehended
.
The action to be examined is always in
the course of becoming something more than it was. The
action of war is not separable from the perceptions and
analyses of what each side is doing. This is no mere
restraint that in principle could be overcome; it resides
in the very nature of warfare that it is an activity
between human agents whose perceptions in part consti-
tute, in part reshape, the events which they seek to
understand.
Second, "war does not consist of a single short
blow." 11 A succession of acts follows upon one another.
Action in war distends over space and time. Clausewitz
remarks parenthetically, that if war did not consist of
a single, overwhelming blow, "preparation would tend
toward totality, for no omission could ever be recti-
12fied." But even in the era of total national warfare,
in which combat achieved a level of scope and intensity
never before imaginable, the constraints posed by commu-
nications, terrain, and human exertion limited the extent
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of war. The embodiment of the concept in even the most
powerful national armies of Clausewitz 's day still en-
tailed something short of absolute war. The "abstract
world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the
extreme is thereby moderated." 13 A who le range of re-
sources basic to warfare "cannot all be depoloyed at the
same moment." 14 The "fighting forces proper, the coun-
try with its physical features and population, and its
allies" 5 all comprise relationships which bind decision-
makers. The frequency of periods in which no direct
combat takes place—the suspension of action in war-
means that violence in battle is not of one piece. The
natural hesitancy resulting from faulty intelligence
further limits the war effort. Moreover, the inherent
superiority of the defensive strategic position helps
undermine the offensive initiative, turning the search
for a decisive breakthrough into a war of attrition.
These constraints, argues Clausewitz, cannot be overcome
through better planning or more training. Writing in
the first third of the nineteenth century, an era which
did not know of tanks, wireless communications, and
aircraft, much less of satellites and intercontinental
rocketry, Clausewitz notes that "the very nature of war
1
6
impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces."
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Finally, "in war, the result is never final." 17
Unlike the site of a duel, where the violent conflict i
settled and both sides then retire, the whole site of
warfare is not just the battlefield, however removed from
cities it may be, but whole countries. indeed, in the
warfare of Clausewitz's day even the battlefield was not
removed from the towns of warring countries. Troops
were billeted in the homes of civilians, soldiers were
conscripted from among the populace, and armies were fed
from the private stock of citizens. But Clausewitz
accords a larger meaning to war than merely provisioning
for and conducting it when he locates it amidst ongoing
political and social relationships.
Even defeated armies are never totally obliterated,
and victorious nations must still face the postwar tasks
of resettlement, reconstruction, and establishing control
When nations are not totally defeated, when wars stop
short of completely annihilating the enemy—and this is
always the case, because there remains a civilian popu-
lation to be governed, land to be tended, and cities for
commerce—negotiations and peace settlements take over
the tasks once carried out by weapons. War in its real
form, not in its absolute manifestation, entails a range
of responsibilities that neither victor nor the defeated
can overlook. Rearmament and revenge may soon threaten
a country which has triumphed in battle, just as the
tasks of postwar civilian administration may pose over-
whelming problems to an occupying force. Had Bonaparte
in 1812 defeated the Russian Army he still would have
had to establish rule over the populace-a task beyond
the capability of any army he could have brought to
Moscow. 18
In these three conditions, each of which imposes
restraints upon the embodiment of warfare in its abso-
lute form, warfare "eludes the strict theoretical re-
quirement that extremes of force be applied." 19 m ac-
tual political contexts, the restraints of human obser-
vation and the calculation of probabilities in action
limit the ultimate exertion of violence.
Clausewitz develops this account of the factors
modifying the practice of absolute war in the first chap-
ter of Book One in On War
. This chapter, he notes, is
the only one in the whole work he considered finished, 20
and it has become one of the most widely read chapters
of all military theory. Here Clausewitz establishes
two points, and the tension between them characterizes
all that he wrote on military strategy. His concern,
first, is to establish what distinguishes warfare from
all other activities. This he can discern only in
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examining the concept of war in its most abstract form.
The essence of war, he concludes, that which constitut
its nature, is the striving by violent means to dis
the adversary. stripped bare of all constraints, this
moment stands revealed as the activity unique to war.
in its embodied form, however, as ah activity engaged in
by two countries, two armies, this moment of war does
not disappear but rather becomes subject to constraints:
of human will, of space and time, of imperfections in the
mobilization, however total, of national forces. War-
fare, then, whatever its extent, is burdened by this
ambiguity. Limited war, defensive wars, both contain a
moment of war's essence, but are not exhausted by this
one dimension. Only by abstracting the concept of war
from the form it commonly assumes in human action can
Clausewitz explore that which defines it as different
from both the exchange of diplomatic demands or the
temporizing of armies unable to achieve a breakthrough.
"All real wars," writes Clausewitz, "are modifi-
cations of the absolute concept." "The theoretical
concept is not fulfilled in practice." 22 Real wars are
quite different from their absolute counterparts, for
here the suspensions of activity that characterize human
battle limit the ability of forces to exert themselves
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But Mobility and inactivity are the nor.ai state
of armies at war; action is reallv th=y the exception. Fear
and indecision, native to the human mind, are reduced to
the rarest of moments when an army does exert itself-
when troops push on in search of a decision, when gener-
als gather together their reserves for deployment. im-
perfect human perceptions, the difficulty of making
judgements, and the virtual lack of any reliable infor-
mation all pose problems for those who have managed the
appropriate will power to mount an all-out attack.
Finally, what Clausewitz explains as the inherently
greater strength of the defensive position reduces the
effectiveness of offensive assaults and tends to prolong
wars. Clausewitz repeatedly emphasized that the defender
enjoys a familiarity with the terrain, secure lines of
communication, established supply lines, a clear line of
retreat, and--usually--support of the population. 24
Such strategic advantages are only overcome with extra-
ordinary difficulty, and overwhelming numerical superi-
ority, on the part of attacking armies. 25 Battle drags
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on, it ceases at night time, and it virtually ceases in
winter. Much of an army's time in war consists of
gathering supplies, securing billets, waiting for word
from convoys, marching for days, weeks, on end without
ever confronting the enemy. War thus consists of a
whole series of separate engagements, each one of which
involves violent battles but which rarely call upon
whole armies. in most wars, the overwhelming majority
of them, neither side can summon the strength to force a
clear decision. And even when in those rare battles
whole armies of a quarter of a million men each converge
upon a vast field for one great confrontation—as at
Leipzig in 1813—the natural friction of the military
machines will keep war short of its absolute form.
"The art of war deals with living and with moral
forces," wrote Clausewitz
. "Consequently, it cannot
attain the absolute, or certainty." 26 This would seem
to follow from the terms of the Kantian distinction be-
tween absolute and real war with which Clausewits opens
On_War. Yet in this text, and in his essays and studies
2 7of Bonapartist generalship, Clausewitz slides over to
the view that here, indeed, for the first time in mili-
tary history, we see war conducted in its absolute form.
The ambivalence is not merely a matter of curiosity,
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nor an example of Clausewitz's phUosophical clumsi,
It goes to the heart of the path of modern warfare-
whether through the advance of technology and the poli-
tical mobilization of the democratic state one could
actually conduct warfare at the absolute extreme.
Clausewitz's condensed sociology of military
history presents an entelechy of war's development into
its fullest, total form. 28 what he repeatedly refers to
in On_War as "the natural course" of battle achieved
apotheosis under Bonaparte. The era of national warfare
ushered in after the French Revolution brought the scope
and intensity of warfare to its highest point since
Antiquity. The "element of war itself, stirred up by
great national interests, has become dominant and is
pursuing its natural course." 29
The French campaigns of 1805-06 against the Third
Coalition "are the ones that make it easier for us to
grasp the concept of modern, absolute war in all its
devastating power." 30 At Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and
Auerstadt, in campaigns that devastated Austria and
Prussia, the French army brought to Europe a scale of
war that no contemporary cabinets were prepared for.
In 1816, Clausewitz observed that since the rise of
240
Bonaparte, "the most daring of gamblers
... all campaigns
have gained such a cometlike swiftness that a higher
degree of military intensity is scarcely imaginable." 31
in apparent contradiction to his philosophical claim for
the concept of absolute war, Clausewitz observes that
"with our own eyes we have seen warfare achieve this
state of absolute perfection.
. .Bonaparte brought it
swiftly and ruthlessly to that point." 32
Clausewitz, to be sure, equivocates on this point.
Within Book Eight of On War
, he shifts terms and quali-
fies his claim of modern French warfare's absolute
character. "since Bonaparte, then, war ... closely ap-
proached its true character, its absolute perfection." 33
His account of the Russian Campaign of 1812 also equiv-
ocates. "This was not," observes Clausewitz, "the kind
of campaign that drags feebly on to its conclusion, but
the first plan ever made by an attacker bent on the
complete destruction of the Russian Army and the occu-
pation of her country. Despite Bonaparte's attempt at
such an absolute conquest, a strategy of annihiliation
( "Niederwerfungsstrategie")
, he failed for having under-
estimated the enormity of the undertaking.
Clausewitz, however, leaves open the question whe-
ther with more forces, Bonaparte could have succeeded.
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And this is part of Clausewitz 's larger ambiguity, left
unresolved, whether in fact an absolute war is really
possible. Clausewitz at times defies the logic of his
own philosophical distinction between absolute and real
war. As we shall see, this was because Clausewitz at
times equates the philosophical distinction between the
two concepts of war, absolute and real, with the prac-
tical distinction between two kinds of real war: total
3 6and limited. m a subsequent section we shall explore
in detail the difference between total and limited war.
But first we need to clarify the reasons why absolute
war in principle is impossible. We need to explore why
Clausewitz really thought, as distinguished from what
he occasionally says in Book Eight of On War
, that abso-
lute war, because of its logical consistency, was a
practical impossibility.
Clausewitz always understood that warfare entailed
obstacles to success in the field: that there existed a
fundamental difference between the plan of war on paper
and battle as it actually unfolded. He expressed this
difference through the concept of "friction," a concept
which enables one to appreciate how plans and strategems
will often go awry because of accidents, misinformation,
the confusion of battle, sheer exhaustion, faulty equip-
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merit, or untimely weather. m this military equivalent
of Murphy's Law in engineering, 37 Clausewitz makes the
reader aware that the enterprise of war involves re-
ducing this factor to a minimum-but that unforeseen,
indeed, unforeseeable, difficulties are bound to arise.
The concept of friction constitutes one of Clause-
witz 's genuine contributions to military theory. No
military strategist before him had developed a system-
atic account of why things are bound to go wrong. A
general whose plans depend on the perfect coordination
and functioning of all his troops and equipment is
likely to face military disaster. 38 Through practice an
army learns, at best, to minimize friction and to accom-
modate itself to the vicissitudes of chance which are
inherent in warfare.
Clausewitz' s concept of friction is far narrower
than the flux of history which Machiavelli had accounted
for in terms of "fortuna." The cyclical nature of suc-
cess and failure, the ephemeral nature of good fortune
and wealth: these Machiavelli had incorporated into a
concept of history that confronted the most virtuous of
princes. But what three hundred years ago had codified
the destiny of whole polities is now, with Clausewitz,
in the era of standing national armies, reduced to a
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range of technical problems in managing total warfare.
For friction » is the only CQncept ^^ ^ ^ ^
responds to the factors that distinguish real war from
war on paper." 39 It retains neither ^ ^
destiny of "fortuna," but friction does pose vexing
problems in the conduct of warfare to the extreme.
Numerous minor incidents interfere, of a type you
can never really anticipate. Clausewitz considers the
case of a traveler who has embarked on a ten mile trip.
The whole journey is but a half day's ride, and so he
does not depart until the afternoon. His progress is
slowed, however, first by hilly terrain and then by poor
visibility as dusk falls. At the halfway point, where
he needs to change horses, the stableman informs him that
his only remaining mare is unaccountably not available.
The traveler thus faces yet further delay until a re-
placement can be found. Finally, hours behind schedule,
he arrives near midnight at his destination, and must
awaken the innkeeper to secure a bed. Multiply these
everyday delays a thousand times, suggests Clausewitz,
and you get an idea of what can obstruct the most basic
of military maneuvers.
In war, events "combine to lower the general level
of performance, so that one always falls far short of
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the intended goal." 40 phvc^a i •y Pnysic l impediments pose the
first sort of obstacles. A planned assault, calling for
two corps fifteen miles apart to assemble the night be-
fore battle, suffers because a swamp not designated upon
the maps slows down the horse-drawn artillery. A fog not
lifting until ten in the morning delays the opening sal-
vo. The soldiers have had to camp outdoors because no
tents could be carried by the supply train; their cloth-
ing has thus had no chance to dry during the night, and
their movements throughout the day become impeded by
their soaked, insufferably hot uniforms. Moreover they
have been marching for three weeks now, and despite
having not yet engaged the enemy until today, a fourth
of them suffer from injuries or illness acquired since
leaving home. The gunpowder fired from their muskets
and cannon creates huge black clouds of smoke in the air.
In the absence of a wind the soldiers' vision is im-
paired, and they can neither see the enemy nor bring
themselves to advance. An experienced messenger of the
flank has fallen from gunshot wounds, and a battalion
commander on the covering side must now dispatch his
orders through a hastily recruited scout who can hear
nothing over the battlefield roar. A cannon breech
blows up and kills the men and horses tending to an
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artillery battery. The soldiers, who have been fed for
weeks on rations of bread and wine, begin to lose their
physical endurance.
The forces at the disposal of the commanding officer
lose in a hundred little ways what, on paper, appeared
as indefatigable strength. Even in a well-oiled machine,
concludes Clausewitz, resistance inevitably develops.
Armies can, however, reduce through rigorous practice the
mechanical failure of their equipment and accustom them-
selves to all manner of harsh weather.
Still, a surprising number of troops will suffer
casualties from their own or their colleagues' weapons.
And try as one might to adjust, the most rigorous train-
ing program will scarcely supplant real battlefield
conditions. Only experienced armies, hardened by their
recurrently having to face obstacles, can learn not to
panic in the field. "Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble
substitute for the real thing," writes Clausewitz, yet
they are far better than "routine, mechanical drill."
Reverting once again to the mechanistic simile that he
so frequently relies upon when discussing the nature of
modern armies, Clausewitz concludes that combat expe-
rience is the only "lubricant that will reduce this
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abrasion" of friction. 41
Mechanical and physical obstacles are not, however,
the only sources of friction. Problems of faulty intel-
ligence confront the general staff with a whole other
category of friction.
Reports in war, writes Clausewitz, are of three
sorts: contradictory, false, or uncertain. 42 They pro-
vide a most unreliable basis for making judgements in
the course of war, yet they remain the only way for com-
manders to gain a picture of what is transpiring in the
field. Information about the enemy and his country are
the basis of one's plans and operations. Yet insuf-
ficient knowledge of the enemy will always create doubts
and anxieties. In an era when neither observation bal-
loons nor telegraph stood at the disposal of the general
staff, the difficulties of gathering reliable informa-
tion about an enemy prior to engaging him were left to
convoys and sentries. All information was carried by
mounted messengers. What these messengers did not di-
rectly observe they gathered from reports by the local
populace or from travelers on the roads. Rumors spread
by spies, however, or estimates based on partial access
to the truth, would often lead to faulty reports. The
great time involved in conveying messages over ten or
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fifty miles might easily render the news close to use-
less by the time it arrived, for the situation would
change in proportion to the distance traveled by the
messengers
.
Uncertainty about one's own strength and position
was another source of friction. in an era when armies
were billeted over an area upwards of one hundred
43square miles, the mere logistics of assembling forces
would lead to numerous stragglers—and deserter s--scat-
tered over many miles. Within the area occupied by an
army, a panoply of unforeseen geographical obstacles
might obtrude upon the movements of men: lakes, hills,
swamps, rivers—not all of them marked out on the map.
And the problems of estimating one's own position and
strength escalated incredibly in battle.
Among one's own troops, uncertainty and exaggera-
tion also served as a considerable source of friction.
Human emotions undergo the most extreme shifts in the
midst of battle: from the depressive contemplation of
one's impending death to the mania of supreme triumph.
This lability of emotions carries along with it the
powers of judgement.
Even amidst the fragile serenity of camp life,
suspiciouns and fear play a powerful role in the moods
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of soldiers. Personal antagonisms among the troops,
deeper antagonisms-inherent in every army-between the
front-line soldiers and their general staff: both of
these feed the kind of explosive atmosphere that per-
vades an army during a campaign. Men receive the
slightest news from home as if it were a message borne by
the gods. A letter from loved ones can becalm the most
tortured soul. Likewise, the flimsiest stories about
enemy forces rapidly become the basis of firm conviction.
Rumors and legends quickly implant themselves in the
minds of every soldier. The generals and their aides
must battle against the spread of such stories, for in
little time they supplant a proper perspective, making
realistic assessments most difficult.
The very climate of war lends itself to faulty
judgement. Extreme danger, utmost exertion, uncer-
tainty, and change: within this lethal vortex decisions
have to be made.
The rush of sensations threatens to overwhelm the
man who has not hardened himself in the face of battle.
Neither classroom study nor the demands of civilian life
will have prepared one to stand up with courage on the
battlefield. Literary embellishments, like the civil-
ian's hankering for honor and glory, ill prepare you for
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what warfare really looks like.
"Let us," suggests Clausewitz in a preface to a
masterful piece of graphic writing,
"accompany the novice
to the battlefield."
As we approach the rumble of guns growslouder and alternates with the whir of can-
2!on k begin t0 attract his atten-ti . Shots begin to strike close around usWe hurry up the slope where the commanding *general is stationed with his large staff.Here cannonballs and bursting shells arefrequent, and life begins to seem more seri-
ous than the young man had imagined. Sud-denly someone you know is wounded; then a
shell falls among the staff. You notice
that some of the officers act a little oddly;you yourself are not as steady and collected
as you were: even the bravest can become
slightly distracted. Now we enter the battle
raging before us, still almost like a spec-
tacle, and join the nearest divisional com-
mander. Shot is falling like hail, and the
thunder of our own guns add to the din.
Forward to the brigadier, a soldier of ac-
knowledged bravery, but he is careful to take
cover behind a rise, a house or a clump of
trees. A noise is heard that is a certain
indication of increasing danger—the rattling
of grapeshot on roofs and on the ground.
Cannonballs tear past, whizzing in all direc-
tions, and musketballs begin to whistle
around us. A little further we reach the
firing line, where the infantry endures the
hammering for hours with incredible stead-
fastness. The air is filled with hissing bul-
lets that sound like a sharp crack if they
pass close to one's head. For a final shock,
the sight of men being killed and mutilated
moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity. 44
The friction and confusion that develops in such an
atmosphere pose the most basic challenges to the plans of
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war to which an army plans to adhere. But how, amidst
all this noise, chaos, and fear, can an army maintain
itself?
The answer, for Clausewitz, revolves around leader-
ship, particularly around the commander-in-chief. To
prevail in battle, to draw up a workable military stra-
tegy and to carry it out, requires leadership of the
most far-seeing and courageous kind. it requires the
military genius.
Genius and Statesmanship
The German Enlightenment concept of "genius," of
"aesthetic genius," pertained to sensitivity in one's
ability to perceive, and elicit through the visual arts,
a sense of nature—of what constitutes the essential
and the enduring of the natural world. Hans-Georg
Gadamer, in a concise account of the transformation of
"genius" in the late German Enlightenment philosophies
of Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, summarizes
Kant's views in the latter 's Critique of Judgement ; "what
the concept of genius achieved is only to place the pro-
ducts of the art aesthetically on the same level as
4 5natural beauty." in its restrictive sense of pertain-
ing to art and to aesthetic reaction, the concept "gen-
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ius" involved an innate ability to master the rules of
a creative discipline-without (necessarily) being able
to articulate precisely what those rules fully are—and
in executing a work that extended our appreciation of
what counted as "natural." Throughout the early nine-
teenth century, in the hands of Fichte and Schiller
during the growth of a more unified Prussian state, the
philosophical strivings for unity and a transcendental
nature that had so characterized the German intellectual
landscape became subject to more practical concerns. 46
Clausewitz, who over-modestly confesses "no special
expertise in philosophy or grammar," 47 develops the con-
cept of genius with masterful psychological subtlety.
Clausewitz 's concept of genius, and his ability to dis-
tinguish its nature from those forms of expertise
unique to other fields, serves as an unintended refuta-
tion of his own professed humility. Indeed, the account
of genius in warfare reveals on Clausewitz 's part an
underlying aesthetic sensibility that is scarcely to be
found in subsequent bearers of the Prussian militarist
tradition like Helmuth von Moltke, Graf von Schlieffen,
Otto Hintze, or Hans Delbriick.
Clausewitz summarily dismisses the bookish, the
formulaic scribblers, from his pantheon of military
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geniuses. "Only the rankest pedant would expect theore-
tical distinctions to show direct results on the battle-
4 8field." Yet in a curious way, Clausewitz himself
makes a whole series of theoretical distinctions and re-
quires that they show direct military results in terms
of the ideal leader taking them seriously. Byt Clause-
witz by no means requires the application of formula in
the course of battle-mere rules for strategy or tactical
engagement. Rather, Clausewitz 's concepts express them-
selves as ways of understanding war. And he wants,
further, to examine philosophically the kind of mind best
suited for directing enormous armies.
A social, indeed a cultural-historical, character
infuses the concept of military genius. Only advanced
societies, in which the military factor dominates, give
rise to such genius. When a society attends in dille-
tantish fashion to a wide range of tasks, or narrowly
concentrates its energies on, say, farming or trade, the
proper intellectual and moral powers peculiar to mili-
tary life languish undeveloped. Nor in primitive, bar-
barian, or nomadic tribes, however warlike they may be,
does such genius take roots, for though here one may
find those skilled in the arts of war, one does not find
a culture sufficiently developed and disciplined to
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war,
cultivate kind of mental prowess and
characteristic of military genius
_ ^ rf
"the greatest names do not appear before a high Uvel
of civilization has been reached." 49 The , .in small armies
°f an Alexander the Great do not qualify him in the test
of genius Clausewitz has in mind. Only in the modern
era of standing national armies, with men such as
Gustavus Adolphus of seventeenth century Sweden and with
Frederick the Great and Bonaparte do we recognize men
who, in Clausewitz' s terms m*Hf« 4.u«x , qualify as true geniuses.
Clausewitz rejects the romanticist's model of un-
tutored genius, "though this is closer to the truth than
that of the scholarly pedant." 50 He is "talking about a
special kind of intelligence, not about great powers of
meditation." 51 The intelligence demanded by battle, he
explains, is that of one who has the courage and covic-
tion to discern from the turbulence and uncertainty of
events the proper course of action and who then has the
will to act upon his convictions. These convictions are
in part the product of contemplation, but they are not
formula etched into the brain. Yet they do not succumb
to the overwhelming sensations and impressions which
define all life on the battlefield.
A natural talent, not a trained and educated one,
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distinguishes the mil itary genius
. Ris knowledgS/ his
sensitivity for guides to action, itself constitutes a
realm of fore-knowledge upon which he can rely when
making decisions. This knowledge "must be so absorbed
into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a
separate, objective way." 52 The genius remains committed
to firmly implanted judgements of which he has been long
convinced, rather than to the intensity and vividness of
immediate impressions and inspiration. He acts instinc-
tively, and senses the deeper truth. Only those able to
downplay the dazzling veneer of war's chaos, only those
few whose thinking retains a kind of impassioned insight,
can succeed in wartime leadership.
In military life one meets various character types:
solid, phlegmatic men who, though lacking initiative, are
seldom seriously wrong because of their great reserve;
those more sensitive in demeanor, who are easily moved
on less important issues but who lack the stolidness to
bear up under pressure when faced with the most signif-
icant tasks; the nervous, excitable ones who frantically
display a veritable flood of emotions and thoughts at
the merest occasion; finally, those moved only gradually,
not suddenly, and who conceal their strongest, deepest
passions
.
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Only in this last character type do we begin to ap-
proach the military genius. But the true genius, though
aroused only gradually, sustains in intensity a level of
courage and boldness that transcends his own self and
that radiates out to inspire the men around him. This
ability to rouse whole armies requires of the genius a
capacity for inspiration that emerges not from personal
greed for honor but from a degree of political enthusi-
asm that can mobilize the entire army.
Clausewitz discusses these qualities under the
rubric of courage. By this term he refers both to the
character of strength in the face of personal danger and
to accepting "responsibility, either before the tribunal
of some outside power or before the court of one's own
53
conscience." Yet Clausewitz discusses only the first
dimension of courage, not courage in its second, poli-
tical manifestation. For Clausewitz is concerned en-
tirely with the genius' ability to stand up to the rigors
of battle. He thus analyses the genius in terms of
character traits and sets aside as inappropriate a study
of the genius' accountability. Perhaps it was mistaken
for him even to have raised the possibility—by mention-
ing such a political dimension in conjunction with the
genius' courage. But it is characteristic of Clause-
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withz's realism that he does not study the military
genius in terms of his political responsibility. We
shall see later that the matter of political accounta-
bility is one discussed in terms of civilian advisors
exercising influence upon the genius, not in terms of
the military genius measuring up to civilian standards;
military brilliance calls for its own standards and
rules. The character demanded by the nature of war
eludes civilian standards.
It is not enough, however, to manifest courage.
The scale of the warfare which Clausewitz analyzed re-
quired that the military genius retain through the whole
course of battle a firm sense of place of where he and
his army are. Friction in warfare arises largely from
faulty intelligence, not the least of which develops
simply from not knowing the positions of your own men and
the lay of the land for which they battle. "Ortsinn," a
sense of locality, is "the faculty of quickly and accu-
rately grasping the topography of an area." 54 Remember
that Machiavelli suggests how princes on the march, or
even out for an afternoon's ride, should continually
study the land, should familiarize themselves with rivers
and hills and pose tactical problems of maneuvering among
55them. Clausewitz elevates this activity to a psycholog-
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ical concept indispensable to the military genius. The
better knowledge of terrain contributes greatly to a
strategic principle of central importance to
military theory: the inherent superiority of defensive
warfare, a superiority rooted in exploiting local know-
ledge of terrain and conditions.
Clausewitz's theory of war revolves around the mili-
tary genius. The great general's personal courage and
political sympathies are fused in an intellect of such
creativeness in battle that he is able to lead and in-
spire whole armies. In the cacophony of battle he never
gets unruffled; indeed, it is here alone that he becomes
gradually roused until he arrives at a level of impas-
sioned action in which his mind and his commitments are
fully engaged. Throughout the storm and terror of bat-
tle his "intellect retains an image of the inner light"
that illuminates both the details of his war plans and
the principles of sound warfare he must follow. 56 This
inner vision, this "coup d'oeil," guides the true mili-
tary genius in times when lesser characters would bow
before the enormous pressure of utmost exertion in war-
fare or panic for fear of their lives.
The military genius must master not only the arts of
war but moral forces as well. The strength of an army
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depends not simply on its numbers; it depends, too,
the depth of motivation infusing men in battle. CI
wtiz, as we have seen, understands real warfare in terms
of a clash of wills, each side intent upon disarming the
other. m Clausewitz's world, psychological concepts
Play a central role. The military genius must embody
particular qualities if he is to lead his armies in vic-
tory. Leadership and courage under fire, and the impas-
sioned allegiance to his country: without these no gener-
al can sustain his battle plans. And no army unrecep-
tive to these psychological forces can sustain its stra-
tegy, m no other collective endeavor do the emotions
and passions play so determinative a role. it is Clause-
witz's sensitivity to these issues that further distin-
guishes him from the chalkboard military theorists of
his day.
Virtue, military inspiration, must infuse the troops
if armies are to succeed. The demands of modern warfare,
the sustained marches—increasingly
, in winter months,
too—require of conscripted men a kind of toughening and
discipline that only the army can instill. Civilian
life, even in a country predominantly rural and agricul-
tural, ill-prepares men for the rigors and sustained
exertion required of armies on campaign. They must un-
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dergo the most exhausting training, aceustoming them-
selves to hardships and extreme pain, and thereby develop
an eagerness for the singular glories gained in war-
time. 57
Clausewitz wrote extensively on the creation of a
Prussian "Landessturm" and "Landeswehr , « the new con-
script army and its reserve system. But in On War he
turns from a discussion of training an army to an ac-
count of the moral forces it must both embody and con-
front. He thought that even the severest military
training would scantilly prepare men for what battle
demanded of them. Despite his obligatory concern for the
drawing up and training of soldiers, Clausewitz really
thought, as he shows in On War
, that on the battlefield
one confronts a world unique unto itself: a world dis-
tended and at remove--but not severed--from the claims
of diplomatic life, a world with a grammar all its own. 58
The only training that could prepare men for war was that
provided by war itself.
A spirit of military virtue comes from a series of
victorious wars and from "frequent exertion of the army
5 Qto the utmost limits of its strength." True military
spirit, physical power accustomed and steeled to priva-
tion, driven by love for the country that it defends,
finds expression in the single, powerful, overwhelming
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idea of the honor of national armies. Modern war pro-
vides occasion for the people to emerge from their petty
Private concerns and to unite-as had the French against
the First Coalition Armies-for one great cause. No
means other than war will shake the people from the las-
situde and pursiut of luxury "which debase the people in
times of growing prosperity and increasing trade." 60
Clausewitz's paean to the patriotic spirit of na-
tionalist warfare was a common response among early
nineteenth century German/Prussian intellectuals to the
threat posed by Bonaparte's forces across the Rhineland.
The new revolutionary spirit of the French peasantry fed
twenty years of warfare on the Continent. A people sud-
denly let loose from rural serfdom brought their revo-
lution to all the monarchies and duchies of Europe:
Spain, Italy, the Empire, even Russia. The explosive
political force behind these armies threatened to over-
whelm those countries which did not increase their
armies sufficiently to meet the French challenge. 61
Despite the inherent risks of arming newly freed serfs,
there was no other way to defend against the threat of
a French imperium but to expand the Continental armies.
And only if charged with an intense nationalist commit-
ment would these new troops prove loyal soldiers. 62 But
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Clausewitz 's discussion of motivation does not cease
with an account of this patriotism. He understood that
in the course of battle a whole range of emotions and
sentiments, which he called "moral forces," affected
troops and could even determine the outcome of engage-
ments between the largest of armies.
Clausewitz's appreciation of psychological factors
in warfare embraces, as we have seen, the military
genius, and it covers, too, the general patriotic senti-
ments which all citizens of warring nations should em-
brace. But Clausewitz also portrayed in a very sensitive
manner the sense of loss, the spread of moral decay, that
pervades an army defeated in a major battle. He appre-
ciated, too, how the outcome of battle could turn the
state of mind of those caught up in it, particularly of
the front-line troops. The psychology of soldiers
proved for Clausewitz as important as the personalities
of statesmen and generals and the quality of naitonal
will
.
In military engagements, a loss of morale can prove
to be a decisive turn of events. The decline in the
sense of comradeship and confidence will quickly lead to
defeat, for the real destruction of the enemy's forces
results less frequently from overwhelming advantages of
troops and firepower than from the ability to exploit
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weakened resistance and determination.
In war, perceptions are everything.
"The actual
facts only emerge much later-through histories." 64 m
the course of a battle, which usually, in Clausewitz's
era, lasted only one day, the moods of the participants
provied if not decisive surely central to the outcome.
Their ability to exert themselves and to sustain their
efforts over many hours would determine the outcome of
battle.
Consider a pitched battle between armies of similar
size. The attacker, having seized the initiative, will
have at first been courageous, even confident, of his
opening moves: the defender, by contrast, prudential in
demeanor, more prepared to fend off an advance than to
conquer new lands. Both sides, of course, have prepared
lines of retreat, just in case of trouble. 65 As the
battle develops, and if the defender proves resolute, the
attacking side will gradually become exhausted at the
realization that it can only maintain its position. The
inherent strengths of the defensive will tend to erode
the positive will of the attacker; the surety of communi-
cations lines, the amassing of local supplies, and the
better knowledge of terrain all play into the defender's
hands here, and they gradually give way in importance to
the different psychologies of each side to the point
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where the defender's prudence and commitment to resist
become the basis for a shift in the moods of the troops.66
in such a situation the defense becomes confirmed in its
will while the attacker suffers: not necessarily in terms
of casualties or guns lost, but essentially in terms of
will power. The morale of the troops, concludes Clause-
witz, cannot replace good arms and well-trained troops.
When the battle reaches a standoff, or when the at-
tacker's initiative is blunted, the morale of the troops
can make a crucial difference. Outcomes can thus result
having little basis in mere differences of materiel and
size of forces.
One of these outcomes, of course, is a rout: not an
orderly retreat of an army along pre-arranged lines, but
a panicky abandonment of entrenched positions or battle
lines. These tactical positions break down completely.
In such a rout the defeated army has virtually ceased to
be an army at all. As if the training and discipline
have been for nought, the lines of authority and the
soldiers' obedience give way to chaos. In its most
extreme form the loss of morale in battle can lead to
the disintegration of the army: soldiers fleeing for
their lives, supply trains abandoned, weapons tossed
aside, the general staff unable to impose order, and the
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febrile emotions of patriotic zeal suddenly transformed
into a frantic struggle for simple survival.
The obverse side of such disastrous defeats were the
victories so decisive and won against such odds that they
transformed an army's spirits and even entered the na-
tional consciousness. Occasionally, victories on the
battlefield become enshrined as turning points in the
hitherto bleak history of a state. Frederick the Great's
victory at Leuthen in the winter of 1757 helped turn the
tide of the Seven Years War. when its 36,000 man army
defeated the 70,000 man Austrian army, Prussia not only
forestalled defeat but was able to take the offense in
Silesia. The victory quickly entered the pantheon of
Prussian military history. Such victories acquire a
political significance that long outlives their strategic
consequences
.
Nowhere than in this moral-political sphere is
Clausewitz's dictum better illustrated, that "in war the
6 7result is never final." One cannot exactly distinguish
the point at which conventional military outcomes become
watersheds of history. "We don't have a concept suffi-
cient to distinguish such defeats and victories, but
6 Q
nevertheless we have such outcomes."
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Clausewitz
'
s
Politics
in an era when newly created national armies first
waged war across the Continent, an era in which military
geniuses led armies of half a million into wars of u„-
imagined intensity, a military theorist dared the apos-
tasy of defending civilian control of warfare's conduct.
Or so it seemed when Clausewitz, in the first third of
the nineteenth century, wrote that "war is only a branch
of political activity; that it is in no sense autono-
mous . 1,69
"In no sense autonomous." War, rather, was an act
of human intelligence, an act of human will and under-
standing: an act worthy of the highest intellectual
inquiry. To this end he devoted his enormous study,
On_War. Here he elevates war to an activity deserving
of the most scrupulous respect. Yet he reiterates at the
outset and conclusion of his theoretical work that above
all, war is something political. Clausewitz argues,
particularly in Book Eight, that warfare does not exist
of its own; nor does it consist solely of military en-
gagements. Even total war, he wrote, "the pure element
7 nof enmity unleashed," is ineluctably political.
It is time now, after these pages of Clausewitz'
s
thought, to ask and to analyze what precisely he meant by
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the politics, the political nature of „ <=LUi
'
t warfare. By the
end of onj^ar one has seen so many times, and in so many
different ways, his claim of a politics underlying or
guiding war. What does this claim mean?
There are, I think, four levels at which one must
confront Clausewitz's assertion about a politics of
warfare. And I propose here, in this concluding section,
to examine what he meant about such a politics: in terms,
first, of war as a human activity; second, as action in
tension between the demands of its own nature and those
of the state whose policy it serves; third, as an act of
national mobilization subject to the guiding hand of
statesmanship at whatever level of intensity; and fourth,
as a political activity with a vision of legitimate
public life.
1. War as a Human Activity
That warfare is a limited, human activity subject to
certain natural constraints was a theme underlying
Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and real war.
With the concept of "friction" he introduced a factor
that delimits the achievement of war plans in practice
and that denotes the inherent, unavoidable problem of
faulty intelligence in wartime. Friction, then, stands
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:are en-
as a reminder, a fruqtraf^ • ,r r s tmg reminder, that warf;
tails a whole range of obstacles ofi the most practical
sort—many of which r-^n k« • • •n ca be minimized, but not all of
which can be overcome. Friction
, Uke ^ principles Qf
suspension of action in wartime and the inherent superi-
ority of the defensive, enables Clausewitz to explain
how a pure concept of warfare gives way to real war as
something protracted, imperfect, extended over space,
and subject to shortcomings of human judgement. The
noumenon of war gives way to its phenomenal form.
Wars, then, whatever their extent, take place within
a particular human context, and this both delimits the
scope of war's action and locates it within a larger
political context. As a human activity war is neces-
sarily subject to the natural restraints of human exer-
tion and to the technological limits of an epoch. But in
a more significant sense, in terms of conducting warfare,
Clausewitz is intent upon placing warfare within the con-
text of ongoing relations among states.
The three counterfactual conditions by which abso-
lute war might be possible thus retain for Clausewitz a
central importance. The epigrammatic conciseness of
their refutations betrays a profound appreciation on
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Clausewitz's part that warfare does not unfold in the
abstract, that international violence, however destruc-
tive and persistent, is continually mediated by human
agency. Because "war is never an isolated act," 71 be-
cause "war does not consist of a single short blow," 72
and because "in war the result is never final," 73 the
conduct of warfare entails locating public violence within
a whole range of human relationships. The first dimension
of a politics of warfare, then, is that by its nature as
an activity of organized human communities, warfare is a
public matter for which political institutions are re-
sponsible and by which, in turn, those institutions are
transformed
.
2. Limited and Total War
At the second level, the politics of warfare may be
located at the point at which states call upon violence
against other states or against organized groups. War is
a series of battlefield exertions that might achieve some
purpose or fulfill a policy. The means and ends of war-
fare, then, are central elements of its conduct. "No one
starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do
so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends
to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct
.74it. Succinctly stated, the political value of a war's
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objectives determines the expenditure in terms of men and
materiel and the magnitude and duration of their expendi-
ture. But the apparently utilitarian calculations neces-
sary to make such ends-means determinations is nowhere
more complicated than in warfare.
The conduct of war involves three fields of endeavor
simultaneously. The armed forces of the adversary must
be destroyed, the country occupied, and the enemy's will
broken. These are the basic elements of total war: anni-
hilating the enemy completely. These would seem to be
the essential elements of warfare were it to achieve its
absolute form. But the first lesson of a politics of war
is that such a "Niederwerfungsstrategie " unfolds in a
whole complex of relationships that delimit exertion.
Though the abstract element of war remains the same—
"all wars are things of the same nature" 75
—the forms
wars take vary markedly. They vary not only because of
inherent human and technological constraints; they vary,
are modified and confined, by the nature of any two
belligerents. "The scale of force that may be used
against the enemy depends upon the scale of political de-
7 6mands on either side." So a politics emerges at the
level at which states must choose to wage war with one
another. And this politics most clearly expresses itself
in the manner by which a war is worth the ends it seeks:
the rational calculation within the midst of war of how
Political objectives merit a particular level of exer-
tion, m the course of war, too, a politics emerges
here in terms of how to keep the war within acceptable
confines without overcommitting resources that risk more
than what politically is at stake. How in the face of
battle does one impose limits on the scope of warfare?
Is there a tension between the tendency of war itself to
full exertion and the political claims of keeping it
within boundaries appropriate to its object?
A substantial part of On War
, most explicitly Book
One, deals with the tendency of modern warfare to
achieve a level of utmost exertion. The conceptual
category of absolute warfare, as we have seen, has served
to codify in philosophical form the gradual emergence of
increasingly powerful and extensive armies. The apo-
theosis of this development was, of course, Bonaparte's
Grande Armee. The lessons of such national warfare could
not be ignored by any of the Continental powers. The
formerly absolutist states had now to prepare themselves
for war on such a scale. There was no reason to believe
that such total warfare, once introduced, would not reoc-
cur in Europe. The possibility thus existed, according
to Clausewitz, that warfare, once it broke out, could
always escalate to the extreme levels of mutual exertion
:e war.
whose pUrest philosophical expression was absolut.
But nations do not wage absolute war; they rage real
war. ^ it is here, at the level of deciding to wage a
particular kind of real war, that Clausewitz's politics
emerges to establish criteria by which war may be ration-
ally conducted.
The rational relationship in war between violent
means and political ends forms the basis of Clausewitz's
entire political theory. He is not the least concerned
in his study On War why nations go to war, what the
causes of international conflict are, or whether such
means are rational in the sense of good or just. That
wars have always occurred constitutes reason enough to
take them at face value as undertakings characteristic of
international relations.
The formulaic incantation, however, that "war is
simply the continuation of political intercourse, with
the addition of other means," 77 obscures in the Clause-
witzian framework precisely how restricted--or "thin"— is
his theory of politics. Despite locating warfare on a
political continuum, Clausewitz confines his account of
a politics of warfare to instrumental conditions of how
must effectively, most economically, to achieve whatever
war aims are set by the government. So his theory is
not an account of what one may legitimately pursue by
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means of war, but rather how to adapt a level of warfare
to achieve what the cabinet sets for itself as an appro-
priate goal of state policy.
The restrictive concept of politics around which
Clausewitz 's whole theory revolves can be seen in terms of
the distinction he elaborates between two kinds of real
war: total and limited. it is here that Clausewitz seeks
by means of an intelligent guiding hand to fend off the
tendency of war itself to seek an even more extreme
character. Here he sets out to distinguish two very dif-
ferent kinds of warfare and to suggest how statesmen
might retain sight of the appropriate means toward their
political ends.
Clausewitz distinguishes two kinds of war: a total
attack aimed at annihilation of the enemy's forces, and a
limited campaign designed to secure occupied territory,
ward off advancing armies, or force through military
stalemate a diplomatically negotiated peace.
The complete military disarming of the enemy seeks
unconditional peace through sheer exhaustion and destruc-
tion of his forces. Clausewitz sketches in the conclud-
ing chapter of On War an example of such a campaign. He
outlines how only an allied attack launched upon France
could defeat her armies, suppress the temptation—to
which since 164 8 France had succumbed—to prevail over
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European politics, and restore the balance-of-power
. The
combined armies of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Prus-
sia, the German states, and Austria could launch two
separate assaults, one from the Lowlands, the other from
the upper Rhine to the upper Seine. Some 300,000 would
advance onto Paris from the northeast, another 300,000
would march from the east. The object of such coordi-
nated attacks, supported by secondary operations from
England along the Channel coast and by the Italian-based
Austrian Army in the sourth, would not be to besiege
towns, occupy garrisons, and invest positions, but rather
to converge upon Paris and occupy the capital. Clause-
witz does not specify the terms of an ensuing peace, but
he makes clear that the punitive political character of
such an allied attack requires an unrelenting advance
aiming for the heart of France.
We are quite convinced that in this manner
France can be brought to her knees and taught
a lesson any time she chooses to resume that
insolent behavior with which she has burdened
Europe for a hundred and fifty years. Only
on the far side of Paris, only on the Loire,
can she be made to accept the conditions
which the peace of Europe calls for. Nothing
else will demonstration the natural relation-
ship between thirty millions and seventy-five.
The extraordinary political aims of this allied at-
tempt to overrun France and to undermine its role in the
Rhineland and Lowlands dictate an unrelenting military
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strategy. In a total war ^ ^ ^ ^
entirely upon the battlefield. But the scope of such a
campaign obliterates entirely the absolutist era's dis-
tinction between native territory and the field of bat-
tle. The campaign reaches into areas central to the
political and economic life of the country. Here, then,
the political aim-complete annihilation, occupation of
the enmy's land-dictates the extreme exertion. At this
point the guiding hand of politics appears to give way
completely to the demands of military necessity.
The more powerful and inspiring the motivesfor war, the more they affect the belligerent
nations and the fiercer the tensions that
precede the outbreak, the closer will war ap-proach its absolute concept, the more im-
portant will be the destruction of the enemy,
the more closely will the military aims and
the political objects of war coincide, and
the more military and the less political
will war appear to be. 79
The virtual eclipse of politics in the conduct of
total warfare emerges almost unintentionally in Clause-
witz's work in his discussion of Bonaparte's Russian
campaign of 1812, a discussion that concludes On War.
Unlike his historical study of the Russian campaign,
Clausewitz's analysis in Book Eight of On War reveals in
startlingly clear terms how the attempted policy of
forcing Czar Alexander to yield to the French simply
required a scale of unrelenting warfare of which Bona-
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Parte himself-or any general-was simply incapable.
Clausewitz here does not question the propriety of such a
Policy; he rather explains that Bonaparte was quite
right, having adopted such a policy, to advance beyond the
Niemen River. Apart from relatively^ criticismS/
that the campaign was begun too late in the year, that the
French neglected questions of supply while advancing on
the main road through Vitebsk and Smolensk, and that the
Grande Armee stayed too long in Moscow, 80 Clausewitz sug-
gests that given the decision to strike at the Russian
core, the French campaign was an essentially sound as-
sault and that those who criticize Bonaparte for not
having first secured his position in Lithuania misunder-
stood the boldness of his plans. It may well have been
an impossible task, but given the goals of grinding down
the Russian Army and occupying Moscow, the French cam-
paign, the very paradigm of a total assault, was in truth
exceptionally well executed—even if bound to fail:
His campaign failed, not because he advanced
too quickly and too far as is usually believed,
but because the only way to achieve success
failed. Russia is not a country that can be
formally conquered—that is to say occupied
—
certainly not with the present strength of the
European States and even with the half-a-mil-
lion men Bonaparte mobilized for the purpose.
Only internal weakness, only the workings of
disunity can bring a country of that kind to
ruin. To strike at these weaknesses in its
political life it is necessary to thrust into
276
shake th^ ^e^„^e^Sr^pe *? .
aim he could «t M»s"f?81
°"ly ratlonal wa
reach
s
hoped
r
We maintain that tho ion
because the Russian ™ campaign failed
misc^ulat^nT8 cert2i2ly showslhafhe
aim at tha^ oA-
U
^-
WS argUS that if h* was to
ea n L JftlV6 ' thGre Was ' broadlysp ki g, no other way of gaining it. 82 Y
The Russian campaign of 1812 reveals for Clausewitz
the ultimate in wartime exertion and the manner by which
total war calls for a politics defined solely in terms of
military conquest. But if we find here warfare at the
limits of its nature, we realize, too, that in less ex-
treme military operations political concerns play a more
decisive guiding role.
A subject which we last considered.
. .now for-
ces itself on us again, namely the political
object of war. Hitherto it had been rather
overshadowed by the law of extremes, the willto overcome the enemy and make him powerless.But as this law begins to lose its force and*
as this determination wanes, the political aim
will reassert itself. 83
If total war entails maximal concentration of forces
at the greatest possible speed, limited warfare defines
a campaign whereby strategy aims not at defeat of the
enemy's forces but at the political conditions of the
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adversary which pnAhiQ -i-v,~y men e able the war to persist. The whole
basis of limited war is to confront an adversary with a
protracted defense or a very cautiously advancing army.
The overriding strategic aim of limited warfare is not to
confront directly and disarm the enemy's forces but to
modify, indeed suspend, military action so as to reduce
the likelihood of an adversary's military success, to
require he commit too great an expenditure of forces "in
proportion to his aims and situation:" 84 to hold or seize
small tracts of land, the occupation of which would in-
duce an adversary to negotiate, to wait in position until
matters took a better turn— for instance, the arrival of
reserves. The aims of such limited campaigns involve af-
fecting the domestic politics of an adversary state, its
public opinion, and the views of allies. War itself be-
comes subject by political design to restraints, suspen-
sions, and modifications of the extreme.
In limited war the emphasis shifts from decisive
engagements to peripheral harassment of supplies, convoys,
8 5communications, and morale. The principles of total
rfare, to act in as expeditious and concentrated a
nner as possible while securing positions already taken,
give way to a concept of deliberate military modification.
The front is slowed down, spread out, positions are care-
fully invested, supply lines and billets thoroughly pre-
wa
ma
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pared, and forces withheld =o ae 4-^ , .x nn ia s as to ensure their survival.
Clausewitz's chapter on "Maintenance and Supply"
(Book five) provides a vivid example of the theoretical
difference between real and total war. Regarding
"questions of supply.
. .as well as the choice of a theater
of war and the lines of communication , " Clausewitz writes:
How far their influence will extend, and howmuch wieght should in the final analysis be
attached to the ease or difficulty of supply—those are questions that will naturally depend
on how the war is to be conducted. if war isto be waged in accordance with its essential
spirit--with the unbridled violence that lies
at its core, the craving and need for battle
and decision—then feeding the troops, thoughimportant, is a secondary matter. On the otherhand, where a state of equilibrium has set in,in which troops move back and forth for years
in the same province, subsistence is likely tobecome the principal concern. In that case,
the quarter-master-general becomes the supreme
commander, and the conduct of war consists of
organizing wagon trains. 86
We could be no farther away from the concept of ab-
solute warfare than in this case of real, limited war.
Clausewitz admits, in fact, that such limited endeavors
reside so far away on the continuum of real war from
total warfare that the former is barely illumined by the
guiding light of the abstract concept. "The more these
factors [of restraint, deliberation, and suspension of
action] turn war into something half-hearted, the less
solid are the bases that are available to theory: essen-
8 7tials become rarer and accidents multiply. " In con-
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trast to the concentrated intensity of a campaign to anni-
hilate the enemy, a limited war seeks to grind down or
exhaust a belligerent's will to fight-to make it clear
that a conventional military victory would require an
expenditure of resources for which the war cabinet is
not prepared. Limited war, "lacking an overt positive
element of attack," 88 seeks through attrition to frustrate
the enemy and thereby to induce him to negotiate a set-
tlement rather than to seek conquest in the field.
A limited war, however, is not so characterized by
moderation and deliberate suspensions of action that it
loses entirely its nature as a war. for all wars are of
the same essence, and no military activity involving
violent confrontations of opposing armed forces can be
said entirely to have departed from the continuum of war.
Even the deliberate retreat of the Russian Army, its
organized march to the rear under Kutusov in 1812, was,
properly speaking, a war, although a classic defensive
strategy. The strategy was precisely to yield ground, to
enable, if not to enduce, further French penetration, and
to force the Grande Armee beyond its culmination point.
At that point, as in any limited, defensive war, the
negative object of the strategic retreat transforms it-
self into a counter-offensive. The extraordinary losses
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endured by the French ^ ^ •n m their march on Moscow may well
have been the price to n«xr *P pay for apparent territorial
achieve Bonaparte's aim of defeating the army and forci
Alexander to caDitniafo Tp ul te. m Moscow the campaign reached
its culminating point. The French forces, unable to
achieve their real policy, were now forced into a head-
ing retrait with the Russian Army at their heels. Thus
the limited, defensive strategy of Russia went over from
the negative goal of allowing the French into a state of
attrition to the positive goal of pursuing them and de-
stroying them on the road across the Beresina River to
Kovno
.
A policy of limited war, then, as distinguished from
a total campaign, controls the level of violence and
seeks to wait until favorable circumstances enable it to
take the offensive. Policy guides and constrains mili-
tary exertion, deploying forces only at a level con-
sistent with the aims of the central government. in
total war this political intelligence recedes into the
background. In limited war it emerges to the fore.
3. The Politics of Mobilization
That specific political criteria guide the choice
between limited and total war aims is a central feature
281
Of ClausewitZ ' =; wn-rlr 04- -, , .s o k. Statesmanship, not the general
staff, exerts the guiding hand in warfare.
Subordinating the political point of view tothe military would be absurd" for it Is poUcvthat creates war. Policy is the guiding
P
?r*el-
r
6
To oT °nlY ^ inst™t, no? Totversa N ther possibility exists, then,
S'StapSSSSS?*! the milita^^
But Clausewitz's intent throughout his work to es-
tablish the primacy of politics in warfare veils on his
part a deeper commitment to a peculiar conception of
what that politics involves. It turns out, as we shall
now see, that for Clausewitz a politics or policy of
warfare revolves entirely around the actions of a very
few statesmen, and that insofar as he considers domestic
politics in civil society at all, he construes it merely
in terms of its service to the political-military ef-
fort. Clausewitz's heralded politics, in other words,
is one confined to the primacy of foreign policy, to
the dictates of "Staatsrason .
"
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the
realist statesman's concern for the conduct of diplomacy
overrides questions of domestic political legitimacy or
virtue. The system-legitimacy of which Kissinger wrote
9 0in terms of an ordered international system reflects
in the parlance of modern democratic theory what are at
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root concepts embedded in the diplomacy of absolutist
Europe
.
The first secular theorist who sought a procedural
political response to the collapse of the Christian
Commonwealth, as we have seen, was Machiavelli. He
sought to balance concerns of securing the polity with
the need to cultivate civic virtue. The primacy of
foreign policy, however, abandons the Stoic psychology of
the virtuous roman citizen that underpinned Machiavelli
•
s
peculiar formulations. Moreover, it abandoned the ele-
ments of Aristotelian political theory that had so clearly
influenced Machiavelli
' s conception of the good citizen.
Where Machiavelli sought a tension between domestic
life and the demands of statesmanship, the emergence of
coherent territorial states throughout the Continent
impressed upon absolutist rulers the need to suppress
competing claims for control of the polity so as to expe-
dite their ability to wage and threaten warfare. The
outcome was a system of mutually encircled, "eingekreist, "
states, each of which, with the notable exception of
insular Britain, found itself virtually in a permanent
state of warfare and which therefore required the service
of a standing professional army. The mercenary system
was reduced from its reliance on commercial contractors,
condottieri, to a secondary role of supplementing the
283
already well-disciplined^ Qf^^
Adolphys, France under Louis XIV, and Prussia under
Frederick William, The Great Elector.
The primacy of foreign policy that developed in
seventeenth century Europe cannot be divorced from the
social structure of the absolutist states, for these, as
we have seen, were the product of an alliance between a
small bureaucratic royal administration and the landed
estates. This alliance, in cutting out the towns and
fledgling merchant and middle-classes from political
power, led to a narrow view of public life, defining it
entirely in terms of securing the state, whether through
mercantile activity or the professional army. France,
Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg states, the corner-
stones of the European balance-of-power system, were
each characterized by such a polity. 91
Clausewitz's politics reflects this absolutist tra-
dition, and it reflects, too, an attempt in the wake of
the French Revolution to accommodate national politics
within this traditional framework. The political changes
during the Prussian Reform Era were a kind of revolution
from above designed to liberalize public life and to
allow for the degree of economic and military strength
that had expressed itself so successfully in France. But
the Reform Era failed at precisely that point at which
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citizens, the towns, and the liberal students
("Burschenschaften") after 1815 began demanding signifi-
cant constitutional changes that would go beyond merely
strengthening militarily the various German states under
Prussian and Austrian rule: that would enable them, so to
speak, to seize public power. At this point, the re-
formers gave way to the Metternichian reaction. The
Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 reversed the limited public
sharing of power that had been conceded by Frederick
William III-without, however, reversing the means relied
upon by the Honenzollern Monarchy to strengthen its eco-
nomic and military powers.
In the wake of the Treaties of Paris, 1814-15, the
Prussian was now immeasurably enhanced by its acquisition
of ore-laden Rhenish lands—the secession of these
Rhinelands being a Metternichian brainchild to punish
France and create a protective belt against renewed
Bourbon expansionism. These lands provided a mineral base
for the subsequent flourishing of iron and coal indus-
tries. A middle class of merchants and the educated be-
gan to form on a self-conscious basis as the Prussian
political economy moved from the last vestiges of feudal-
ism to the first stages of capitalism and industrializa-
tion. The Prussian King had legally abolished serfdom in
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1811, and the ensuing migration of unskilled peasants
into the oities provided nascent manufacturing with new,
relatively cheap sources of labor, with feudal ties to
the land now severed, mass armies could be recruited from
people who otherwise would have been beholden to their
Junker lords. The Prussian Army was now expanded to
embrace a considerable share of the male population.
Contract law and legal codes began to replace the patch-
work of natural law traditions that had marked the old
German states. Standardized currency, stamps, and tolls
(through the "Zollverein") were introduced to expedite
trade throughout the whole German Confederation.
By mid-century, the Prussian Army became the back-
bone of the German Confederation. Neither the Austrian
state nor its army could hold in check the centrifugal
political pressures of its polyglot empire. The Prus-
sian Army suffered from no such pressures. It was an
army which claimed an extraordinary share of public
expenditures and that, combined with Germany's economic
and industrial boom, served exceptionally well in the
three wars of German unification of 1864-71 against
Denmark, Austria, and France. The army in its abso-
lutist guise had enabled the Prussia of Frederick the
Great to seize Silesia, Pomerania, and Eastern Prussia.
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More than a century later, that army, having again
panded to meet the Bonapartist challenge, became the
means by which Germany achieved unification in the fo:
of the second Reich under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I.
No European state better exhibited the political uses of
warfare. And in no other continental country was the
relationship between political reform and military power
so clear.
Clausewitz, whose political activism confined it-
self to military reform, expansion of the Prussian Army,
and to arguing in 1812 against the alliance with France,
was neither at the forefront of the Reform Era nor, like
Hardenberg, Alexander von Humboldt, and Hermann von
Boyen, one of its victims after the Metternichian reac-
tion. But his military writings nonetheless contain a
significant political element rooted in the Prussia of
his time. His theoretical studies on the policy nature
of war betray this contemporary dimension. The politics
of which war was a continuation is defined by Clausewitz
entirely in terms articulated by a statesman and his
closest advisors. Moreover, the statesman himself should
be both political leader and military genius.
When military strategy is decided in the capital,
far from the field, operations become stultified and in-
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flexible. The overcoming of friction, the securing of
reliable information, questions of when to pass over
from a defensive to an offensive stance, or confronting
the culminating point of battle all require a close
working relationship between cabinet government and the
army. Indeed, the affinity should not merely be poli-
tical. It should be physical and territorial as well.
It used to be the custom to settle strategy
in the capital, not in the field—a practice
that is acceptable only if the government
stays so close to the army as to function as
general headquarters. 92
But as Clausewitz's account of the military genius
makes clear, it is best for strategy if the roles of
general and statesman are fused in the hands of one man
We argue that a commander-in-chief must also
be a statesman, but he must not cease to be
a general. On the one hand, he is aware of
the entire political situation; on the other,
he knows exactly how much he can achieve with
the means at his disposal. 9 -^
If war is to be fully consonat with poli-
tical objectives, and policy suited to the
means available for war, then unless states-
man and soldier are combined in one person,
the only sound expedient is to make the com-
mander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so
that the cabinet can share in the major as-
pects of his activities. But that, in turn,
is only feasible if the cabinet—that is,
the government— is near the theater of oper-
ations, so that decisions can be taken with-
out serious loss of time.94
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4. A Vi sion of Political Life
The imperative of fusing political and military
leadership for the rational, goal-oriented conduct of
warfare brings up the final dimension of Clausewitz's
politics: its vision of legitimate public life. Start-
ing from the view that warfare is a legitimate tool of
state policy, Clausewitz's realism elevates warfare into
the central activity of a polity. Hobbes and Rousseau,
by contrast, were two political theorists who even while
viewing the international system as a state or condition
of war did not locate the rational conduct of warfare at
the center of public political life. 95
Perhaps it is unfair to hold Clausewitz to the
standards and concerns of other, more explicitly politi-
cal theorists. But the whole point of this work has been
to explore the domestic side of realist theories of in-
ternational relations, particularly in the early modern
era of the European balance-of
-power system. The pecu-
liarly authoritarian fate of such theories, especially
of the doctrine of total war first articulated by Clause-
.
. 96
witz, suggests as an appropriate concern a critique of
ertain tendencies apparent in the theory's early ver-
ion. It is not a question of somehow blaming Clause-
itz for either the Schlieffen Plan or the Second World
c
s
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War. However, theories and strategies, even in mili-
tary matters acquire significance insofar as they es-
tablish a kind of intellectual framework by which sub-
sequent generations form their views and develop poli-
cies, m the history of military thought Clausewitz
'
s
work has been peculiarly influential.
Clausewitz 's work has so tightly circumscribed
politics as to render his vision of rational policy a
matter delimited to a few statesmen who do double service
as military leaders. The theory he develops construes
politics in terms of the mission of the army, but not in
terms of the relationships of men either within the army
or within the state they serve. With the theory of total
war we have reduced relationships among citizens to a
managerial problem for the general staff. civic virtue
becomes entirely absorbed by the technocratic politics
of waging warfare.
Postscript: The Era of Total Warfare
Clausewitz had been greatly impressed by Bonaparte's
ability to mobilize and command an army, and he dis-
cerned in the French general's maneuvers the limits
achievable in real warfare. In 1816 he observed that
since the rise of Bonaparte, "the most daring of gam-
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biers... all campaigns have gained such a cometlike swift-
ness that a higher degree of military intensity is
scarecely imaginable." 98
These comments were written before industrialization
began to take hold on the Continent. Armies then con-
sisted of mobile cavalry, infantry with muskets, and
horse-drawn field cannon that could shoot 100 pound balls
up to half a mile accurately.
Clausewitz's confessed inability to foresee great
changes in the technology and scope of battle may strike
us today as stunning naivete, the more so because Clause-
witz was himself a skilled military historian. But we
can now see that the armies of Napoleonic Europe stood
far closer to those of the Renaissance some three hundred
years earlier than to those that fought the First World
War a century after Clausewitz
.
In the era of mechanized warfare, an era ushered in
by the rapid advance of technology accompanying the indus-
trialization of Europe, the face of battle underwent a
revolutionary transformation." Warfare went from the
clash of men in battle to a struggle between machines and
technologies of destruction. 100 Behind this new iron veil
of firepower stood nations not capable of a decisive
victory in the field but intent instead upon mere sur-
vival through attrition.
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When war broke out in early August 1914, the young
men of Berlin and Paris marched off eagerly to the rail-
road stations expecting to return by Christmas. Visions
of yet another charge of the Light Brigade, the cavalry
that had inspired Britain's efforts in the Crimean War
of 1855-56, filled the air of Europe. Men and women
celebrated the outbreak of war that August with an enthu-
siasm normally reserved for sports rallies. The decisive
breakthrough achieved so stunningly by Germany in the
Franco-Prussian War: surely this could be managed once
again. The Schlieffen Plan, the bold German strategy of
sweeping through Belgium in an enormous move to encircle
Paris, was born out of this vision of another Sedan. If
the last man on the German right flank brushed his sleeve
against the English Channel, victory would be Germany's
in a matter of weeks. The last words uttered by
Schlieffen on his deathbed were reported to have been
"make the right wing strong." 101
Two years later the land of Verdun gave way to rot-
ting bodies. In the forests and mud of a valley eight
miles long and half that distance across, 700,000 men of
France and Germany lost their limbs and lives. Further
north, in Flanders Field, flamethrowers enfiladed rat-
infested trenches in which the men of three countries
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spent their short lives. Phosgene gas filled the air.
Land
.nines laid waste the once-arable soil, and flares
lit up the night time sky. Machine guns rendered cavalry
simply obsolete, and long-range artillery heaved half
-ton
chunks of metal across twenty miles of no-man's land.
Front-line soldiers fought not to win but merely to sur-
vive. Home fronts, now fully mobilized, worked overtime
as national economies were transformed in a year's time
into full-scale economies of death. In mind-nineteenth
century the citizenry of Paris and Vienna would occasion-
ally venture out for a picnic astride the battlefields.
Now they burned their furniture for heat and spend win-
ters eating turnips because their armies had requisi-
tioned all the potatoes.
The wars of annihilation brought by Napoleon to
Europe had become wars of attrition. The early phase of
Britain's Industrial Revolution that had brought forth
looms, "satanic mills," and railways was now surpassed
by the products of the second Industrial Revolution in
Germany in the last third of the nineteenth century.
Lightweight steel replaced iron. Bursting cordite
shells replaced the solid iron balls of an earlier day.
Accurate rifles with spiral grooves in the bored-out
barrels rendered archaic the muskets of revolutionary
France. Water-cooled machine guns enabled one man to
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stand guard over acres of bleak gray land. Telegraph
lines were laid so that generals could direct the course
of battle from reinforced bunkers behind the fronts.
Railways delivered fresh recruits with a speed unimagin-
able in Clausewitz's day. And submarines were used to
blockade whole countries from receiving shipments across
the North Atlantic and the North Sea. War, once conduc-
ted by military geniuses on a battlefield of limited
scope, had come to embrace whole continents and to in-
volve citizens at the home-front in the era of total
warfare
.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION:
THE UNSTABLE BALANCE OF TERROR
The relationships which Machiavelli saw between
good laws and good armies, between love of country and a
willingness to defend one's liberties in battle, are re-
curring themes in the political theory of realism. In an
international system of numerous sovereign states com-
peting for wealth and land, no country can be assured of
its security when its citizens are unwilling to do battle
in ints name.
"Si vis pacem, para bellum: If you want peace, pre-
pare for war. Nations that voluntarily disarm, that do
not provide for well-trained armies and the latest array
of military technology, only invite disaster at the hands
of hostile foreign powers which will seize any advantages
presented them.
The psychological bonds of patriotism, and the poli-
tical relationships of civic virtue, are repeatedly con-
strued by Machiavelli in terms of a citizen-army. The
willingness to fight for one's state, in fact, is con-
strued in his account of statesmanship as an obligation
entailed by citizenship. For Machiavelli this charac-
terizes a virtuous state: one not dependent upon mer-
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cenaries recruited by condottieri
, but upon an infantry
force of local volunteers and conscripts. The symbol of
Machiavelli
^ respect for infantry was the disdain he
expressed for cannons. Machiavelli
' s almost Luddite
stance regarding cannon, his preference instead for
Roman column formations and the tactics of Swiss pikemen,
embodies in stark terms his concern for building into
his military strategy a place for the patriotism and
political zeal which he thought should underpin the
virtuous polity.
In the three hundred years separating Machiavelli
'
s
armed civic virtue from Clausewitz's articulation of
total national warfare, the terrain of political rela-
tionships expanded—and with it, the scope of warfare.
The nascent urban republicanism of Renaissance Italy
gave way to the obligatory military service of conscript
armies within a continent-wide balance-of
-power political
system. Within this new state system that characterized
Europe after the era of religious wars, from the Thirty
Years War to the French Revolution, citizenship and al-
legiance to the state differed dramatically from Machi-
avelli 's understanding of them.
In this new state system a more ordered hierarchy of
public power developed. The dynamism of copeting urban
factions gave way to a centralized mercantile economy and
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trolled monopolies, the primary concern Qf which ^
expansion of state fiscal and military strength
. The
balance-of-trade and the balance-of-power occupied the
courts of Europe. The glory of military leadgrship ^
the muster of feudal chivalry increasingly became the
domain of war cabinets and professionally trained career
staffmen. The commercial mercenary system of Italian
Renaissance warfare gave way to standing armies with
their coterie of technologists, metallurgists, and manu-
facturers entirely occupied in the development of mass
firepower, military engineering, artillery, and naval
science. These bureaucratic military institutions only
drew upon mercenaries to supplement the manpower re-
quirements of warfare in the service of the balance-of-
power
.
The economic constraints of mercantilism expressed
themselves in elaborate battlefield tactics designed to
avoid costly expenditures of men, provisions, and arma-
ments. But eventually this, too, gave way to the inten-
sification of firepower afforded by technical improvements
and by the ability of some states, preeminently Prussia,
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to train and discipline their ^ ^
This gradual expansion in the scope and intensity of
found its apotheosis in the French Revolutionary Army
The rules of absolutist warfare, assiduously followed by
the Continental powers throughout the shift fro, dynastic
to national politics, demanded that citizenship be con-
strued in terms of supplying the manpower necessary for
political competition. The open public space of Machi-
avelli's city-state became narrowed, structured, and
firmly institutionalized within the stultifying ministries
and bureaucracies of the modern nation-state. The flux
and challenge of overcoming "fortuna" became the me-
chanics of managing "friction."
After the Treaty of Westphalia had consolidated the
modern state system, the great European states all devel-
oped standing armies: armies that did not disband in
peacetime; armies invariably led by professionals from
the noble, land-owning families. Those states unable to
raise such armies, Poland, for instance, or the small
Rhenish principalities, literally disappeared from the
map, absorbed by neighboring land powers. The sole ex-
ception to the forging of standing national armies was
the most geographically isolated and secure country:
England. Yet even she replicated within her naval force
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the social structure of European absolutist militarism.
As we have seen in the chapter on Frederick the
Great, the political-geography of Prussia dictated that
its army play the greatest fQrmative role . n Qf
internal state-building and territorial consolidation,
indeed, the history of the Prussian Army clearly exempli-
fies the military dimension of political reform.
Throughout the absolutist era and the Reform Era, and the
later chancellorship of Bismarck, political liberaliza-
tion and the transformation from feudalism to capitalism
were recurrently the product of initiatives undertaken by
the state in the name of creating an army more competitive
with those of Prussia's allies. The result was a poli-
tical revolution managed from above: military liberalism.
Machiavelli's initiatives for political reform had also
been guided by this concern: to create a more effective
and larger, more broadly based army. This later con-
stituted the underlying rationale of political reform in
Prussia and Germany. The political character of poli-
tical-military strategy thus expressed itself in a
liberal guise, but its deeper structure pertained to
consolidating national military strength.
Several themes have emerged in this dissertation.
My interest has been to show how the preparation for war
has been a central activity of the modern state. The
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gathering together of human and material resources for
the purpose of waging war has played a decisive role in
the political and economic development of public life in
Western polities. Such activities have found intellec-
tual justification in terms of a balance-of-power
: in
terms of the need to preserve the peace by preparing
for war.
"Si vis pacem, para bellum" has provided a kind of
telegraphic summary of a whole range of efforts coordi-
nated by the state in the interest of protecting public
life: of assuring national security, of furthering na-
tional interests. But as I hope to have shown here in
the development of the state in early modern Europe,
the politics of warfare in the name of responsible states-
manship has created an environment of armed civic virtue
on a national scale in which both citizenship and the
national economy are placed in a permanent state of
readiness to do battle.
Countries like Britain and the United States, coun-
tries without traditional militarism embodied in standing
land armies, had until the advent of nuclear weapons been
spared somewhat this classical realism. Strategies of
deterrence, however, have changed this.
The organization of peacelessness that characterizes
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Public life in the nuclear age has its origins in the
reali sm of the early modern state. It is a peaceless-
ness that renders unstable the very same balance-of-
power in whose name deterrence has been invoked.
Every new weapon and every new propellant in mili-
tary history has been heralded as the advent of a revo-
lutionary era. Strategies devised to integrate them
within armies, navies, and air forces are looked upon as
ushering in a new age of warfare. Yet in retrospect we
see that each new level of violence has only contributed
marginally to warfare. The breakthroughs of today fade
in their significance. What looks like a military revo-
lution becomes, upon consideration of the changes that
followed, just another step in the escalation of warfare.
In two respects, however, we can concede that nuclear
weapons and intercontinental missiles really do constitute
such a revolution. For the first time in history we have
the capability to annihilate all life. And if it turns
out that nuclear strategies of deterrence and the search
for a stable balance of terror become but means for war-
fighting, there may remain no one on earth to testify
that, in retrospect, these weapons were deployed in a man-
ner not all that different from their predecessors.
That war would be something different. The war that
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quite conceivably could rage with these weapons would
approach if not embody that war in its pure form which
Clausewitz rightly dismissed as meaningless: as apoli-
tical and outside the realm and comprehension of human
life.
Despite the widespread claims, however, of a nuclear
revolution as embodied in pure mutual nuclear deterrence,
the statesmen and military geniuses of the post-World War
Two era have assimilated their weaponry and targeting
doctrine in terms that very much recall conventional
military strategy. Despire the obsolescence of Clause-
witz' s principle that defense is the stronger position in
warfare, arm-chair strategists in their video-arcade
scenarios now contemplate ballistic missile defenses
against incoming nuclear missiles. Earlier restraints
upon "first use" of nuclear weaponry have given way in
terms of N.A.T.O. "first-use" strategies. Arguments on
behalf of a purely retaliatory capability have fallen by
the wayside as the nuclear superpowers never really sub-
jected themselves to the political-military constraints
called for by a classic strategy of nuclear deterrence.
They have increasingly moved to a strategy of active war-
fighting and counterforce targeting; conventional mili-
tary concerns for destroying enemy forces in the midst
of protracted warfare have been resurrected in the nuclear
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age
.
The nuclear revolution is over. The revolutionary
strategy of pure mutual nuclear deterrence has given way
to the continuation of realism, with the addition of
nuclear means. An inherently unstable balance-of
-power
has been transposed into nuclear terms. But a political-
military strategy derived in an era of limited and re-
strained warfare can scarcely serve as the basis for
world politics in an era today of absolute warfare.
The weaponry now available to statesmen renders
archaic the tradtitional wartime distinction between
warriors and civilian non-combatants. And the classical
distinction between wartime and peacetime has been made
obsolete in the era of nuclear deterrence. The political
character of political-military strategy has now been
eviscerated: replaced by techno-warfare . An inherently
unstable balance-of
-power
,
transposed into nuclear terms,
has converted the language of "virtu" into a language of
mere military capability. The citizenship once ennobled
by the efforts of its state to preserve and defend its
institutions and customs has disappeared from the annals
of strategy. The armed civic virtue of the Machiavellian
city-state has been depoliticized and confined to the
existential bunkers of a terrorized nuclear republic.
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